NIGHT BONGER COMMAND REPORT ON MIGHT OPERATIONS, 31ST AUGH 1ST SEPTEMBER, 1942. 2 001 Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command Estimated midnight position of fronts (1) occluded: 0930 hdurs. 1. Oban - 58°N. 4°E. becoming warm to Berlin and cold to Heligoland Bight and southwards. (2) cold: Oban -Spurn Head - Yarmouth - east of Paris - Pyronces. Residual convection cloud with breaks and Germany:scattered thunderstorms, conditions better in south than north. In Heligoland Bight -West Baltic area much low cloud and rain; freezing level 8,000 - 10,000 ft. N.W. France: Convection cloud with breaks behind cold front. Home Bases: Cloud breaking and lifting; patches of Belt of rain and low cloud along fog. cold front in Yorkshire and off cast coast. 1250 hours. No change except that position of front (2) is doubtful and conditions at home bases therefore doubtful. 1605 hours. South-west Germany: - Small amount of cloud probable. North Denmark :- Much cloud with base about 1000 ft. or possibly lower. Thundery conditions over much of routes with Routes:-

towering cloud and icing above 10,000 feet.

Home Bases:-All expected to be fit for take off but for return low stratus at 600 feet or local fog, with threat of local thunderstorms in south, and at least 50% of bases unfit.

2150 hours.

Home Bases:-Almost all bases in 1,4 and 5 Groups and 75% of 3 Group's bases are liable to be unfit by dawn. Only 1 station on 92 Group reliable for diversion, but scare stations in 2 Group may be available. The only other reliable diversion area is East Scotland.

Sorties

2. 5 Lancastors were despatched to lay mines in the Kattegat. 2 were successful and laid 10 mines but the remaining 3 were unable to obtain pinpoints and either jettisched their mines safe or returned them to base. No damage was sustained by our circraft and there were no interceptions by enemy aircraft or other incidents of note.

BC/S. 26342/1/ORS. 17th September, 1942.

MIGHT RAID REPORT NO. 142

FORBER CONCIAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 1/2ND SEPTERBER, 1942

SAARERUCKEN

Heteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

0915 hours. Estimated midnight position of fronts and (1) cold 1. front Wilhelmshaven - Murenberg - Central Alps (2) occluded front 60°N. 42°E - East Anglia, becoming warm to Cherbourg and cold to Brest etc. Home bases: to west of front convection cloud with good breaks; East onglia and S.E. England, much low cloud with Target areas: - cast of 15°E.: occasional rain. generally small amounts of cloud, between 10°E and 15°E. ' scattered thunderstorms and thundery rain. Along front a belt of thunderstorms is expected. Behind cold front: wariable amounts of convection cloud, perhaps a few scattered showers. Over E. and N.E. France: variable amounts of convection cloud. N.W. France: much medium and low cloud. Over all areas visibility will be generally moderate.

1300 hours,

1615 hours.

The situation is by no means straightforward but at this stage we do not expect serious worries ut home bases, local visibility troubles may affect low lying aerodromes locally. E. anglia may have low cloud persisting and may be unfit most of night. Turgets: unsuitable conditions expected at Stettin, where there will be much cloud and probably thunderstorms. On Route to Stettin there will be thunderstorms. Stuttgart: probably best choice possible but even there the best we can hope for is some breaks in cloud. Route to Stuttgart somewhat better than to Stettin but thundery showers or even thunderstorms cannot be excluded. Cn all routes to Germany cold front over East England or to East of England will have to be crossed.

Nos. 2, 3, and 92 Groups expect bases to be fit apart from risk of thunderstorms, visibility will be poor towards dawn. 4 and 5 Groups take threat from west more seriously and think their bases may be affected at time of return. 91 Group expects stratus forming from 0200 hours becoming more general from 0300-0400 hours. No. 1 Group not so worried as 4 and 5 Groups and reckon cloud will prevent visibility troubles. Stuttgart: changy, probably 6/10-9/10 ths. residual cloud, risk of thunderstorms. Frisian Islands: thunderydth1 cloud below 1,000 ft. at times, later in night the better.

Executive Orders

2. Weather conditions forced the selection of an objective as far South and West as possible within the range of the types of aircraft which were to be used. <u>Saarbrucken</u> was chosen because the concentration of industry centred there had already been heavily damaged and it was thought to be in a condition where a further successful attack might have cumulative results. There was the added advantage that the gun defences were not thought to be established on a very heavy scale, and hence it might be possible to get underneath to bomb if the cloud was not well broken.

...../Porties

Sorties (For details see attached table) 3. Total Number of Sorties231 Number claiming Attack on Primary 205(88.75) Number claiming .ttack on alternative target Abortivc Sorties:-(a) Technical defects Late take off Sickness of Crew Attacked by Energy .ircraft Crashed - Cause Unknown 21(9.1%) (e) Missing Weight of Bomba dropped:-H.E. 231 tons 4. Incendiary 134 tons Moon 5. Above the horizon; low; 665. Plan of attack 6. 0150 hours. Zero hour:-Period of attack :-0150 - 0220. The attacking force was divided into three sections. Aircraft of the Pathfinder Force were to be over the targe 7. Section 1 between 0150 and 0155 hours. During this period 3 aircraft were to release flares (on Gee fix if the weather proved unsuitable for visual identification of the target) to illuminate the target for the marker aircraft, followed by 1000 lb. bonbs to suppress the A.R.P. services of the town. The remaining aircraft of this force were loaded with 250 lb. incendiaries to produce "blob" fires at the aiming points. These marker aircraft also carried 2 target flares (green with red stars) and 1 (red steady) which were to be released only when and if the aiming point had been positively identified. Section 2 ... incraft were to carry 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries (Lancasters to carry 4,000 lb. H.E. made up with 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries and were to attack not earlier than 0155 hours in order to leave the P.F.F. undisturbed. This phase of the attack was to last from 0155 hours to 0215 hours. 9. mircraft were to carry only H.E. bombs, and to attack Section 3 between 0210 and 0220 hours. Special reports on the success or otherwise of the raid at 0200 hours were to be provided by a specially selected crew from each 4ancaster Squadron and by one orew from each of 12, 103, 142 and 301 Squadrons. Aircraft of 1 Group were instructed to bonb from a height as possible compatible with the weather conditions and the intensity of the opposition (but not below 4000 feet). These crews were not to carry flares. Aircraft in other Groups were not to release their flares before the Pathfinder Force was due to have left the target (i.e. 0155 hours). Routes 10. 1 Group Base-Gross Coast between Southwold and Frinton - Furnes Searbrucken - Turn Right - Berck - sur-mer-Dungeness.

2.

..../11

11. <u>3 Group</u> Dungeness - Berck-sur-mer - Saarbrucken - Return same route.

12. P.F.F. Clacton - Furnes - Saarbrucken - Berck-sur-mer - Dungeness.

13. 4 Group Base - Furnes - Saarbrucken - Return same route.

3.

14. <u>5 Greup</u> Orfordness - Furnes - Saarbrucken - Eerck-sur-mer - Base.

licather

15. Bases:- Generally cloudy. Rain in East anglia at first. Patches of cloud below 1,000 ft. over areas South of the Wash decreasing during the night. Hist potches developed over North Lincolnshire and South Yorkshire towards dawn.

16. <u>Reute:</u> - 8/10ths. to 10/10ths. cleud from S. North Sea extending overland to 4°B; main top 8,000 to 9,000 feet. Over French coastal area 10/10ths medium cleud above, top 16,000 ft. otherwise only broken cirrus cleud above, mainly 4/10ths to 10/10ths. Visibility - 10-20 miles above cloud

17. <u>Target:</u>- Hainly cloudless; occasional patches 2/10ths. to 3/10ths. layer cloud; top 8,000 feet. Visibility mainly 10-20 miles, but some slight haze reported at times.

Results

18. Photographic Evidence

Number of photographs taken with Bombing	= 95
Number of photographs which have been plotted	= 7.1
Number which have been plotted within 3 miles of the aiming point.	= 0
Number of photographs plotted within 3 miles	= 59

The photographic evidence shows that a very concentrated attack was delivered on <u>Saarlautern</u> in mistake for Saarbrucken, 70 of the 71 photographs which have been plotted being centred on this town. The remaining plotted photograph is of Saargerand. There is no evidence that Saarbrucken was attacked. Since this raid daylight reconnaissance cover of a small portion of N.E. Saarlautern and of the suburb of Fraulautern has been obtained. In the part of Saarlautern covered severe damage is seen to a group of buildings adjoining a sports stadium.

In Fraulautern there are 4 incidents of damage to industrial property and about 60 incidents of damage to residential property, which vary from damag to single houses to the devastation of areas up to $3\frac{1}{2}$ acres.

19. Almost all reports refer to the help given by the flaros and incendiary "blob" bonbs dropped by the Pathfinder Force, and nany crews relied on the placing of these for identification of the target. However, confirmatory fixes were stated to have been obtained from the following visual identifications:-

- (a) Loop of the River Saar in the town.
- (b) River island in centre of Town and Shape of Town.
- (c) Railway marshalling yards N.E. of Aiming Point.
- (d) Lakes to the South West of the Town.
- (e) Two bridges over river.
- (f) Woods N.E. of town.
- (g) Pinpoint on River Moselle and on River Saar.

...../20.

Concentration and Timing of Attack 20. Thole force Number of aircraft bombing early including Pathfinders. late:-0-10 mins. = 10-20 " 11 (Ъ (o) 20-30 . " 2 -Pathfinder Force Number of Aircraft hombing early Π. " in allotted period = 2 n 10 late:-4 between 0 - 15 mins. . 5 - 10 2

5.

= 43

= 0

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12

Visibility was excellent apart from some smoke obscurity towards the 21. Half the attacking force bombed from heights of 10,000 end of the attack. feet or less, there being practically no opposition over the target and very little searchlight activity. All reports agree that the attack was extremely concentrated. Many fires had been started 15 minutes after the beginning of the attack, several extremely violent explosions were seen and crews to bomb state that the area was a mass of flames with a high column of black amoke. An 8,000 lb. bomb was dropped in this attack and was seen to burst with a terrific yellow flash between two fires in the centre of the Extremely heavy damage must have been done to Saarlautern. town.

2

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4 by nore than 15

10 - 15

n

Other Target Attacked

One Lancaster which developed engine trouble and was unable to locat 22. the Prinary Target bombed an unidentified built-up area.

Casualties

23.			damaged by flak
	Number	of	Interceptions
		11	Attacks by fighters (2.2)
	11 10-		Aircraft damaged by fighters 3 (1.3.)
		*	" damaged, not due to energy action 19 (7.45)

Over the target area slight inaccurate heavy flak and practically 24. no light flak or searchlight activity was reported. En route there was accurate predicted heavy flak at Abbeville, and some flak in other areas.

25. The number of intercoptions, is rather high, but only 5 of these developed into attacks.

Our own observations indicate that 1 or 2 aircraft were possibly shi 26. down by fighters, and 1 possibly by flak. One loss (a Lancaster) was probably not due to eneny action.

The low proportion of aircraft missing is probably due to the borbin 27. of Saarlautern instead of Saarbrucken and the cloud on route which appeared hinder both night fighters and flak.

Sumary

An extremely concentrated attack was made at low cost, by the whole 28. lautern, which had been marked by the Pathfinder Force in mistake for SAAFERUOKNI. BC/S. 26342/5/ORS. 9th September, 1942.

Target	67.	Type	No. of		t claiming					y		sounit		10	Inter	restions
			Sorties	to at	Prinnry		d Target	Over Er		lot t	1000	by	Demoged by Enony	to	ATTOCK	Attack
					Area	other	Abortive	Benbed other		Energy Territory		Flak	lirenft	Enony Action		3
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100000000000		Coll.III	10		10			-	2	1		1 m	140	1 8	1	1
	1	Mol. II	5		4				-	1			1944	1 .0	-	2
	3	Stirling Sell.III	29		27				1	1		1 m				2
	4 -	Hol.	29		23				2	3-	1	-		2.8		3
	5	Long.	62	-	11 59	1 7			-	1	1	2 11	2 .0		2	4
	1	10000	- Sugar		1933	-		-	-	1-1	0	1 .0				1
	3	Epupden	7 -	-	2	-	1	-	-			1 m				121
		Stirling	7		5	-			h-	2					-	-
		Loncor ter	2		2				-							
		Fullington	6		4					2			har mark	12		
	1		231		205	1	1		6	14	*	1C 6 m	3.0	4 B 1 //C	5	17
S				- 5					35			2.20		100		
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			• NOT 115	500 000		13										
\$2.		(*)														

NICHT TIME BONDER CONCLAD REPORT ON NIGHT 101355 (Karlsruhe; Mining) 15 OCT 1942 Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command. 1. 0915 hours. Developments in S.W. Ingland and Bay of Biscay this morning were too uncertain to know what conditions at home bases will be tonight with any degree of confidence. Variable cloud with local thundery rain seems most probable. Over the coastal strip of N. Germany west of 9°E. and over parts of the Plain, broken medium cloud and broken low cloud are expected. A cold front is expected to lic from Holland - just N. of Ruhr-Copenhagen. South of this front cloud will decrease southwards and south of 50°N, well broken nedium and low cloud arc expected. Visibility over Germany will Over N.W. France broken be moderate generally. convection cloud is expected. 1250 hours. No change from 0915. Development to s.i. of England Still obscure. areas of rain at home bases are expected, however. Some bases in country are expected to be out, but 1615 hours. not sure which, Some, if not all, probably affected by rain and low cloud during night. Not yet prepared to say how severe conditions will be for take-off and landing. Route to Karlsruhe; not too severe, cloud first half of route; running out of cloud towards target. Karloruhe: really good chance with only broken medium cloud and probably some patchy low. No one suggests that this target night deteriorate badly. Frisian Islands: suitable for gardening but better to wait until after midnight. Advantage in daylight landing but we should like to discuss the situation again at 2000 hours. finds 50 - 60 m.p.h. at 10,000' over first

2030 hours,

Karlsruhe - still looks very good, unlikely to have more than shall patches of medium cloud. All Groups are prepared to see rain, mainly slight, spreading over then before time of return, they expect cloud base to go down to 1,000' above M.S.L. but risk of cloud to 600 ft. over any extensive area in the operational Groups is regarded as slight.

half of route, probably decreasing towards target.

Executive Orders

2. Karlsruhe was in the area with promising weather conditions and of a suitable size to be attacked.by the medium sized force available. It was also thought that an attack on the rather neglected spot might result in preventing the removal of the defences to other larger targets.

The weather risks to the bases and the phase of the moon made it advisable to attack late and return as near dawn as possible. The aircraft were routed to cross the coast on the outward journet at different places in about equal numbers the shorter range aircraft being given the shorter route to the target. All aircraft were to return by approximately the same route.

...../Sorties

Sorties

3. (Fo	r details see attached table).	
3 (a)	Total number of Sorties	} (85;\$)
1	Technical Defects 17 Attacked by Enemy A/C 1 = 18	(9%)
(a	Number claiming attacks on other targets 4	(23)

(e) Missing.....

Weight of Bombs Dropped on Primary

Hoon

5. Above the horizon; low; 47

Plan of Attack

Zero hour: 0130 hours.

Period of Attack: 0130 - 0200 hours.

7. The Fathfinder force was given the task of marking the target between 0130 and 0135 hours for the main force which followed in two phases of Incendiary or H.E. carrying aircraft.

b. The Fathfinder force was flivided into two sections; the first section consisted of four aircraft which were to release flares to illuminate the target for the marker aircraft; after releasing their flares these four aircraft were to release 250 and 1000 lb. H.B. to disorganise the A.R.P. services; the second section of the Pathfinder force carried 250 lb. incendiary bombs which were to be dropped in salvos to produce "blob" fires at the aiming points, and target marker flares (red with green stars) which were to be released only if the aiming point could be positively identified.

9. The Pathfinders were to be followed by a force consisting of twothirds of the remaining aircraft, manned by the best available crews, which were to attack between 0135 and 0155 hours. This force was composed of

(a) Aircraft carrying 4 or 30 lb. Incendicries

and (b) Lancasters carrying mixed loads of H.E. and 4 or 30 lb. Incendiaries.

10. The remaining aircraft of the main force were to attack with H.E. between 0150 and 0200 hours. One Lancaster of 97 Squadron was to drop 1 2000 lb. bomb in this phase.

11. Crows of 1 Group were detailed to bonb from as low a height as the state of the weather and the opposition allowed but not below 6000 feet.

12. The target was to be reconnoitred at 0200 hours by one specially selected crew from each Lancaster Squadrons and from each of 12, 103, 142 and 301 Squadrons, who were to report on the success achieved.

13. Since the target was at extreme Gee range navigators were warned of the necessity of obtaining good fixes on the outward journey to aid accurate D.R. and E.T.a.

Route

14. 1 Group:- Base - Cross coast between Mablethorpe and Orfordness -Ouddorp - Karlsruhe - Turn right - Berck-sur-mer - cross coast between Orfordness and Selsey Bill. S

5.00

3 Group:- Base - Bradwell Bay - Dungeness - Berck-sur-mer - Karlsruheturn right - return same route.

4 Group: - Base-Orfordness-Furnes- Karlsruhe-Berck-su-mer- Orfordness.

5 Group:- Base-Orfordness-Ouddorp-Karlsruhe by Le Youquet - Cross coast part at Dover and part at Shoreham.

Weather

15. Basos:- Variable medium cloud. Snall patches of low stratus formed during the lattor part of the night. Visibility - moderate or good.

Route:- Hainly 5-9/10ths medium cloud, base 14,000 ft. A narrow frontal belt was crossed near th. Ardennes, giving 8/10ths medium cloud, with some low cloud beneath. There was slight rain near this front with light rime or first in cloud. Visibility - moderate or good.

Targot:- (Karlsruhe) 3/10ths to 8/10ths modium cloud, base 18,000 ft., some cirrus above. Visibility good,

Rusults

16. (a) Photographic Evidence.

Number of Fhotographs taken with bombing = 97 Number of photographs plotted within 3 miles = 48 (50.) of target.

Number of photographs showing target ____ = 8

17. Night photographs suggest that about half the aircraft claiming attack boobed within 3 miles of the aiming point. Many of the photographs show fires burning in the city and these appear to have increased in size and intensity throughout the raid. The later photographs show considerable snoke. About 20 photographs have been plotted to the West of Karlaruhe, outside the 3 mile circle. Many 6f these cover the area of the docks where fires are also seen.

18. Subsequent daylight reconnaissance photographs show that this raid achiewed great success. There has been heavy dra:go to industrial property at Grumvinkel, and to the East end of the harbours, where 60 acres of industrial buildings and yards have been devastated. In all 27 factories have been affected in various degrees and about 30 other sheds or varchouses have been destroyed. The industrial promises which have suffored partial or complete destruction include a Pirc-fighting Equipment factory, a Soving Machino and Gas cooker works, two food factories, a factory making small electric motors, a textile works, a samuill, an engineering works, a paint and dyostuffs factory and a concrete manufacturor's works. A long shed 500 feet x 60 feet in the railway repair shops has been severely damaged and 3 or 4 small shods destroyed, as has also a shed 450 feet x 70 foot and a small shed in what is probably a transport depot. Tho main Railway Station has had at least one direct hit on a platform, as a result of which the tracks'end some rolling stock, as well as the platform itself have been damaged. A direct hit on the line close to the West Station at Grunzinkel has damaged 6 tracks. At Grunzinkel also there is a direct hit on a build-up road, which has prohably damaged a bridge.

At the accordance a barracks block, one of the hangers and a scall shed have been destroyed and another barrack block dranged. Considerable damage was also done to a military barracks in the town. Public buildings severely dranged or destroyed include the administrative offices of the State, the main Post Office, the Museum and State library, an exhibition hall, the Provincial Court of Appenl, a Church, two hospitals and five schools.

Damge to residential and conversial property includes 260 acres of devastation nestly in the contral and Beierthein districts, and the destruction of a number of houses in various parts of the city.

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Gr und Sourcess report that du ing the attack as many as 200 fires were burning at the same time, that the Goods Station was still on fire the following afternoon, and that warehouses in the vicinity were severely demaged.

The Food Office the Regional Treasury, the Police Hendquarters, and the Main Post Office building were severely drunged. Over 800 houses are said to have been heavily drunged. Pive days after the raid three-quarters of the town was still without electric current owing to the drunge to the Power Station. On the evening of September 3rd rail traffic was being steps at the cutakirts of the town, and coal traffic through the town is reported to have fellen on September 4th and 5th by 301. 500 trucks of coal on the harbour sidings and 12 sidings are said to have been destroyed. New thousand people were evacuated from the town about 48 hours after the attack. It is also reported that the main Gas Container was destroyed and the vector mains damaged in several places.

The inhabitants of Karlsruhe are said to b lieve that the success of this attack was due to the fact that q good proportion of the heavy flak defences was removed from the town on September 1st.

19. Observations by crows taking part in this raid, and particularly by these crows specially detailed to reconneitre the target at the end of the planned period of attack confirm the success of this operation. How large fires were seen to be well concentrated in the target area, and the glow produced was visible at a distance of 100 miles. Snoke rose to a height of 9000 feet. The areant of misdirected effort appears to have been very small, though a few reports mention bords being dropped in open country to the West of the target. Almost all crows testify to the accurate pinpointing of the target by the Pathfinders where flares were seen up to distances of 60 miles, All crows reported excellent visibility in the target area, apart from some slight grand have and snoke in the later stages of the attack.

Concontration and timing of attack

20. Main force

Number of aircraft bonbing early......1 (by 2 mins.)

between 0 and 10 mins.....between 10 and 20 mins....between 20 million 30 mins....between 30 and 40 mins....between 40 and 50 mins....

21.

Pathfinder Force

Number of aircraft boabing carly..... 0

between 0 and 5 mins..... 8 between 5 and 10 mins..... 2 by more than 10 mins..... 6

Other Targets Attacked

22. The following targets were attacked instead of the Primary target:-

······/over

F

Targot	Number of Aircraft Attacking	Result	Reason for not Attacking Primary
Acchon	2	(i) None obsorved (ii) Fire seen to start 6-7 mins. after bombing.	(i)ttockud by Encuy Fightor (ii) Potrol Shortago
Saarlautorn	'2	 (i) ^Bursts seen and fires observed to start. (ii) Inconditation seen to burst and take hold 	 (i) Late take-off and alightly off course. (ii) Lete take- off.

Canualtion

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23. The number of serties, missing and demaged aircraft, and interceptions, are given below:-

Sortics	Missing	Dra	Ago	Interceptions		
		Plak Pigh	tor not E.A.	Attacks	Approaches & Followings	
200	8 (4;)	3(1.53) 2(1)	5) -	6 (3;3)	14 (75)	

24. The total number of interceptions, 20 (10.05) is rather high, but the proportion of attacks is not much above the average. Over the target area, flak was moderately heavy, having apparently been strongthened since our last raid in October. There were searchlight comes operating on the outskirts of Karlsruhe. Flak was reported from known defended areas on route.

25. Our own observations suggested that 3 and possibly 4 of our aircraft were shot down by fighters, and 4 by flak. A Sieg Heil heard in the South Dutch area cannot be identified with any report of aircraft seen shot down.

26. The cloud conditions and good visibility favoured the energy defences, particularly fighters, which were very active.

Sumary


27. This attack on Karlsruho can be classed as a highly successful operation carried out in excellent weather conditions with comparatively light casualties. The target was accurately marked by the Pathfinder Force.

Hinolaying

28. 3 aircraft of 3 Group were detailed to lay mines in the Frisian Islands erec. All three successfully accomplished their task without incident, 10 mines being laid.

BC/S. 26342/5/ORS. 10th September, 1942.

Target	Op.	Type	No. of		olaining	irera	ft fuilir d Turget	to bor	ib Prin	Not	Bank		Domnged	Flat C	Inter	Coptions	
1	125	1.000	Sorties	to att	Primary	43	a furget rea		itory	over Encry	lissing	by	by Energy	to	acked	Not attacked	
					in the	other Target	ive	other	tive	Territory			ALFORD T	Action			
					6	arget		Target		-	1		-		1	000	
CRESIDER	10	Well,III	12		10				1	1	1				-	308	
		Well, IV Solifux	24 .		18 2	1		2		,	1		1.n		1	1	
	3	Well.III Stirling	18		15 20	-			1	1	1	-	1 10		1	2	
	4	Belifar "ell.III	- 23		21			1	-		1	2 1			1	- 1 -	
	5	Langester	61		34			1	1	1	2	-			2		
а -	P.F.F.	Humpdon Stirling	3.		4		-	-	-						-		
	(3 Group)	Halifax Lance stor	8	-	-7				-	1					-		
		Well-III Totrl	3 200		170			4	3	15	8	5 m	1 m	-	6	14	
NEL-YING	3	Vell,III	2		2						-	-	1.40	- 4	-		
	1	Stirling	11		1			-		1		1		-	1		
÷		Total	203		173			4	3	15	8	3 m	1 m 1 AC		6	14	
4			50														
		*Not fi	tted Gee				Total ab	ortive -	18								
5		10000000						0100000	100								



--- OCT 1942

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BOHRER COMMAND PEPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 3/4TH SEPTEMBER, 1942.

(EIDEN)

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1.

0915 hours, Estimated midnight position of fronts: (1) cold front Shetland - Texel - 45°N, 2¹/₂°E. (2) occluded front N. Scotland - 55°N. 2°E. - Wash - 3.W. England. becoming cold to 48°N. 10°N. with narrow warm sector in Western Channel.

> Home Bases: - Cloud breaking and lifting behind occluded front. Much low cloud and rain on the front and over S.E. England.

Germany:- between 5°E and 10°B and north of 50°N. much medium cloud, scattered thunderstorms. Further east over N. Germany: woll broken medium cloud, patches of low cloud. South of 50°N over Germany: much medium cloud in the west, woll broken medium cloud further east. Along the cold front and between the cold and occluded fronts here will be much low cloud and occasional rain, also cloud will extend to great heights in places (particularly near fronts) with icing above freezing level, which is 8-10,000 ft. Visibility will be overwhere moderate to good.

1245 hours.

The main difference from advice at 0915 hoursm is that the cold front may be less active over the Continent than was suggested. ... one breaks in cloud are therefore expected both over N.4. France and most of N.W. Germany, but it is unlikely that the breaks would be very extensive. In no area west of 10°E. can a cloud amount less than 5/10ths be assured, except possibly in the extreme south.

1610 hours.

All groups think that all bases will be fit tonight.

Enden:- expected to have 10/10ths total cloud at different levels. Best time over target for maximum cloud cover expected to be 0200 hours., but tining, which is important, may not be quite exact. Advise that flight be made below 9,000 ft. owing to risk of sovere ising above freezing level.

Executivo Orders

2. Weather conditions were unfit for major operations, and a small blind bombing attack on Under was substituted,

Sortics

 Hoon

4. Moon rose during course of operation; 57%

Vector

5. Target 10/10ths medium cloud, top 11,000 ft.

6. <u>Route</u> Gloudy with rain in west North Sea with bumpiness and static near coast of East Anglia and severe icing at 17,500 feet. Becoming 10/10ths medium cloud in layers from 5°2.

7. Bases Some main in East anglin till 0100, with cloud mainly about 1000 ft. Otherwise fine, well broken cloud. Visibility moderate to good.

Plan of Attack

8. This operation was planned as a Gec attack with the use of cloud cover. Approach was to be ande wither from West to East or from North to South.

Co-ordinates of the target were given as:-

77 - B	B.4.44	C 39.59
N - S	B.4.43	C 39.60

Boobs wors to be released when the pulses first appeared in line.

Results

9.	Weight of	boubs dropped: -	H.S.:-	15.1 tons
	10000000000000000000000000000000000000		Incondicry: -	Nil

10/10ths cloud was encountered over the target. Boobs were dropp by navigational aid 1.0.

No results were observed. I aircraft sow the flashes of its bals through the cloud.

Casualties

10. There are no reports of damage on this night, but 2 aircraft are missing from this operation. In the absence of evidence both losses must be ascribed to causes unknown.

BC/S. 26342/5/ORS. 11th September, 1942.

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-			ι.	

	3/41	h September,	1942.										311		17
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					aren Ber oti Tu	abedbor- her tive rgot	Borbed 1.3 other ti Target	or- Enon vo forr	tary	Flak	by Encry .ircraft	Enony Action			
15.08	N 3	Noll.111 Stirling Rolifex	6		2	_	++	++	2	+	-				-
L		Total:-	11		6				2						~0
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					- 1000 1210	2									

NIGHT R.ID REPORT NO. 145-

COPY NO. /6

BOMENT COMPLIED REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 4/5TH. SEPTEMBER, 1942.

(Bremen and Minelaying)

· Meteorological advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0925 hours.

Estimated midnight position of frontsas (1) occluded 60°N 13°E - Copenhagen - 50°N 7°E then southwestwards (2) cold front 56¹2°N 55°N 14°E - Mannheim. Home Bases: convection cloud dispersing, moderate to good visibility. Germany: near and S.E. of frontal system: some rain and low cloud, much medium cloud still further east. _ On N.W. side of frontal belt there will be a narrow strip of medium cloud but in the area, including Brenen, .Wilhelmshaven, aachen and to the west of Ruhr, cloud is expected to disperse except that on the coastal strip from Enden-Westwards, some broken convection cloud is expected to persist. Over N.E. France north of front, cloud is expected to disperse but over N.W. France there will be some convection cloud, with breaks. Over southern France weather will be generally fine. Over Germany, behind front, visibility will be moderate to good. . Wind on route to Bremen at 10-15,000 ft. is expected to be 40 m.p.h. first half of route. 60 m.p.h. second half, from S.W.

1230 hours,

Alto-strains cloud has been reported at 10.00 hours in S.W. Ireland, and while this must be regarded as a threat of rain and low cloud to home bases during the night, this is no definite indication that the threat is serious. As regards targets, it not seems probable that this front will be fully as far east as was indicated at 0925, and probably further cast. This improves prospects of cloud dispersing in the Brenen, Wilhelmshaven area tonight.

it time of take-off all groups expect slight rain from medium cloud. Bremen expected to be clear of cold front. There is a warning that medium cloud from now development west of Ireland may have got to this target before time of attack. Bases for return are extremely doubtful and we should like to discuss this later, but we expect rain

and low cloud for return.

target be arranged for daylight return.

1620 hours.

2015 hours.

vague and unsettled, Targets:- no change from 1620. Route: strong winds reaching 50-55 m.p.h. 10-15,000 ft. backing between bases and target: strong wind at bases for return. Bases :- 4 Group will have most rain, likely to be continuous, moderate but for return. Do not expect cloud base below 1,000 ft. visibility 2-4 miles. f Group expects continuous slight rain but cloud base not falling below 1,000 ft. above M.S.L. 1,5, and 92 Groups expect intermittent rain; for return cloud will fall to about 1,000 ft, above M.S.L. with visibility 2 and 3 Groups: conditions much the same 2-4 miles. as for 1,5 and 92 Groups but more definite about cloud base being 1,000 ft, or more above M.3.L. for return. 91 Group is threatened with warm air and after 0,00-0400 hours is not considered suitable for diversion owing to low stratus.

...../Executive Orders

 $t \propto$

Suggest that time over

Outlock:

Executive Orders

2. The weather was fine in North West Germany for a short distance inland. There was no useful moon, and it was therefore considered a favourable opportunity to re-attack the heavily defended port of Bremen which, being situated on a river, was not expected to be difficult to find on a dark night. 25 Lancasters of 5 Group were given the Pocke-Fulf Aircraft Works as their particular aiming point. Wilhelmshaven was chosen as the last resort target, to be attacked if the primary were found to be obscured by cloud.

Sorties

3.	(a)	Mmber of Sorties Despatched		251	12
	(1)	Number claiming attack on Primary	12	212 (84.55)	
	(o)	Number claiming attack on alternative target		3 (1.2%)	
	(a)	Abortive Sorties :-			
		Technical Defects 20			
		sickness of Crev 2			
		Sickness of Crev 2		2008 - 10 - 0 - 0	
			=	24 (9.63)	
	(e) (f)	Missing	-	11 (4.45)	
	(f)	Result not known (orashed in return)	=	1 (0.45)	

Weight of Bombs Dropped (On Bremen)

4. (a) H.E. 246.5 tons (including 49 4,000 lb. bombs and 1 8,000 lb. bomb)

(b) Incendiary 234.0 tons.

Moon

5. ,Low; 285

Plan of attack

6. Zero hour:- 0150 hours. Period of attack:- 0150-0220 hours.

The attacking force was again divided into three sections as follows:-

Time of Attack

(a) Section 1 - Pathfinder Force Zero to zero + 5 mins.
 (b) Section 2 - Aircraft carrying Incendiary or mixed H.E. and Incendiary loads. Zero + 5 to zero +25

(c) Section 3 - Aircraft carrying H.E. Zero + 20 to zero + 30 min

7. Section 1, the Pathfinders, were to mark the target with flares and 250 lb. incendiary bombs. The primary method was by the release of bundles of flares (Stirlings 12 x 3, Halifaxes 8 x 3, Lancasters 6 x 4, Wellingtons 9 x 3 flares) at .6 second intervals. These flares were set so 1.3 to φ en at 1500 feet above the target. Each aircraft of the Pathfinder Porce clso carried marker flares (red emitting green stars) which were to be released only on positive identification of the target. The number of these flares carried by the various aircraft were: Stirlings, Halifaxes and Wellingtons 1 x 3, Lancasters 1 x 4.

Sticks of 250 lb. incendiaries released at 0.5 second intervals were to be used as a secondary method of target marking. The loads per aircraft were: Stirlings 11 x 250 lbs, Halifaxes 6 x 250-lb. Lancasters 7 x 250 lbs. Wellingrons 8 x 250 lbs.

Section 2 was composed of about two-thirds of those aircraft from/Groups

8.

- Groups 1, 4, and 5 which were taking part in this operation. These aircraft were to carry loads of 41b. or 30 lb. incendiaries (Halifaxes and Lancasters to carry mixed loads of H.E. and I.B.)

9. Section 3 was composed of aircraft carrying loads of H.E. only (remaining aircraft of Groups 1,4and 5.)

10. One crew from each squadron of 5 Group was detailed to reconnoitre the target at the end of the allotted period and to report on the measure of success achieved. Navigators were warned that Gee signals might fade before the target was reached and that, as wind speed was high, errors in computing wind velocity would cause serious errors in $D_{\rm e}R_{\rm e}$ plotting.

Routes The briefed routes were as follows: see also the accompanying diagram.

11.	1 Group	Base - cross coast between Mablethorpe and Saltfleet - Vlieland - Cloppenburg - Bremen - Turn left - Juist - 5400 N 0500 B - cross coast between Mablethorpe and Morrore.
	3 Group	Base - Cromer - South and of Vlicland - Coppenburg - Bramen - Juist - 5400 N. 0500 E - Cromer - Base.
	4 Group	Base - Hornsea - Vlieland - Bremen - 5420 N. 0500 2 - Nornsea - Base.
	E Comm	

<u>5 Group</u> Base - Vlieland - Cloppenburg - Brenen - Juist - 5400 N. 0500 B - Base.

Weather

12. Bases:- Some rain in 4 Group from 0300 with cloud base above 1,000 ft. ratches of low cloud developed over bases in all Groups except 4 and 1 towards 0600. Otherwise weather was fine with well-broken cloud and good visibility.

Route:- Good visibility, little cloud on outward journey, increasing high cloud in N.W. on return.

Target :- No cloud. Visibility good, a little h.ze.

Results

13. Photographic Evidence

Total number of photographs taken with bombing that could reasonably be plotted = 105

Total Plotted (see accompanying diagram)

By Ground detail65	within 3 miles61
By Fire Tracks22	between 3 & 5 mls18
	outside 5 miles 8
Total: 87	Unplotted 18

of the 18 unplotted photographs (with bombing),

13 show open country

4 have many fire tracks on a background of

open country (indistinct)

1 shows fire tracks - no ground detail.

Of the photographs taken on this raid, 65 have been plotted by ground detail and 22 by fire-tracks (see diagran). The positions of these last are approximate only, and they are indicated on the diagram by broken lines; 61 of the photographs (583) are plotted within 3 miles of the centre of Bremen, 79, or 75%, within 5 miles; this represents a very good concentration for this target.

. 14. The night photographs show at least 75 sticks of incendiaries and 7 Trobable 4000 Tb. books within Frenen and its immediate neighbourhood, apart from many other bomb explosions which cannot be related to ground detail. In some areas, e.g. north and east of Brenen, there were almost certainly a sticks than can be identified from the photographs. In the later stages a the operation there this a tendency for the weight of the attack to apread out from the centre of the target. In the majority of cases where established fires are recorded on the night films, day cover has revealed damage. A stick of incendiaries fell across part of the Pocke-Julf vorks towards the end of the attack, but apparently failed to take hold.

15. Daylight recommaissance next morning revealed that considerable damage had been caused to factories, warehouses, rullways and residential property. At the Weser aircraft works the machine shop has been almost completely destroyed and other buildings have suffered minor damage. At the Atlas Werke shipyard a long building containing workshops has been gutted. Elsewhere about 25 industrial buildings, including railway and dockside warehouses have been completely destroyed or very severely damaged. At the Focke-Fulf Works a direct hit on the Bouth end of a hangar-type building 265' x 205' has caused considerable damage to it.

Commercial and residential damage was also on a heavy scale, though its exact extent cannot be estimated from these photographs owing to the anount of snoke from fires still burning at the time of photography. A number of municipal and public buildings have suffered severe d mage including the Rice Exchange and a barracks. The largest area of dustructures measures about $6\frac{1}{2}$ acres, but there were a great number of lesser incidents.

16. Although a few reports mention some scattered fires outside the target area, on both sides of the river, there is no doubt that the main weight of the attrick fell on Brencen, and that it was concentrated and intense. The glow from the many fires started was visible from distances of over 100 miles. Many 4000 lb. bomb-bursts were seen in the town, North of the river. An 8,000 lb. bomb dropped by a Lancaster was seen to burst in the target area. Searchlight dazale and alight haze made identification of ground detail difficult. In most instances it was impossible to identify, positively, the Focke-Wulf factory, but fires and H.E. bursts were reported by several crews in its estimated position.

18. The first part of the homeward route between Bremen and the coast was reported to be very heavily defended by searchlight and flak concentrations, although the more Southerly route into the target was comparatively quiet.

Total Concentration and Timing of the Attack 19. P.F.F. (a) Number of aircraft bombing early (flores mly - 2 min 18 12 late:-(b) 0-5 mins. 6 5-10 mins. 10-15 mins. 17 15-20 mins. (0) in allotted ; criod Mamber of Aircraft Bombing early Main Force (a) by 15 Lins. 2 by 2 mins./(b)

4.

(b) Mumber of aircraft Bombing later between 0 and 10 mins. 31 10 and 20 mins. 20 and 30 mins. 2 37 (c) Number of aircraft bombing in allotted period 172

Other Targets Attacked

20.

Target	Mumber of Aircraft Attacking	Result Reason for not attackin Primary
Wilhelmshaven	2	 flash of bomb (1) Uaable to identify seen; iccation primary. unknown. Bombs seen to (2) Coned in explode in S.W. searchlight, area of Target; one large fire started.
Groningen (believed)	1	Results not seen Hit by flak

Cusualties

CONTRACTOR OF A

The number of sorties, missing and damaged aircraft, and interceptions 21. wereas ifollows :-

and the later of t		Der	anged	Interceptions			
Sorties	Missing	Flak	Fighter	Non Eccay Action	Attacks	Approached	
251	11(4.45)	30(11.9%)	3(1.2,3)	5(2.0%)	3(1.2,;)	12(4.85)	

22. Our own observations indicate 6 losses to fighters, 4 to flak (over the target) and 1 to "unknown causes". In view of the eneny's claim to have shot down 11 of our aircraft, this latter loss was also probably due to eneny action. Lorses on this night were not unduly high, but flak damage was higher than usual. This was probably influenced by the clear, dark night and little haze, aiding the searchlights and flak defences.

23. More than half the night photographs plotted within 5 niles of the target show heavy flak, the measured intensity being 9 single-run discharges per aircraft, from batteries consisting, mostly, of six guns or under:

Light flak is also seen on more than half these photographs. Searchlights are recorded on just over ene-quarter of the photographs, some of which show then to have operated in clusters.

This evidence indicates that heavy flak was fairly intense, but that searchlight activity (in the target area) was less than usual.


A number of crews reported the route to the target as being extremely quiet, but a considerable proportion of 5 Group stated that the first part of the return route was over extremely heavy flak defences. Sumary


23. This attack on Bremen, carried cut in good weather conditions with casualties about average for this target, achieved a large measure of success, the exact extent of which cannot be more precisely determined until the area covered by reconnaissance has been extended.

MINKLAY ING

24. A total of 6 mines were laid by 3 Wellingtons of 1 Group in the Frisian Island area. These aircraft accomplished their task without incident. BC/S. 26342/5/ORS.

9.CO





100.000	11 1.	20 INT	77.	7.46	1.374
Ideau	A	CS. RT	1.	140	HOURS
	- C.	8' iui	16		

NOV

318

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BOARSR COASIA D REPORT ON MICHT OPERATIONS 6/714. AST TE BER 1942.

DUISBURG Minelaying Leaflets.

teorological Advice Submitted to the Command.

0915 hours.

Hight position of cold from Berlin to Hamheim. Over an area epuroxizatoly 50 miles behind this line there will be broken medium cloud. To the north-west of this area there will be little or no cloud, with good visibility apart from local anoke pollution. On the north-west constal strip of Gormany, the north-w storly winds will bring patches of strate-cumulus in as far to Hamburg and Brown. Surface drift in the Bahr W.M.W to West. Lecal visibility troubles in the about due to macke. Home Bases:- Little or no low cloud.

1215 hours. No change, It seems most unlikely that any difficulties will arise to-might.

1600 hours.

Information from aircrust being forried corose the Atlantic should rain at 0400 hours this morning at 25° W. 4 Group consider that this may constitute a threat to bases but other groups are satisfied that this threat is negligible. All Groups except to appet local mist troubles towards down, confined to low lying stations. Target area -Duisburg - little or no cloud; good visibility. Heligoland Bight erea, 4-8/10ths.convection cloud. Winds 260° -270° at 45 m.g.h.

cutivo Ordors.

The Ruhr was the obvious target area, because cloudy weather over Gormany ... I very high wind at operational heights limited the range. Duichurg was locted as the target, because there was expected to be a north-weaterly wind, lich would give comparatively clear conditions there.

rtius

(a) (b) (c))	Number of Number cla	Sortios de	soctohed	ienry	20 17	7	(85.5%)	22	1.0	2	- 3970
(c)	5	lamber cla	iming atta	ck on o	hor to	e sta						
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Plan of Attack

4.

	cero hour state - Period of Attack.	0	240 hours.
	(a) Thinders	40 - 030	0 hours.
8			5 hours. O hours.

The P.F.F's primary motiod of marking the target was to be by bundles of reconneissance flares released at 4 second intervals, to even at 1500 feet ever the docks and aiming-points in the town. If woather conditions over the target rendered it necessary and Gee functioned satisfactorily, carly aircraft of this force could release their flares on Gee fix; crows of the Main Funce wore therefore to be warned that the earlier flares night not be exactly over the aiming points. As a secondary nothed of marking the target, the P.F.F. aircraft carried 2 groen marker flares, which cuitted red stars, and one red markor-flare, all of which were only to be released on positive identification of the aiming point. Stirlings and Wellingtons of the P.F.F. carried 1900 1b. or 500 lb. G.P. bombs. The first section of the Main Force was to consist of about two-thirds of the romaining aircraft, ranned bythe best crews and carrying maximum loads of 4 lb. or 30 lb. Imondiarios, or mixed loads of H.F. plus Incendiaries. 6% of the 4 lb. Incendiaries were to be of the explosive typo. The second section consisting of all the remaining aircraft was to drop heavy H.C. or G.P bombs. One crew from each Lancastor Squadron, and one from each of 12, 103, and 105 Squadrons were to make special reconnaissance of the targot at 0310 hours and to report on the degree of success achieved.

6. All Goo aircraft were to approach the target from west to east along the "C" lattice line, and to return along this line from the target to the Dutch coast. Since it was considered possible that interference might render homing to the target difficult, navigators were instructed to pay careful attention to D.R and E.T.A. Bombs were to be released on visual identification of the target, which would be reached approximately when the pulses first appeared in line. Trows were to be warned of the danger of confusing the River Maas with the river Enine.

Routos. The briefed routes were as follows. (see also the accompanying diagram);

7. <u>1 Group</u>: Prom coast betwoon Mablothorpo and Orfordness - Noordland - ... Duisburg - Ouddorp - coast between Mablothorpe and Orfordness.

3.4 and 5 Groups: Orfordness - Noordland - Duisburg - Ouddorp - Orfordness

Neather Encountored.

8. Target :- Little or no cloud. Visibility good, but patches of thick.

Route :- No cloud, becoming 6/10ths. to 10/10ths. over sea, base 6,000 ft tops 8,000 ft.; breaking to small amounts at 5-6° E. Visibility good.

Bases:- Fine. Moderate to good visibility. The moon was 13% . . illuminated and above the horizon.

Havigational Aids.

9. Of the aircraft fitted with Gee which claim to have attacked the primary area, 30 (19%) reported that they obtained Gee fixes over Duisburg; three of these aircraft bombed blindly on their fixes.

Weight of Bombs Drouged by Aircraft claiming to attack Prinery.

10. (a) H.E. 259 tons, including 1 X 8500 lb. 63 X 1900 lb. 51 X 4000 lb. 69 X 1000 lb.

(b) Incondiary 164 tons.

...../11.

Mant Photographs.

Number of photographs taken with bombing that have been plotted (see 11. accompanying diagram) :

By ground dotail 44	within 3 milcs
By fire tracks 0	between 3 and 5 miles9
	outsido 5 milosil

(holotted photographs (with bombing) : that have recorded ground detail (all of even country)

sheing fire tracks only Total. 115

The 44 plotted photographs taken with bembing are distributed as in the table above, while the 31 unplotted photographs which have recorded ground istail all show areas of agricultural land in open country. A further 40 negative frames, exposed with bombing, have registered fire tracks alone, and are evidence that the aircraft concerned borbed districts in which incendiaries woro burning. In view of the concentration of attack revealed by the plotted photographs, it is reasonable to export that a cortain number of those aircraft attacked Duisburg. This number may be estimated at between - third and one half, a figure suggested by concertive data from other raids for which fire plots are available.

Subsequent recommaissance revealed no large areas of devastation but a considerable number of fire and H.E incidents, concentrated almost entirely in the Southern half of the town. 5 buildings in the United Steel Co. works at Meidorich have been destroyed. Elsewhere about 20 industrial buildings have been destroyed and an equal number damaged, 7 of them severely. The factorios affected include an iron works, weaving-sheds; a machine-works, a tobacco factory, a starch factory, a soda works and a chomical works. There is also some damage to reilway tracks and installations. From 130 to 150 houses or small buildings in residential districts have been destroyed or scorrely dranged. It has also been reported that as meny as 90 barges were such as a result of this attack rendering the herbour temperarily unserviceable.

13. This attack on Duisburg was loss concentrated than the Provious operations, those against Karlsruhe and Bromen. This was probably due, in part, to the densor ground hazo ovor the target area. Masercus fires were seen to be scattered in the town, and a large calumn of black sacks from a presuned oil fire in the dock region was reported by several crews including two who had been dotailed to make a special recommaissance of the target and who obtained photographs with bombing of Duisburg. Soveral fires were reported in woods wost of the river; dumnies in this region appear to have attracted some attention while the three photographs plotted near the sheet of water at Rusoln 4 miles south-wost of the aiming-point suggest that this may have acted as a doc oy for the Rhine. Most reports agree as to the usefulness of the P.F.F. flaros as an aid to target identification, but their effect was sometimes carrod by upward roflection from ground hazo and saw were rather scattered.

Tiring of Attack.

14,	P.F.P.	(a)	Numbor	of	aircreft	borbing	carly:- by 0-5 mins.	= 3 (flare: 	
1	°	(ъ)					late :- by 0-5 mins - 2 sy10-15 mins- 3	= 5	
	1000	(c)		"			in allotted poriod	=11	
	Main Fo	nco	:-	έ.			8 ., ., s	85.0 G	
						CONT 1000Y	4/m ()	• V	

Number of Aircraft banbing early late :- by 0-10mins.13 by10-20mins. 3 by20-30mins. 2 :: =18 in allotted period ±139

Other Targets Attacked.

15. 1 Wellington which failed to reach the primary owing to engine trouble, claims to have attacked an aerodrame on Seiserson Island close to Harmstede. Results were not observed.

Cosucitios.

16. The number of missing and damaged aircraft, and interceptions, are given below.

14 - 14 - 14 - 14 - 14 - 14 - 14 - 14 -		•	Deas	Intercor	tions		
Scrtics	Missing	Flak	Fightor	Both .	Not Enery Action	Attacks	Approaches
207 .	T (3.8%)	26 (12.8,:)	3 (1.49)	1 (0,5%)	2 (0.9;')	10 (4.8%)	20 (9.7)

The proportion damaged by flak is very high and the number of attacks and other interceptions is rather high, as on provicus nights.

. Claims by onony fighters to have shot down two of dir hireraft over the Dutch coast correspond with our own observations. Ever the target a further direraft was probably shot down by a fighter and 5 mere by flok.

our losses, therefore, may be allocated as 5 to flak and 5 to fighters.

17. Examination of the might photographs has revealed that heavy flak wis fairly intense in the target area, being recorded by more than three-quasters of the 39 aircraft, which obtained photographs, plotted within 5 miles of the siming point. The measured intensity in this area is 9 single-gun discharges per aircraft from batteries consisting of 6 guns and unler; there are several references to the use of a flashless proballant on this might. The photographs show no light flak, but 50% record scarchlights.

Summary

18. Although this attack on Duisburg lacked the concentration attained in the provious two rajor operations against Karlsruhe and Brenen, there is no doubt that the main weight of the attack foll on Duisburg and that useful damge was done. The nere scattered nature of the attack can probably be attributed to the thicker ground haze in the target area. The P.F.F. flares were more widely scattered than at Karlsruhe or Brenen; nest reports, however, agree as to their usefulness, which appears to have been greater than that of the 250 lb. incendiaries as a useful of marking the target.

The coat of this operation was about equal to the average for the Ruhr area.

MINELLYING

19. A total of 27 cines were laid (11 in the Melicoland Bight area and 16 in the Frisian Islands region) by 9 aircraft which all accorplished their task successfully, without incident (for details see table).


LE/FLETS

20. 5 mircraft detailed to drop leaflets over Paris, the Hague, Amsterdam and Rhoins successfully carried cut their mission without incident.


MISSING PAGE 5 WITH CONCLUDING PARAGRAPHS AND DATE REPORT WAS COMPLETED

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		11.1.111	11	9 +	1.	1		1	1	140		1	. 2	1
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	1.000	Him.II	4	3						1				
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ToF. 5 .	gring		4.45	ultiday.	Signification of a graduate	Linet.	V.	Recult	Applaty	Decressed	banesd.	lot duo	Att=	Not
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Paris; the Hagun, instandus, Rhoine.	5	WELL.III	2 1	2 										
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	NIGHT RAID REPORT NO. 147 42	
	<u>copy ho. 76</u>	
G	GER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OFERATIONS 7/8th. SEPTEMBER 1942.	
	MINELAYING	
10	logical Advice Submitted to the Command.	
20	10 hours. The frontal system to the west is likely to keep well to the north, and any rain experienced in operational groups will be confined to 4 Group. Even there cloud is not expected to below. Tentative frontal positions of this system at midnight were given astminor warm front just E. of east coast of Scotland. Warm front, Stornaway to E. coast of Iroland, Weak in S Minor cold front, S.W. Frway to Heligoland Bight. Cold Sect. E. S. Danzig, to Broslau, to Yurin. In southern home bases medium cloud, local visibility troubles. N.W. coast of Gormany; large amounts of low and medium cloud; inland, small amounts of medium and low cloud, becoming fine with slight haze S.E of a line from Cologne to Hemburg. Stattin area fine, until near the most distant cold front, where broken medium and low cloud will be found. Towards Nuremberg and porthern France, well	
23	230 hours. Stottin area now expected to be affected by about 5/10ths - 7/10ths medium cloud, which is spreading rather more quickly east than had been anticipated. Cloud height probably 13-14,000 ft. but icing not serious, as cloud will be dispersing rather than forming. Home bases rather more promising then before.	
	10 hours. Target: Stettin: increasing emounts of medium cloud probably less than 5/10ths until midnight. Further west, larger amounts of modium and probably some small amounts of low cloud. Warnemunde: 6-8/10ths medium cloud, 2-3/10ths low.	
	Route adross N. Sea: through two fronts with cloud possibly oxtending to great heights at times, and freezing level 7-8000 ft. Heavy icing possible above this level. Bases: as stated before. All groups expect their stations to be fit for roturn, with only local troubles:	
	10 hours. 4 Group expect rain and low cloud in the northarn part of their group for return, with poor visibility in the south. The other groups anticipate no trouble except 1 Group, possibly after 0300, but there are planty of diversions elsewhere. Conditions on the route as before, with planty of cloud and rain, and no pinpoint likely on the Danish Coast. Targets in North Denmark soon unsuitable as there may be 10/10ths. medium cloud by the time of arrival. At Borkum becastorel	
	Ordors.	
- sh	ellingtons, 9 Stirlings and 2 Halifuxes of the P.F.F were despatched to tak Warnemundo, but a final study of the weather forecast led to the collations of this operation, and to the recall of those aircraft which taken off.	
1	coast of Holland.	
	MINELAYING	
É.		
	cor of sorties dospatched = 43	

1.25 Sea. La Street Lake Number claiming to have mined Primary area = 37(86%) Number of abortive sortios: Technical Defects 3 Navigational Error 1 Mistaken Rocal: Si nal 1. = 5 (11.6%) Missing. = 1 (2.3%) Weather Encountered. -----4. (a) La Pallico No cloud, excellent visibility. (b) St. Negairo No cloud, excellent visibility. (c) Prisian Islands Considerable low cloud moderate visibility. (d) Lorient 22 No low cloud, visibility good, but slight here. 2.461 $\frac{1}{2}$ There was no moon. . Results . 11 20 - 1. 37 aircraft blaim successfully to here laid 72 mines in their allotted 5. areas, In addition two aircraft aimod their 250 1b. bombs at flag ships off the north east extremity of the Ilo de Groix and one aircraft bombed a concontration of flak and soarchlights 2 miles north-wast of Morlaix.' Results were not observed by two of these aircraft, but the crow of the fhird estimate that their bombs fell ...ithin 25 yards of a X flak ship.

-2..

"In"Gee" aircraft were dotailed for the Frisian Islands area (the only Goe aircraft operating on this night) Of the 9 which claim to have mined in primary area, the majority relied on Geo fixes for obtaining the correct positions for laying their minos.

Casualtios

14

*ROMIT

6. No aircraft was damaged as a row! of this operation, but one Welling's of 1 Group despatched to La Pallic is missing. There is no information as to the cause of loss. There were no interceptions or attacks by enomy aircraft. ÷+--500

Target	Group	Type No. of Sortios		Aircraft claiming to mine Primary Area.	Minos	Abortivo		Casu:	
			No. of Sortios			Ovor Enomy	Not Over Enany Coasts	His:- ing	
La Pallice	1	Woll.II	2•	0	0	-	1	1	
		Well.III	2*	2	4	-	-	-	
	1 8	Woll.IV	3*	3	6	7 7 1	L -	-	
t.Nazaire	1	Well.IV	6*	4	8	1	1 1.	-	
	1	Woll.IV	13*	13	26 .	19 - 1 90	-	-	
Prisians	3	Woll.III	8 .	7	14	1-2-	-		
	3	Stirling	3	- 2	8	-	11		
Lorient	5	Hampdon	6*	66	6				
Total			43	37(86%)	72	2	3	1	

* Not fittod.Geo

Total Abortive = 5 (11.6%) Missing = 1 (2.5

BC/S.26342/5/ORS 9th. October 1942. THER COMPLIND REFORT ON NIGHT OFER FIONS 8/9th. SEPTEMBER 1942.

FRANKFULT

logical Advice Submitted to the Command.

20 hours. Owing to warner air working across the British Isles, cloudy conditions are expected at home bases tonight. Cloud very low in the south-west, but not expected to fall below 1,000ft. in 2 and 3 Groups. 4 Group threatened by a cold front approaching slowly from the north-west which may give slight rain and cloud at 1,000 ft. 5 and 1 Group stations will probably escape both threats.

> Much low cloud on the north-most coast of Germany and across Donmark which may penetrate as far as the Ruhr; further southcast conditions fine with slight haze. In the north of Germany considerable mounts of modium cloud, and some broken low cloud on the Baltic coast.

.....

line

225 hours. The cold front approaching Scotland from the north-west new expected to be furtherNorth, which descreases the threat to 4 Group materially and makes it probable that conditions there will be good: All factors favour the carliest possible start: there is a rather strong threat of local fog in the Midlands and S.E., becoming more serious in the later part of the night. Any spread of low stratue from the west castwards will not affect 2 and 3 Groups seriously until late in the night. The heze in the target area may be expected to thicken slowly during the night.

615 hours. <u>All bases</u> fit up to 0300 neart from local visibility troubles W. of 1° E, and some broken strate-cumulus in North, base above 1,000 ft. Later a cleve deterioration will set in but will not become serious un. I towards dawn, with much cloud at 1,000 ft., and visibility troubles underneath. Noute: no troubles -Not much cloud. Yarget: Conditions less certain as recommissance aircraft this morning reported fairly extensive medium or "high low" cloud over Belgium and the Ruhr. All Groups agree, however, that by 2200 B.S.T the target area should be clear, with only -small amounts of medium cloud, if any.

ivo Orders.

It was necessary to go South to find a target clear of frontal conditions, ut the range was limited because of the approach of bad weather...t the most prankfurt was chosen as suiting these considerations, and the stack was timed as early as possible, making allowance for an indirect but to be used.

Number of Sorties despatched = 249 = 192 (77.1%) Number olaining attack on Primary = 14 (5.6%) Mumber claiming attack on other targets 41 Abortivo Sprties:-1.2 Flak Damage 2 Attacked by Fighter 1 Sicknoss of Crow..... 2 Crashed (chuso unknom) 1 = 34 (13.7%) Result not known (aircraft crached on roturn) = 2 (0.8%) (f) Missing = 7 (2:85) A Constant of /Plan of Attack Plan of Attack.

Zoro hour:- 2315 hours.
 Period of Attack:- 2315 to 2345 hours.

The attacking force was divided into three sections:-

(a)	Pathfinders	2315 to 2320 hours.		
1.200	Main Force.			
(b)	Section 1. (incendiary, wave)	2320 to 2340 hours.		

(c) Soction 2. (H.E. Wave)

2335 to 2345 hours.

5. The P.P.P.was detailed to make the target by two methods. The main marking tochnique was by the release of loads of 250 lb. incendiary bombs in a salve, to produce "blob" fires at the aiming point. As a secondary method, strings of flares, fused to open at 1500 feet, were to be released with intervals of 4 seconds between each bundle. Single reconnaissance flares could also be dropped by early crows of this force to aid them to find the target.

5. The first section of the Main Force, consisting of about two-thirds of the remaining aircraft, manned by the most experienced crows was to carry 4 lb. or 30 be incendiaries, or mixed H.E. and Incendiary londs. The second section was to carry only H.E. londs. All aircraft of the Main Force were allowed to release reconnaissance flares, fused to open at 1500 feet, but these were not to be dropped before 2320 hours. The target were to be reconneitred at 2345 hours by one crew of each Lancaster Squadron and by one erew of 12, 103, 150 and 460. Squadrons. Since the defences were believed to be heaviest to the west it was recommended that crews should approach from north to south or from south to north.

7. It was expected that it would be possible to obtain Gee fixes at least as far as 07 E, and it was emphasised that navigators should use fixes on the outward journeys to check wind velocity and to assist in obtaining accurate D.R. and E.T.A.

Routes

8. The briefod routes were as follows:- (see also the accompanying diagram):

<u>1 and 4 Groups</u> Base - Purnes - Oppenheim - Target - turn left - North of Wiosbaden defences - St. Quentin - South of Berck-sur-mor-Base (keeping clear of Charleroi)

P.P.F. 345 Groups - Base - Bradwell Bay - Dangeness - South of Berck-sur-Gr St. Quentin - Opponhoim - Target - North of Wiesbaden - St. Quentin - South of Berck-sur-mor-Dungeness-Bradwell Bay - Base.

Weather Encountered.

9. Bases, Route and Target: Considerable cloud (up to 8/10ths.) at zero how over the target. The amount of cloud became rapidly loss as the attack doveloped. Visibility moderate at home bases, good over the sen, but much haze inland on the continent.

Thore was no boon.

Navigational Aids. ...

 Roports received from 104 aircraft show that the maximum range from Daventry at which a Gee fix was obtained was 491 miles. This, however, was greater by nearly 100 miles than the average range, which was 395 miles. The distance to Frankfurt is 450 miles.

Woight of Bonbs Drouned by /irchaft claiming to attack primary.

Incendiary Bonbs 222.2 tons.

...../12.

erschic Evidenco.

he might photographs indicate that there was a considerable concontrationck on and around Russolsheim.

proor of photographs taken with bombing that have been plotted (see accompanyingral ..

By ground dotail 70	Within 3 miles of Russelsheim botween 3 and 5 miles of "	41 18
By fire-tracks (no fire-plot 0 svailable)	Outside 5 miles of "	11
5+505+-11-10-12 * 1		
		70
litted photographs with bombing:		
Ent have recorded ground detail (all of ofer country)	41
() 教授学者	Total	111

with no ground detail but with fire-tracks that night te plotted. . .

The 59 photographs plotted within 5 mics of the centre of Russelshoin , that this district bore the weight of attack intended for Frankfurt. ges that the course of the river Main near Russelshein, which bears some availance to the course at Free furt led direraft astray; certainly early in e poration incendiarios wore burning in the area of the Opel Works. These with attracted attention and a sonewhat seattered attack developed over the intourhood with small local concontrations near Floraheim, near Opolbahn and s of Russolshoin. The second of these may have been attracted by the decoy 1: II, near Bauschhein - Fhotographs takon in later stages of the operation a many sticks of inconditrics burning both at Passelsheim and in the surrounding. recountry. The 40 photographs taken with become which have recorded fire-rate alone indicate that the aircraft concerned burbed districts where incon-triss were alight. Comparative data area other raids suggests 30 to 40 per at is the proportion of these photographs that could be plotted from fireat patterns and the results would almost or sinly be to reinforce the rather dured distribution revealed by the accompanying disgram.

. Absequent daylight recommission of the second state of these works but a Her of points of damage are seen. Ar area of about 8 acros which contained Stay building and several smaller ones he been completely gutted, and a shed stially destroyed and a number of other buildings have suffered damage. Hits the Bischofshoin marchalling pards have damagod at least 4 tracks and destroyed hilding. . The photographs also show that in the eastern part of the town one is sized and three shall industrial buildings and also two sheds have been thei. / In addition about 40 houses have been desgroyed. The photographic The of the term is, however, by no means complete and the total damage may well - Nusiderably more extensive.

. I survey of crows' reports shows the there was considerable doubt as to met identification of the primary taked. There was also some critician the marking of the target, as follows.

- Flares widely scatte: . many over oven country.
- (b) Flates too high (some ignited at 11,000 feet).
 (c) Flates too late becoming useful only after the allotted borbing period.
- (d) Absonce of coloured marker flares made identification difficult.

in is fairly general agreement that the flares drop of by the P.F.F. in this ick more not as helpful as on provious onersions. There can be no doubt that the was largely due to the difficult weather scattions at the beginning of the tack - 8/10 the cloud courled with considerable ground haze. These conditions Stated the planned concentration of mark r brown and flares in space and time. Whigh the arount of bloud became progressively loss as the attack developed, Sharchlights made identification of ground detail extramely difficult.

3

26

9.

Size good fires were reported in built-up areas but many incendiarios were scattored in open country and woods to the south of the target, which were set ...blaze. There was little concentration of attack in the allotted time; only 56% of the Main Force attacked within the allotted period.

Tota

31

Tining of the Attack.

- -

given below.

22

> 0-5 nins.....5 5-10 mins.....5 10-15 mins.....7 15-20 nins.....7 More than 20 mins....9

(The total number of sorties of P.F.F aircraft does not correspond with the number shown above because aircraft which released flares and bombs at different times appear twice in this table).

6110	a appear our	o in alle capiel.	
	Main Force	(a) Number of aircraft bombing e	arly 0
		(b) Number bombing during planned	d intorval = 94
		(c) Number of aircraft bombing 1.	ate :
	12012	(0) 100000 10 10000	
	(3) (3)		O.Y
	191	0-10 nins	
		10-20 nins	
		20-30 mins 6	
	1 (1) (1) ⁽²⁾	Moro then 302	= 73
Othe	or targots att	tacked.	
	and the second		in in the designed
16.	Targot.	Type of Aircraft.	Reason for not attacking
			Primary.
			and a second fi
	Mainz	Stirling - 3 Group	Not statod.
		Halifax - 4 Group	Lato arrival - fires seen
			Mainz.
	*	Halifax - 4 Group	Hit by flak.
		Lancastor - 5 Group	Mistakon identification.
	8 A	Lancaster - 5 Group	Mistakon identification.
	Wicsbaden	Lancaster - 5 Group	Led astray by P.P.P. flar
	(believed)	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
		Stirling - P.F.F.	Pilot convinced that it ?
	- 38 - 		Wiesbaden which was being
			TITUTHICOG. OF THE
		Wollington P.F.F.	Off track on routo - too
		(10) (20) (10) (2)	lato to attack Primary.
	Darmstadt	Stirling - 3 Group.	Attacked by fighters.
	" Area	Halifax - 4 Group.	Unablo to locato primary.
	Hochst	Lancastor - 5 Group	E.T.A. inaccurato causing incorrect identification
	Alzoy (Railwayling from N.d.)	Lancastor - 5 Group.	Engine failure S.W. of E
	Offonbach	Hampdon - 5 Group	Inability to penetrato
	orionoach	halpdon - 5 Group	intense searchlight defa
	Built-up are		a at a strendard meder
	noar Frankfu	art Stirling - 3.Group	Could not pinpoint owin; extreme darkness.
Ga	multios.		N 34
25.2	141		
17	The number	of missing and damaged aircraft and	d of intercoptions are

...../over

- 5 -

Sortios	Missing	Denazo	. Intercon	
		Flak, Fightor, Other.	Attacks	Not Attacked
249	7(2.8%)	20(8.0%) 6(2.4%)4(1.6%)	12(4.8%)	13(5.2%)

The proportion of aircraft attacked is high, and half of them wore damaged by the attacking fighters.

Our own obsorvations and Wireless Intelligence indicate thatlairer of was shot down, pessibly by controlled fighter, in the Luxenburg-Trior area, 2 (1 by flak) in the Wiesbaden-Frankfurt area, 1 probably by fighter near St. Quentin, and 2 (cause unknown) one S. of Liege and one at Mezibres. A claim to have destroyed a British aircraft at Charleroi cannot be identified. Our lesses may be allocated as 2 aircraft to fighters (1 controlled), 1 to flak, and 4 to unknown causes.

18. A moderate amount of heavy and light flak was reported to have been oncountered in the target area. En route, the coast defences were particularly active. Fhotographic evidence indicates that both flak and searchlight opposition was slight. Half the 71 photographs plotted within a 5-mile radius of Russelsheim show heavy flak of a measured intensity of 3 single-gun discharges per aircraft (which is necessarily a minimum figure). Only 4 of these photographs record light flak, while searchlight activity is shown by one-third.


19. Cloud (in excess of the snall amount forecasted) at the beginning of the attack, and extensive ground have made the task of the P.F.F. most difficult. The majority of that force marked Russelshein in mistake for Frankfurt and the major part of the attack by the Main Force was accordingly directed against the former town, where useful industrial damage was done. Losses were below average for targets in this area.


BC/S.26342/5/ORS. 6th October, 1942.

				annen furituted president		THE REAL PROPERTY AND INCOME.		100 01 5		300.002				
		-	: الله التاريخ 	r berry.	15 - 31, 41 51 barnt dawn	Ore Entry Torritory		not known	Missing	Danaged by Flak	Damagod by E/A.	Not due to enemy Action	Attackod	Dot attacked.
PRANKFURT		W.11	(fla)			1	1	+	1	-		1.1		
FRANKLEDRI		W. 111		9			3	1.	2	18	1			
			25(a)	19		3	2	10	1	3m 1 //C	•		1	2
-		Hx	6	- 14		1			1122	20			1.0	1 1
-	3	W.111		20		-	5		1		18 1		1	1
	-	Stir		24	3	3				50 12	3m		2:	2
	4	W.111	4	3		+.	1		1690 U.					
		11x	.39		· · · · A · · · ·		. 5.			24	1.0	. 32	4	. 3
-	6	Lane	62	53		1 1 1	3			341	140		2	1. 181
		Hamp	9(a)	6	- 1	2.04.434.8	2					The second second		4
		Stir		.7	1.4	ALC: NO.		10.00	11-10-20		1 19	1/2	1	
	-	Hx	6 1	5(0)	181	1 7				ln	10		1	1
		Lane	6	6(c)		4 = - A	1.1			-	1		1.1	
		W.111		7(d)	1	1			C	- E				. 5
1			249	192	14	12	22	2	7	32 1/D 160	1)5 2AC 3m	JE 14.C	12	13

(a) Not fitted GDE
 (b) includes 3 Halifaxos which attacked with the main force.
 (c) 1 Lencestor
 (d) 1 Wellington

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SIGHT RAID REPORT NO. 149 CODY NO. BER COLOUAND REPORT ON NIGHT OFERATIONS 9/10th. 1948 feets الطينية من منه منطقة المنهم المنه المنهم (MINELAYING) the time Spice they shad still to . 12.00 in the second ological Advice Submitted to the Com and. 0915 hours. Estimated midnight position of the cold front, now over the West of the country was from 60° N.15° E, to Bremen, the Brussels, to Brest. L'IL Home Bases: No worries early in the night, but moke troubles medium cloud, but small amounts cannot be relied upon unless a very distant target is selected. Much medium cloud in North Germany, east of the front. Frisians, Bight and N.W. Baltici , suitable for minelaying, but not the Baltic samt of the front, West coast of France suitable, except for a fairly narrow strip near the front, in the Brest area. 1215 hours. Cold front probably further advanced to east and south-east than the position given earlier. Little change as regards weather for minelaying, but good conditions are more certain in the Kattogat and Frisian areas. The Bordeaux area probably only just south of the front, but, at the worst, cloud should be 1000 feet or above. 1550 hours. No change as regards minelaying. All areas expected to be suitable, no cloud below 1,500 feet. 50 hours. suitable, models (Bib table for details). = 34. Number of Sorties.despatched = 28 (82.5%) Munber -olaiming to have mined primary-area Abortivo Sorties:-= 1 (2.9%) l due to flak damage l " ongine failure threatened attack by enemy fighters inability to pin-point = 4(11,0%) Missing = 1(2.9%) ther Encountered; North Seat 'Little or no cloud, rightlity moderate. Prision Talanda North Sea: Little or no cloud, visibility moderate. <u>Prisian Islands</u> and <u>Heligoland Bight</u>: 5/10ths to 7/10ths cloud, base 1500 to 2000 fost, tops 3000 to 3500 fost; visibility moderate. <u>Baltic</u>: No cloud; Visibility moderate to good. <u>Bay of Biscay</u>: No cloud; Visibility moderate. There was no moon. S. A. Schuleric itea 1 and a second To Kattagat Rinkjobing - Khudshoved or Randersfjord or Mariager fjord (according to minolaying area) .----To Gironde ' 'He de Brehat - Argol - Pointe de la Coubro. 24 of the Alexandron States and the state of t/Results. 22.1 . . . n - i.e

Results .

5. 28 aircraft claim to have successfully laid 111 mines in their allotted areas, and one Lancaster, which was unable to mine its primary area (the Kattegat) owing to its bomb doors jamming, jettisoned 4 mines in the Staggerak, the estimated position being 8 miles due east of Lökken (near the Skaw]. 50% of the aircraft which were operating in the Heligoland, Frisian or Texel areas used Geo fixes (either alone or followed by timed runs) for laying their mines. Most of the remainder were able to obtainvisual pinpoints on the enemy coast, and made timed runs from these "fimes".

. F

Casualtios.

6. 1 Lancaster of 5 Group detailed for the Kattogat area is missing but there is no information as to the cause of loss.

Two aircraft received minor damage from flak, one at the French coast (Morlaix mea) and the other in the north Denmark area.) One Stirling orashed, owing to engine failure; shortly after taking off; the aircraft was completely wrecked, but the orew successfully bailed out.

BC/S. 26342/5/ORS. 11th. October 1942.

			6 J		2		()*/ ·						
(1130) (1130)	Group	TYP	No. of Spriins	A/C claiming to mine primary area	A/C claiming to mino alternative mice.	No. of mince laid (Prin. area)	Over Znony Coasts.	Not over Enouy	Miloning	Flak	Not Energy Action	Atlacked	Not Attackod
Prisian	3	Stirling	9	7	- 9 2	38	r	1		-	15		
Holigoland Bight	3	Woll.III	5	5	-	10		-					
South of Joxel	3	Woll.III	3	3	-	6	-	-		·			
Setuary	5	Sirline	6	. 6		24	1	-		1 minor			-
attegat	5	Lanoautor	7	4	1 2	27	12		1.	1 minor	-		
(Aalborg sron)	5	Lancastar	4	4		16	-						<u></u>
Total			34	29	1	312	3	1	1	R minor	12	-	1

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OVOT

able

Bomber Cornand Roport on Night Operations 10/11th optenbor

DUSSLIDAR

Motoorological Advice Submittud to the Command.

ALL'S STAR

7.2321

and the second s

1, 0920 hours. Homo Bases: Visibility moderate, in all areas till 0300, then local mist troubles developing in the S.E. but not in the northorn basos.

NIGHT REID REPORT

Targot areas; Focblo cold front cast of Danzig to Broslau to Nuremberg, Sonc strato-cumulus on N.W. constal strip which might penentrato as far as Bromon, Hamburg and Kiel. Further inland, fine with slight hazo over the Ruhr and upper Rhine, Patches of mudium cloud and strato-cumulus south of Mannhoim and in morthern Gormany. Conditions very favourable for production of artificial moto screens.

1315 hours. Hazd of Dussoldorf would be thick, with no cloud. The chance of clear skies at Bromen now sceme to be better, and the visibility would be a good doal better. Otherwise no change.

> .7

. . 1600 hours. As at 1315.

Executive Ordors,

The choice of targets was limited by the necessity for an early roturn before 2. the onsot of fog at the bases, particularly so because less experienced crews from 0.T.U's were going to be included. Dusseldorf was the target chosen since, apart . from hazy conditions, weather was expected to be good and no difficult navigational problems would be given to the O.T.U. crows.

N. 14.1.2

Sorties.

3.

the store .	8.67		1. 1.	•	
(b) Number	of Sortios despatche reporting attack on reporting attack on	Primary		5 10.151	
(d) Abortive	Sortios:-	· · · · ·			
		ots			
1	faulty navigat	ion	•• •		
50 C (144	crow wounded o	y flak		÷*	
* <u>8</u>	damage da taba	-off		54M	
- F - 7	lata taka af	-011	. 1	A +	
	1 Taro caro-orr		62 6	2(13.0%)	
		See.	1000 C 100	and the second second	
a - 1960 - 1	not known Aircraft crashod on	•••••		5(1.15) 0(6.35)	
++ (a) Engi	ne# 1 36	(f) Hatches	. 2		
	ata 5	(g) Gyro	· 1		
 (o) Sign 	ats 5 als (7.7) 3 orcon, 3	(h) Underca	rriago l		
(d) Int (e) Oxyg	orcon, 3 on 2	(1) Bomb ro	lease gear 2	··· •	
· · · · ·	N MAR	¥	5.8.8	4.14.27	
lan of task	1	11.	34	ે પૂર્વ	
Zero hour:- Foriod of a	2215 hours. ttack - 2215 to 231	0 hours.			
Tho attack	ng fordo was to bo	divided into the 1	collowing section	mas.	- 62
1		1. 19 Mar 19 Mar	аланын т И _{лт}		
Pathfinder	Force.planned.to	consist.of.24 aircr	aft zoro to zer	ro + hadins.	

Minin Porce.

Main Porcof (a) :11 aircraft of 5 Group.....zoro + 3 to zoio + 15 m (b) .11 aircraft of 1,4,91,92 and 93 Gps.zoro + 15 to zoro + 50 -(c) .11 aircraft of 3 Group + 13 .zero + 45 to zero + 55 aircraft of P.F.F..... Seat and Fathfindor Forco. Loads wore to be as follows:-No. '7 Squadron 6 aircraft - 12 x 3 flares. 6 x 1000 1b. g.P. 1 x 3 rod flaros 1 x 3 grocn flares. 4 aircraft - 15 x 250 lb. incondigrios. - No. 35 Squadron No. 83 Squadron 2 aircraft - 1 x 4000 lb. incondiary 1:124 6 S.B.C. of 30 1b, incondiarios. No. 83 Squadron 6 mircraft - 8 x 4 flares 2 x 2000 1b. H.C. 11 1 x 4 rod flares. 1 x 4 green flares. No. 156 Squadron 6 aircraft - 6 x 3 flares. 3 x 500 1b. G.P. 1 x 250 1b. C.P. 1 x 3 rod flaros. 1 x 3 groen flaros 15 5 1 x 3 groen flares.

The main markor technique, to be adopted by the P.F.F., was to illuminate the target by strings of reconnaissance flares, fused to open at 1500 feet, the bundles to be released at 4-second intervals. On definite identification of target, stoady rod flarss wore to be dropped in addition at the west end of the town and stoady groun ones at the east ond, ... The auxiliary marker technique consisted in "blob" fire-raising by the release of loads of 250 lb. incondiers in a salvo at the beginning of the attack. "Two very heavy incondiarios burning with a palo yollow flame word also to be dro pod experimentally. Some of the P.P.P. woro also to reloaso H. .. bombs to discourage potential firc-fightors. 2. .

· · ·

Main Force.

105 G

6. The first section (a) of the Main Force was to consist of 3 Lancasters, each carrying 1 x 8000 1b. H.C. bomb, the romaining Lancastors with mixed loads of H.E. and 4 1b. or 30 1b. incendaires and Hampdons with H.E. only. One crew fra each Lancaster squadron was to reconnoitro the target at 2230 hours to report the progress of the raid. The bomb-loads of aircraft in the second section

..... wore to be similar to those to be carried by the Lancasters of 5 Group. Air of 4 Group, however, were to carry both 4 and 30 lb, incondiaries in their min loads of H.E. plus incondiaries. Halifaxes were to carry 6% of the explosive type of 4 lb. incondiary boxb. Beconnaissance of the target at 2305 hours w to'bo carried out by one erow from each of 12, 103, 150, 300 and 460 squadrons All aircraft of 5 Group togother with 9 aircraft of the P.F.F. which had not allotted the task of marking the target, were detailed to wind up the attack. Wellington 423's wore each to carry 1 x 4000 1b. H.C. bomb; 6 Stirlings wore carry 500 lb. G.P.bombs, while the romaining aircraft wore to carry maximum 1 of 4 1b. or 30 1b. incendiarios. 6% of the 4 1b. incendiaries were to be a explosive type. Special emphasis was laid on the importance of adhoring str to the times over the target which ware laid both for each Group. No crow of main force was to release bones or flares before zero hour + 3 minutes (2216 hours), and after that time only experienced crews of the operational groups to be allowed to release flarge, if required, fused to endit at 1500 foot on target. Inexperienced crows and 0.T.U's were not to release any flares with 50 milos of the Target.

.

..../7

124 4

Goo Instructions,

7.

Target corroction-factors were to be used at Ground stations to cancel the 2nd. docimal place of the target-coordinates. Navigators were werned that interforence might render it difficult to use the hering procedure in the target area, and that they were therefore to pay careful attention to D.R. and E.T.A. If the hering procedure were adopted, navigators were to approach from N.W. to S.E. along the 'B' lattice, from a point not more than 30 miles from the target.

Briefed Routes (Soo also the accarmanying dierran)

8. All Groups: Base - Ouidorp - Dussoldorf - Julich - Noordland - Base.

Weathor Encountordd.

9. Basos:- Fine, but widespread fog forning after 0300 hours. Reuto:- Fine; good visibility. Target:- Fine; but hazy. There was no moon.

Weight of bombs drouped by aircraft reporting attack on Primary.

10.

3.6	1.1.1			100 C		-2 TO: THOOMATCHICS + H.D.	_	**	
	16 ¹¹ 10	н.		· n		30 20, """		62	
		*		н		4 + 301b. incondiaries + H.E.	-	33	
					**	250 1b. inconditrios aloba	=	4	
			·		. 11	4000 1b ". "	. =	1	
	1.0	1.1.1.1.1	it is or it			1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	84 - 43		

Nevigational Aids.

Βv

11. Reports received from 136 zircraft show that the average range from Deventry, at which Gee fixes could be obtained, was 34- miles, this distance being very nearly equal to that of the target (348 miles). The maximum range at which a Goe fix was obtained was 397 miles.

Mint Photographic Evidonco.

RESULTS

12. Mumber of photographs taken with bambing that have been plotted (see accompanying disgram):

ground dotail		
	within 3 milos	
	batwaon 3 & 5 miles	
	outsido 5 miles	
		100

The night photographs indicate that a very considerable concentration of the attack was achieved against Dusselderf, the evidence suggesting that at least 50% of the aircraft reporting attack did in fact bond within 3 miles of the aiming point, while a further 10% bombed the docks, marshalling yards and built-up areas of Nouss. 8% of the weight of attack was diverted on to open country from 1 to 6 miles uset of Nouss, while the neighbourhood of Bulker and Vierson 15 to 20 miles that of the aiming-point received perhaps 15% of the attack intended for Dusselderf. This was made up of separate attacks by individual aircraft throughout the planned period of the operation.

pl

No fire-plot has been undertaken for this raid but with the considerable photographic cover available possibly one half or more of the photographs taken with bombing which have registered fire tracks alone might be plotted, and the effect of their inclusion would be to reinforce the existing distribution.

The contral built up area of Busselderf and the industrial suburbs to the cast received the main weight of atlack and the night photographs show there a great concentration of incondiaries, smoke from well established fires, and a number of H.2. incidents. Incondiaries were also recorded burning in the decks and warehouse area of Neuss. There is no evidence of any decoy in action west of Neuss which might account for the few aircraft which bembed the open country there, short of the target.

a series -

13. Day Roconnaissance.

The success of the operation is shown by subsequent daylight recommaissance which reveals very heavy damage throughout the towns of Dusseldorf and Neuss. In Dusseldorf the greatest compentation of damage is in the centro of the city where there is very extensive denige to business and private property. Over low acros between the Rhine and the main railway line have been devastated and many public buildings, officos, shops, and blocks of flats have been dostroyed as woll as numerous industrial premises and warehouses. The total devastated aroas amount to about 120 acres and, in addition, a further 75 houses have been destroyed. 19 industrial promises have suffored heavy damage or complote destruction and 6 more have been loss howily damaged. Those that have boon severally damaged include an iron foundry, a chemical factory, an enamel works, a stool tube works, (the greater part of which has been destroyed) and a factory making insulating materials (completely destroyed). In addition some of the warehouses in the inland harbour have been burnt out. The main railway station has received a direct hit and half the main block of buildings is wrecked. In addition there is a hole 100 yards long in the main roof over the platforms. There has been damage to the track in other places, a shod has been jutted and 2 others damaged in one part of the town, and rolling stock in Derenderf marshalling yard has been damaged by fire. The Post Office and postal administration buildings and the tolograph office have been seriously damaged, as have a Savings Bank, the main Tramway Depot and the State Observatory. In Nouss 5 large factories including a chemical factory have been sericusly damaged as woll as many industrial promises and warehouses. The town Gas Works has also sustained serious darage. Railway buildings no .r the Roundhouse have been damaged and the track damaged in a few places including the junction of the Munchen-Gladbach, Aachen and Cologne lines. Three schools have been soriously damaged. In the residential and business districts in the centre of the town 13 acres have been dowastated and there are many other single points of damage.

Narrative of Att.ck.

Six of the crows detailed to make special reconnaissance of the target 14. (paragraph 6) took photographs, with bombing, which have been plotted in the target area. Their reports, and the statements made by other crows who also photographed the target, show that the bulk of the reconnaissance flares released wore accurately placed, on time, and excellently illuminated the target. Some flare's, however, opened at far too great a height. The red and green marker-flares also released by the P.F.F. wore the chief means of target identification by many of the following aircraft. Some reports stated that these flares were dropped indiscriminately over a wide area, but it scemes probable that this apparent scatter was the result of enemy imitation flares. One crow reported socing red and green flares at intervals along their return r ute. There are several references to "chandelier flares", which were reported to have been shot up by the energy on this occasion to heights of about 12,000 fest, where they ignited and slowly sank. It is more likely, herever, that these ware released from aircraft, and belonged to that type of multiple flare, recently used by the commy with the probable. Sidet of assisting fighter attacks. Soveral crows found their illumination helpful in marking the target. There are vary fow references to the 250 lb.incendiary "blob" bombs, but the 4,000 lb. incondiary dropped by a Lancaster of the P.F.F. at 2226 hours was identified by several crows, some of whom refer to the gigantic yellow flame produced, which holped them to identify the target. : :

-4-

The three

The three sections of the Lain Peres which followed the P.F.F. were mainly successful in identifying and bombing the target area, although a properties of the attack foll short, to the west of Dusselderf. Thus, perhaps 15% of the aircraft attacking bombed the Dulken-Viersen district and between 5 and 10% dropped their bombs west of Neuss where a number of incondiary sticks were seen to be scattered in open country. Considerable ground haze (which had been for east) and encrmous numbers of searchlights mide observation of results difficult. The defences were found to have been very considerably strengthened since the large scale read of July 31st/August 1st. Hewever, many large fires were seen to be well concentrated in the town and towards the end of the attack smoke was rising to 8000 feet. Soveral crows who bended at this stage stated that the effect was furnace-like in its intensity.

Timing of the Atteck.

(as flaros and bombs are included in above, the number of circreft shown in this table is greater than the number actually attacking in this period)

MAIN FURCE.	Number	of	aircraft	boal	bing carly	-	l(by 3 mins)
(i)		18			lato 0 - ly mins	21	
		**			" 10 - 20 "	3	<u>)</u> ::::
				u	" 20 - 30 "	2	
		**			more than 30 mins	2	= 28
	• •		**		In Allotted Period		= 316
			1.				

Other Targets Attackod.

16. 14 aircraft claim to have attacked the following targets in liou of the primary: Neuss, unidentified built-up area west of Dusseldorf (2 aircraft), aerodrome 20 miles We t of Dusseldorf, Uudderp aerodrome (2 aircraft), abrodrome on Overflakkee, Coedcreede aerodrome, Venle (3.E. side), lights en Walcheren, triangle of lights neur Julich, Julich tewn, Grevenbreich and Hamstede aerodrome. In 8 instances, engine treuble was the cause of alternative attack, 3 aircraft were late in take-off or on E.T.A., two were unable to locate the primary, and one made a mistake in identification. In most instances definite results were not observed, although at Overflakkee aerodrome a reddish fire was seen to have been started.

Dofonces.

17. Moderate to intense flak (chiefly heavy) and several large cones of searchlights aware reported in the target area. Nearly three-quarters of the night photographs which have been plotted within 5 miles of the target show heavy flak from batterics of 6 guns or under, the measured intensity (and this is necessarily only a minimum figure) being 8.8 single-gun discharges per aircraft. : Only one photograph in every 15 shows light flak. Three-quarters of these photographs show searchlights; enly 8 photographs cut of a total of 4 (in the target area) show no flak or searchlights. Thus the intensity of both flak and searchlights in the target area appears to have been high. The offect of this high rate is seen in the large number of aircraft deleged and estimated to have been brought down by flak.

Casualtios.....

Casualtics.

18. The numbers of missing and damged aircraft and reported interception are given below:-


Sortios	Missing		Detter	Interceptions.		
		Elik	Fightor	Not Encity Action	Attacks	Other
476	30(6.3%)	39 (8.2,)	1(0.2,3)	(مزا2.1) با	15(2.1%)	26(5.5)


The propertion of atticks is normal, but from the available informatic it appears that only one of them caused any damage. This is an unusually 1 proportion and cannot be explained by cloud or other weather conditions. Our own observations and wireless intelligence indicate that aircraft were shot down as follows:- Over Dusselderf 5 were lest to flak, 1 to fighter, and 3 to unknown causes. 3 aircrift were shot down in an area south of Eindhoven (1 by flak). In the Overflakkes -Jeheuwen area 7 aircraft were shot down by fighters (4 controlled) and 1 by flak. laircraft was reported to have been lest 15 miles N. of Antworp, and another was shot dev at West Kapelle. Our lesses, therefore may be allocated as 17 aircraft to flak, 8 to fighter and 15 to unknown causes.

Sucreary.

19. This attack on Dussoldorf achieved groat success. The target was accurately marked by the P.^F.F. in spite of senewhat hazy conditions, and the was only a relatively small amount of misdirected bombing by the Main Feren Very heavy damage was done in Dusseldorf and Neuss. Lesses were relatively higher than is usual on raids in this area, perhaps mainly due to a considerable strengthening of the flak defences since the last attack.

BC/S.26342/4/URS. Novombor 1st 1942





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· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	TOHT B	LID 12 11 No 151-
a k	CODY NO	16 a 140 942
BOMBER C.430ND REP	URT ON MIGHT OPERATIONS 13/14th S	EP T1'BOR 1942
4	(BREISEN)	r

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

F. 0915 hours. At home bases no troubles are expected, apart from local smoke haze towards dawn. Over Germany, visibility should be good in the Hembourg-Bromen-Kiel area, although there will be small amounts of stratecumulus cloud. To the south of the northern Constal strip, much cloud and thunderstorms are to be expected.

<u>1100 hours</u> Little change is probable from the advice given at 0915 hours as regards conditions over the north German constal eres; after midnight 3/10ths to 4/10ths layer cloud is likely to be found, but there would probably be clear patches over any particular eres.

1230 hours. Although conditions at the bases are not expected to be so good as was considered earlier they are still likely to be fit. The advantages of a late attack are doubtful, as the amount of cloud at Bremon might tend to increase rather, than decrease during the night.

1545 hours. Bases are expected to be fit for the take-off, and most of them should be fit for return. South of a line from the Wash to Bristel, 8/10ths to 10/10ths strate-cumulus cloud is probable; but the base should be above 1,500 feet and visibility good. North of this line, variable amounts of strate cumulus cloud will occur, with local visibility troubles at dawn. In the target area there is a rick that Branch may be as much as half-covered with cloud at any tize in the night. En route to Branch, much strate-cumulus is likely to be found between 2,000 and 5,000 feet in the westerly part of the route but this cloud should become progressively thinner to the East.

2200 hours 4 Group will probably need iversions to the south for their aircraft, after 0500 hours. 93 Group are also likely to need alternative landing-grounds. The other Groups will probably be able to handle their aircraft at their cam bases, making only local diversions, where necessary. The cloud base will probably be about 1,500 foot in all groups

1. 18

Executive Urders

2. As this was one of the mare occasions when no time limit was set on the operation by weather conditions at bases or target, it was decided to attack the target in two where, the second wave being timed to begin its attack one how after the first had withdrawn. It was heped that this interval would allow considerable fires to develop at the target, would eatch the ground defences confused and disorganised, and that the two streams of aircraft going in opposite directions would help to disorganise the fighter-control.

Serties

3. (a) (b) (c) (d)	Numbor Numbar r	of Serties Despatched reporting attack on a oporting altack on a o Sertics:-	Primery	trīgota .	=	446 353 (79.1%) 10 (2.2%)
	6	(Engines	31			
		Electrical system	7			
Tochnical	defects.		3			
12.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.		Intere cunication	5			
	1	Turrote and guns	4			
(583)		Miscollensous	4	26		
		Atteched by fighter	1			
		Sicknoss of cruw	2			
1		Unablo : locato				
		tarect	2			20
i -		Grash i on this off Stusie unhout	1			62 (13.9%).

J. 1.1.1. (Cent.

. (o) Rosult not kn.m (aircraft or sh A on rotufn (f) Lissing . . .

Plan of attack.

1. 1. 18.

addit of

Zero hour Ollo hours:

-(- P. L. F. (plaunod to consist I at (Derait) . .0115 to 0120 h 1st soction

= 1 (0.25

= 20 (4.59

2.0 2nd soction(hiroraft of 1,91,92, and 95 Groups and Hampdons

(Incendicry (Have) ("ireraft of 3 Group and 11 aircraft of 2.F.F. 0255 to 0305

This contion was planes, in ... Setting. The Pathfinder Force ini 5. Gr up were exposed to be able to at rt fires between 0115 and 0130 hours which would be will established by elte hours, when mireraft of Section 2 w dotailed to stare Westratt en. Thus seen a s to be a lull of ene hour or The archite or force and ellotted two functions, & the czurse of the raid. " their time ever the target between elle at elle hours. "They ware to illus the target area when recommensance first and start "blod" fires at the air point with advect of 200 lb. intendicty costs. Aircraft of 35 Squadren, bidipped with dark TV recommendation to concentrate on laying their

including on the cost cost as striy as casible in the attack and proe foral geint. The very hirs, inconting bases (COUVID) were to be droped 2 becaustors wring this acrist. The flavor carried by aircraft of this force work fused to Lenite a 150% over the target and me coloured identifie flares were to be used.

> Benb loads:- 7 %. . :/C 10 . . flares + 6 x 1000 1b. C.P. 35 3 . 4 1 1 x 250 1b. incondimines.

> > 83 31. 242/0 E x C Charles + 1'x 4000 lb.inconliary

C & x & flaros + 8 x 250 lb, incondiarios.

... 11: St. 9 4/C 1: x 5 flages + 6 x 250 1b. incondiarias.

Between oll8 and old hours all "escenters of 5 Group whre to attack a they wore not to been been to the P.S.A. had had time to illuminate the target . adequately. The west erone were to cate this chase of the attack between .0118 and 0125 hours, in order to guide the lose experienced creave to the tar, only specially soldered or as is . is section wors to carry flares and they whre to be related in ensuriance due valual instruction passed by 5 Group opulations.

Botacon 0250 and clds source all 4 Group aircraft, carrying mexican 5. commissi incomilary 1 als, sore to thesh. Special cross wore to be solectel to make processessance of the sight at 0840 hours in order to repon the programs of the rail. The next e stien consisted of all aircraft Nos. 1, 91, 92 and 95 Gr aps with the Pargelons of 5 Group, carrying incended or H.E. leads. One area offic, bod, 150, de See squadrons were to be dete to report on the success of the side of theurs. Aircraft of this seets were to be ever the target between while all olds hours. During the last w minutes of the attach (6855 to the Lenter direraft of 5 Group, including 4 of the P.F.F. which were batalle, as wart of the main force, were to attack t incondiarion. Half the strong t war ... carry 4 16 and the other half 30 H incondicrios.

Every effort was to as eals to a time to the alletted times over the to Crews which word dettiled to "theel between Gebe and 0005 hours were warned to expect well established first to the falle wint but to take care to avoid decoys.

God Instructions

'7. All mavigators muts to use Got fit estained on the outward journey to chock wind volcoity and shours accurate DE to the turning point and accurate Targot ETA

14

9.

.Routes Briefed

The briefer routes were as follows: (see also the accompanying diagram): 8. 1 Group. - Mable thorpe - North of Texel - South of Delmenhorst - Bremen turn right - Basaum - Enkhuisen - Matlethorpe.

3 Group - Base - Croper - North of Texel - Assen - South of Delmenhorst -

Bromen - turn right - Baseun - Enden - Southwold - Base.

4 Group - Scarborough - Toxol - Bromen-Enkinuizon - Southwold.

5 Group . - North of Toxel - Brenen - Bassun - Enkhuizen - Base.

Weather encountered

10

9. Bases :- Fine north of Wash; local mist and res patches developed from 0200, more particularly in north Lincolnshire. Fair to cloudy south of Wash, with very

. low cloud South of T ares; occasional rain; maderato visibility. Reate:- 7/10tha - 10/10ths layer cloud over North Sea, tops 4,000 to 5,000 foot, base 2,000 to 3,000 foot. Variable encounts of medium cloud, with one re-port only of slight rim. at 12,000 foot. Cloud bre king from Holigeland towards .taget.

Tarrot; L'inly cloudloss; occasional patches 2/10ths cloud, tops 2,000 to 3,000 feet; considerable haze. Wind at ground level moderate, westerly. There was no moon.

Weight of Bombs dropped by Aircraft claiming attack on Primary

1	· **,*		second as		1 . 5	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
0.	H.E. bom	bs: 364	tons.	(in	luding	CCC8 x ≜ :	1b.)		
1875	- Market - Shark			1000	(1	07 x 4000	1b.)	7/	-
					(5 x 2000	16.)		
1.15		8 (A)			1	12 x 1000	16.)		34
2	25 XXX22 1				(1	22 x 1000	1b.)		
1 99	Incundi	ary bombs	: 568	tons.					
	No. of	riroraft	corryi	1g 4 1b	. incon	diarios a	nd H.E.	-	18
	n . u	1. 19	3				alono	=	84
				1 1h an	d 30 1b	. incendi	arios(mixed)		
							nd H.E.	=	31
35	No. of	aircraft	c.rryi)	N: 30 1	b. inco	ndiaries	and H.E.	=	84
	n					n	lona	=	26
	18			250 1	b; "		Ħ,	32	10
				4000 1	b. "		."	-	2

Navi, ational Aids

Reports from 94 sireraft show that the average distance from Daventry at · 11. which Goo fixes were obtained was 373 miles. A small proportion of aircraft were able to obtain fires at the target, 422 miles from the master station.

RESULTS

light Photographic Zviderco

12. Photographs taken with borbing (see accorpanying diagram) : Plotted by grean, detail ... 59 Within 5 miles. . . . 32. .Botwaen 3 & 5 miles 18. Outside 5 miles . . . 59.

> Umplotted photographs (with borbing) : that show ground detail (all of open country.] 58. with no round lotail but with Fire-tracks that might be plotted 64.

No fire plot is available for, this raid, but even so it is evident that the attack was not so compontrated as the last operation against Bromen 9 days carlier. The photographs show that there were local concentrations of attack in the contro of the city, and in Sudervorst near the Focke Wulf works. 15% of the plotted photographs (nearly all taken by circraft in the first wave of attack) lie in even country between Dolmonharst worodrame, and the Honstedt doc oy, approximately 122 miles from the centre of Bromen. The decoy wea photographed at 0124 when it was not, how wor, in setion. f the photographs (with bombing) that have regist red fire-tracks alone, the positions of possibly one third (21) wight be fixed if a fire-plot were undertaken. In considering their effect on the existing distribution, they should be allotted between the concentration on

1.2

Brown, and the cluster to the south-wost, in the properties of the plotted photographs. This suggests seen such figure 20 or 25% for the properties of the aircraft reporting attack which did in fact boxb within 3 miles of the contro of the city.

The photographs taken in the first wave of the attack recorded impendiaries alight tainly in Sudervorst east of the Vocke Wulf factory, and in the old torm. Only 11 aircraft of the second wave of attack obtained photographs with ground detail within the 5 mile circle, round the aiming-point. The earliest photograph from this phase of the operation show new sticks of incendiaries alight, but the position is uncertain as ground detail is lacking. The photographs do not suga that well established three remained from the first period of the attack.

One of the earlier photographs from the second phase(at 2,40) shows sticks of incondiaries burning in Suberverst - including one across the geredroms. The minutes later, fires and anote from bond bursts were photographed in the morth of the old city, and in Deterturnerverst, and subsequently fires in east and south Bremen were recorded by other airCraft. Only the aircraft from the second phase of the attack have been platted in the cluster 12¹/₂ when south-woot of Bremen.

Day Recompaisminco.

13. The Filet of a Mesquite which based cleap to Breach on a lay operation is fellowing day reported large fires in the city which were visible for 50 miles is daylight. SubSequent photographic reconnaissance has covered only part of the city and some suburban districts. At the Freke Hulf-works at-Rouenland 18 of : group of single storey shids, situated near the dispersal standings, and probabused for storage have been destroyed. The main part of the works hewever, des not appear to have resolved any fresh damage. The buildings of three other factories in Henon and, including a woodworking factory, have been burnt out. In Hastedt two median rised buildings, probably the bloyd Dyname Works, have be damaged, one being suited, and the other half-distroyed by H.E. In this neight hood also three scall shelp at a manufactury of ernoured fighting vehicles and Motor transport have been destroyed. Soveral incidents of damage to houses at seen in these suburbs which have been covered and in Suderverst there are sover areas of devestation, including one of 35 acres.

Narrativo of Attack.

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14. The P.F.F. found very thick have at zero hour and had great difficulty is finding the target; the flares which they dropped to mark it were, in general, scattered. However, some flares were correctly placed and these assisted that P.F.F. crows who were carrying 250 lb. 'marker' incondiary brabs to drop some, least, of these banks close to the aiming-point. The "blob" fires thus raised were report that they saw end of the 4000 lb. immediaries burning mills a reddish-yellow glew within the target area at 6125, approximately. An 8, "I H.E. book was dropped, at about the same time, by a Lancastor, which obtained a photograph with bending, which has been plotted within 2 miles of the aiming Flares.

These aircraft attacking in the first wave, which obtained photographs a the target area, report that a useful flare cluster was dropped at 0130 and a 4 minutes later, both being accurately placed. The searchlight glare was inand several crows compared it to a "wall-of-light" effect to the West of Brain

15. Aircraft attaching in the second wave found the firm started by the full wave still alight; at 0230, the fires were extensive, but sectored. At 025 a crow which obtained a photograph of the target, reported that fires were but north-west of the airing-point, and that there was one particularly large firsouth-east of the assenger station.

There are several reports of indiscriminate banding to the south-west of Branen. Dolmenherst was sinted to have altracted a part of the attack and is suggest that the Honotedt decoy situated about 13 miles south-west of Brazen, have been in action. Thick have and stoke made pin-pointing very difficult is there was also more clead during this since than was executived by the first wave. In spite of the difficulties of observation, the last crews to attack reported very large fires in the built-up area of Brazen, all of them boing for in colour.

Timing of Attrok.

16.	(2.F.F. ins short string of flares w (hour, 9 strings (including 1 short st	
	(period, an! 7 strings (1 short) word	late (4 between 0 and 5 minutes
	(late, and 3 between 10 car 15 himutes (borbs were iropped in the planked int	
'lst		0 and 15 minutes and 1 by 21 minutes).
WAYO.	Alexandra and a second second	a) (a) (a) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b
	(5 Group (except Handons)	
88	(No. of aircraft banbing ourly	= 1 (by 1 min.) load: 1 x 8000 1b.bccb
1	(No, beabing in allotica period	= 76
	(Ne. boubing late .	= 13 (0-10 minutas)
	(No. of aircraft boning early	= 21 (4 'aburcon 30 and 10 mins.)
2nd		17 " 10 :ni C ") 1
	(No. of aircraft louding in militted	
1931204 (C)	(= 215.
	(Ne. of aircraft Labing 1.00	= ? (0-5 mins.)

-5-

N.B. In the above analysis of tiday the scaration is into the two major attacks only; the scarate stations of such attack have not been, distinguished.

Altornative Terrots attac.ul.

17. 10 minoraft chain to have atteched the following targets in liou of the primary:- Syke (1 aircraft), Texel considers (1), becauries conducte (1), bingen (1), Obienburg (2), a fight ship off the decision falands (1), flak or Searchlight positions in arti-cast Hollant (2) and in the month German constal area (1). The reasons for failing to attack the primary zero technical defects in seven instances and lateness of take-off or late on Z.T.A. in the remaining three.

Casualtica.

18. The numbers of diversit visiting, darged and intercepted in each wave were as follows:-

•	Sertios	Missin,		De er	41	Intere	c.tod
			T.ak	<u>Fi hi-n</u>	Not Brory	<u>Attophed</u>	Not Attroited
lst Wave: 2nl Wave:	1.	4 (5.1/.) 16(5.0/.)	11(0.5;) 50(12.0	, a(2,5,/)	10(3.2%)	13(4.1 %)	5(3.9%) 33(10.4%)

Total: 446 20(4.69) 49(11.0) 2(1.0) 17(0.2) 15(2.9) 28(8.5%)

The properties of missing algorant of the second ways is more than 50% greater than that of the first. The ratio of flak hum re-between wayes two and one is also nearly 2.2. Moreover, only 4% of the first ways reported interceptions, none of which developed into attachs, whereas the them 10% of wave two were intercepted and 4% attache by fighters. Men considering the higher elevality rate in the second ways it must be berne in and that that section consisted of those types which usually show higher less and each percentages; however, the above figures suggest that the plan to confus, ground delences onl fighter centred by splitting this attack into two sections, separated by a one hour's interval, was unsuccessful.

Our own observations in soats that is aircraft of has first wave and 4 of the second wire dust from by flak over Bremen, and that one siteraft of weve two was destroyed in the target area by a flighter. Incred is one report of a collision over the target. Outside the target area, it is a chable that 4 aircraft were shot down by fighters, 3 in the wells-legten area and 1 near Sneek. Our losses may be allocated therefore as 6 to fighters and 9 to unknown causes of which 2 may have been due to collision.

19. Very intense light fink and mentrately income heavy flak (the latter being either of the producted type or with the co-o, ration of searchlight comes) were

.. ...

reported to have been one-untered over the target. Night photographic evidence confirms the strongth of the opposition and initeates that both the flok and searchlight defences of Eremon were nerve intense in this attack than on the last raid on the city. Thus, on this eccasion, more than four-fifths of the photographs, which have been plotted within 5 raises of the target, show heavy flok of a measured intensity of 14 single-gun discharges per circuit carpered with a proportion of just over one-half, and an intensity of 9, for the raid on September 4/5th. -Both figures give necessarily only minimum views. The proportion of photographs showing light flok on this and the provides attack are three-fifths and one-half respectively, and it is noticed thy that the concentrative intensity expressed by these percentages is unusually high as pared with that for other targets, including much heave been greater outside the target than ever bearen itself, being recorded by three-fifths of the photographs plotted wichie 5 miles but it here for the four-fifths of these outside the target than ever bearen itself, being recorded by three-fifths of the photographs plotted wichie 5 miles but it are seechight of these outside the radius. There is withere of the provide seechight activity that on the weaters of the provide set of the second provide the provide second by three-fifths of the photographs plotted wichie 5 miles but it are seechight activity that on the weaters of the provide second provide the provide the provide second provide the provide the provide the provide the provide the provide of the provide second photographs plotted wich is a miles but it were second by

Summary

20. The daylight photographic evidences though incomplete, shows that this attack on Bremen was probably leas successful then the last maid on this target, possibly because of secret visibility, due to abscise of about 214-thicker haze. Nevertheless, much useful industrial decays was also particularly in the Heatedt and Neuenland districts. In spite of thest inteness first and searchlight opposition, lesses were not appreciably above average for this target, though there is no evidence that they were reduced by the subdivision of the attack into two sections.


50/3. 26342/CR3. 15th November, 1942.


urgot	Group		No of Jortian	Aircraft reporting attack on Primary.	Aircraft roporting attack on altornative	Cver Deritary	Not ever Enany Territory	not)iligoin	g Danagod by flsk	Danagod, by Energy aircraft	Not 7	soked	Att- scked
1/22:	2.2.2	stilling	1.8	7+		1	1			15				
allor?		Hallfax	15	5+			1			111				3
	1 3	Lane.	16-			i secolarization	T1			læ			+-+	
	in the second	Weil.11.	112	64		13	1		12					1968-1
		Wg11.11.	6.	5		1		1	11					+3
	1	mol1.111	. 16	10	1		3	1	12	0				21160
	· · ·	Woll.1V.		23	1	2	11		11	30			11	21 We 3) ty
		Halifag	7	5			2	1.5	1	ln	140	LAC	11	unkhos
- 3	3	Holl. 111	, 28	25			3			1n				7
		Stirling	43	33	1	11	7	1	1	1E. 11.7a		1H.1/C		4
	4	Halifax	36	27		12	15	1	11	146.40	14	1.2	2	
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	5	WING .	198	90	11			-	2	1/10 1/1/00			-	2
	-	Hamdon	7.	5		12	1		-				-	
		Whitley	104	9			-	-	11	ln -				2
		Wall.ic	454	29	1	2	7	-	6	7m	10.1.2	142 34	2	4
• •		We11.111		<u> </u>	2	12		-	-	25			12	~
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		Holl.	3.72	24	2	1	10	-	2	30	1.1	112.1/2	14	3
		19011.10	22.	16			5	-	-	UC 20		per une	+	
		W11.111		3			-		-	22 34	PE 20	BE 18	13	38
		2.115	46	353	1.	14	40	1.	24	34 412		10 21	r	

Total Abortivo = d2

Not fitted Goo + of the F.F.F., 3 Stirlings, 3 Halifaxes and 1 Wellington attached with the Main Force in the second wave.

341





COPY No. 1.6 344

AFTENDUM - NIGHT RAID REPORT NO. 151.

BOMBER CONCIAND RE ORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS, 13/14th

SEPTEMBER 1942.

BREMEN.

Daylight reconnaissances were carried out on 1st October and 23rd renber, 1942. These cover the results of the night raid of 13/14th tember and a few items from previous raids photographed for the first e. The prints are of poor quality; and the cause of a number of ridents cannot be clucidated.

No vory large areas of devastion can be seen, but heavy damage is itered all over the town. Industrial and residential property have bered equally, and about 60% of the total damage appears to have resulted in fire. Industrial buildings that have been hit include the Lloyd one works, the Borgward engineering works, a jute spinning and weaving mill, a considerable number of smaller industrial buildings. In addition, in warehouses have been partially destroyed. No damage is visible in Pooke-Wulf aircraft factory at Neunland, although eighteen huts of an inpment north of the works have been devested by H.E. This was probably irkers' settlement. The Schauspiel Haus and the Doutsons Bank have been iroly damaged by fire, and the State Huseun by blast. At least 300 we have been destroyed.

.26342/3/ORS. January, 1943.

YD,

BANBER CONCLARD REFORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 14/15TH OF WOLLDR. 1942

345

(WILFELMSHAVEN)

Heteorological Advice Submitted to the Conand

1. 0910 hours :- At midnight a feeble dath front was almost stationary, from Stadtlandet, to Tynemouth, to Anglesey. Visibility troubles at bases will be local only. Clear skies are expected over the whole of north Germany, but there will be some haze. Further south there will be variable amounts of cloud at all levels with an expectation of thunderstorms this evening.

1245 hours:- There is now a more terimits threat from the south due to a slow northerly drift of the thunderstorms over morth France. At bases, south of a line halfway between Yarmouth and Folixstowe to Ress, there is now a threat of cloud below 1000 feet, certainly late in the might and perhaps even all night. North of this line, but south of a line from the Wash to Penbroke, skies may be clear, but fog may become wide pread in the latter part of the night. Further north no cloud is expected but there may be a who troubles.

1610 hours: The enset of rain in the south has raised the dew-point of the air there, and for this reason all baser south of a line from the Wash to Bristel are expected to be unfit owing to low stratum or fog soon after midnight. Stations in 1, 4 and 5 Groups are expected to remain fit until between 0200 and 0300 hours, and will probably offer suitable diversions for 3 Group's aircraft. 6/10ths medium cloud has now been reported in the Heligoland Bight, contrary to expectations. This cannot be ignored, the scalar amounts at heights of about 10,000 feet must be forecast for the heaping and Wilhelmshaven areas, with rather more at Bremen.

1830 hours: Stations in 1, 4 and 5 Groups will be safe diversions for 3 Group's aircraft. There is an even chance that 3 Group's stations will also be fit.

Executivo Orders

2. Dotoriorating weather conditions at bases, especially in the south, made an early return necessary, thus enforcing a short range. Wilhelmshaven was chosen as a suitable target, where favourable weather might be expected.

Sortios

 (a) Number of Sorties despatche: (b) Number reporting attack on Primary 	= 202 = 182 (90.14)
(c) Number reporting attack on other targets.	= 3 (1.5%)
(d) Amertive Sorties:	
Tochnical defects = 12	
Inability to identify target = 1	
Bombs released prematurely = 1	
Unknown; crashed Thr take off= 1	2000 (100) (100) (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (100) (100) (1000 (100) (1000 (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (1000) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
15	. 15 (7,4%)
(c) Missing	= 2 (1.0%)



Flan of attack.

4. Zero hour: 2200 hours.

· Period of attack: 2200 - 2230 hours.

.....

Pathfindar Force (19 mircraft) ... Zero to zero 4 5 mine.

Main Forces

(a) All aircraft of 3 Group zero + 5 mins, to zero + 15 mins.

(b) All remaining aircraft (including 6 P.F.F. aircraft)

zero + 10 mins to zero + 30 mins.

5. It was intended that the Pathfinder Porce (19 aircraft) should operate over the target between 2200 and 2205, releasing bundles of reconnaissance flares and incendiaries. The flares were intended to provide sufficient illumination of the target area for location of the aiming-point, while the incendiaries were to be released in salves to produce blob fires. Aircraft of 35 Squadron, equipped with Mark XIV loop-sights, were to concentrate on releasing their incendiaries exactly over to centre of the aiming-point, as early as possible in the attack.

Bomb loads:-	4 Stir.	14 x 3 flares + 6 x 1000 lb. G.P.
	5 Hal.	15 x 250 lb. incondiaries.
	5 Lanc.	6 x 4 flares + 8 x 250 lb. incendiaries.
	5 Well.	12 x 3 meres + 6 x 250 1b. incondiarios.

6. The first section of the Main Force consisted of all aircraft of 3 Group, attacking with maximum oconomical incondiary loads of 4 lb. or 30 lb. incondiaries butwocn'2205 and 2215 hours. Aircraft in this section woro warned against roleasing their loads before the Pathfinders had had time to illuminate the target. Tho second soction of the Main Force consisted of all aircraft of No's. 1, 4 and 5 Groups + 6 P.F.F aircraft, 3 Lancastors oach were to carry 1 x 8000 lb. H.C. bomb, the othor Lancastors were to carry mixed loads of H. E.and incendiary bombs. Halifaxes and Wellingtons, with the exception of Wellington 423's, were to carry incendiary The poriod of attack for this section was 2210 - 2230 hours. Aircraft of loads. the Main Force were permitted to use reconnaisence flares, if this seemed nocessary, fuced to ignito at 1500' but these flares were not to be dropped by any aircraft of this force before 2205 hours. One aircraft of each of the Lancaster Squadrons as will as one from each of 103, 142, 150 and 300 Squadrons were detailed to reconnoitre the target at 2230 hours, with a view to making in interim report of the progress of the attack.

Geo Instructions

7. It -- s considered likely that reception by Gee sets of all three pulses would be set factory as far as 6°E, and ma igntars were to use fixes obtained west of this point to check wind velocity and assist DR. to the target. The position on BTA at the turning-point was to be checked by Gee to ensure setting the correct course for the target.

Routos:

B. The briefed route for all Groups was are follows (see also the accompanying diagram): Fase - 54°N. 06°E. - Wilhelmshaven - turn left 54°N. 07°E. - Base.

Weather Encountered,

9. <u>Bases</u>:- Variable amounts of cloud. A few local mists or fog patches leveloped by midnight, but dispersed towards dawn. Cloud, below 1,000 feet, iffected areas south of a line from Felixstowe to Fembroke, and there was occasional light rain.

Route:- In the west part of the North Sca route 7/10ths to 8/10ths cloud mas or prienced, with base at 4,000 feet and tops from 6,000 to 9,000 feet.

In the Contral North Sea ar 1, 10/10thr cloud was encountered extending from between 3,000 and 4,000 feet upwards to 6,000 to 10,000 feet.

A second, higher layer of modium cloud in varying amount, was present botween 10,000 foot and 14,000 feet.

<u>Target</u>:- Variable arounts of low cloud and thick haze were reported in the target area, nevertheless a number of piveraft obtained photographs of excellent quality. Wind at ground level was 0 - 5 m.p.h. from the east. There was no mean.

Navigational Lids.

10. Reports from 139 aircraft show that the average range from Davontry, at which Gee fixes could be obtained was 313 miles; some aircraft however, were able to obtain fixes at the target, 395 miles from the master station.

Woight of brobs tropped.

11,	(a)	H.E. bombs	159	tons	including:	1	x	8000	1b.	
					NA BARANA MARKAN	61	x	4000	15.	94 () 14 ()
						2	x	2000	16.	
					* 1	4	x	1900	1b.	
		- 22	1.	29		33	x	1000	1b.	
	1.	201								

(b) Incondiary bombs 269 tons.

	19	unber	of	aircraft	carry	ying 4 1b. incendiaries + H.E.	m 23
						4 lb. incendiaries	= 54
1	-	н.			11	4 1b. + 30 1b. incendiarios+H.E.	= 19
						30 1b. incondiarios + H.E.	= 34
		4.				30 1b. incondiaries	= 20
		"	"	"		250 lb. incondiaries	= 15

Photographic Evidence.

B

12. Number of photographs taken with borbing that have been plotted (see accompanying diagram:-

by ground dotail 60	Within 3 miles	34
By fire tracks (no fire-	dotwoon 3 and 5 miles	10
plot available) 0	Cutside 5 miles	16
Implotted photographs with berbing:	-	60
that have recorded groun	d detail	27
	Total	87
with no ground detail bu	t with fire-tracks	
that might be plotted :.	approx.	20

The night photographs show that a very fair proportion of the attack fell on Wilhelmshaven. Sticks of incondiaries were burning in the dock area, in the text and suburbs to the north and west as the attack developed. Two particularly large columns of snoke came from fires in the built-up area a little north of the docks. A photograph of the Rüsterriel docer taken halfway through the operation shows that it was not then in action, for does the Etzel decoy seem to have been in use.

13. In examination of the reports of these creas, who obtained photographs of the target area, shows that assessment of results and identification of ground detail were extremely difficult, exing to the thick haze. Several crows report having spent up to 20 or 30 minutes in coarching for pinpoints. There is fairly general agreement that the P.P.P. flares, though not concentrated in space or

ż

time, did, in fact, approximately ring the target and were useful in illuminate it, during cortain periods. The general accuracy in the placing of flares is confirmed by the fact that soveral crews who bombed by flare-light, did in fact obtain photographs of thotargot. The omlier privals report that the first fires started were scattered and failed to get a good hold, Lator leports describe at least one large, concentrati fire, from which the glow was visible at distances of from 60. to 80 miles. Several crows report having observed 4000 1b. bomb-bursts in the town and near the docks. There are several reforences to a particularly large explosion in the dock area near the end of the period of attack. Only two of those crows, who had been dotailed to make a special reconnaissance of the target, succeeded in photographing Wilhelmshave and their reports confirm that, although there was considerable scattered bombing with only a fow fires early in the attack, a large number of incendiaries foll in the town at about 2220, starting fires, which ware burging well at the end of the raid.

Timing of Attack,

Owing probably to the haze, and consequent difficulty of target location 14. only 4 of the 19 Pathfinders detailed to mark the target did so in the allotted period. However, two-thirds of the flares had been dropped by 10 minutes after zero hour and the flare illumination appears to have been practically continuous from zero hour to zoro + 15. The 250 lb. incendiaries were fairly evenly distributed in time throughout the whole of the planned period of attack (with the uncertion of the first five simules, during which and was followed.

Main Force (Both soctions)

Numbor	of	aircraft	bom	bing ourly	6-0 m	inutos)	4
		u		during play	nned into	rval	150
				late: 0-10	minutos	8	
		(A)		20	•	1	
							 . 0

9

There were considerable intermin, ling of the two soctions of the main force; 16 aircraft of section 1 (Inceniary wave) dropped their bombs late and 8 aircraft of section 2 bombed early.

Other Targets Attacked.

Three aircraft report that they bombed the following targets in lieu of u 15. primary: Wesermundo, Enden and an aerodrome 4 miles north-cast of Norden. The reasons for not attacking Wilhelmshaven were: (1) the heavy flak encountered at Wesermunde and (2) a late take-off or estimated late arrival in the other two instancos.

Casualtics.

16. The numbers of aircraft missing and damaged, and of reported interceptic are as follows :-

				Danagod		Interco	
S	ortios.	Missing	Flak	Fighter	Not Enery Action.	Attacks.	Oth
1	202	2 (1.05)	Flak 12(5.95)	1(0.5)	1 (0.5%)	6(3.0%)	011 9(4.1

The proportion of aircraft missing is unabually low, and the proportion damaged aircraft and interceptions are al - les. No interceptions or claims c~ trolled night fighters zere heard. our own observations indicate that one one losses was probably due t. flak over the target and that the other was probably not caused by enemy action. The low casualties are no doubt partly due to the extremely short time during which our aircraft were over energy The thick haze at the tallet have prevented the use of search territory. lights, and, since there was no moon, night flighters were leas able to make interruptions.

Photographic evidence confirms > comparative inactivity of soarchlight 17. and also of flak defences at Wilhelms: (12). on this occastion. Less than onehalf of the 47 photographs, plotted within 5 miles of the aiming-point, show The measured intensity (and this is necessarily only a minimum heavy flak.

-5-


figure) is 2.4 single-gun discharges per torait from batteries of 4 guns or less. Light flak is recorded by just over ene-thin of the photographs and searchlights by less than one-third. Of the sixteen photographs plotted outside the 5-mile radius the proportions showing heavy flak and searchlights do not appreciably diffe from those quoted above, but there is no evidence of light flak.


Summery


18. Though the weather was indifferent this rail undoubtedly achieved considerable success at a very low cost. The part played by the P.F.F. in marking the target, in spite of the thick have, is not sorthy and may have contributed largely to the useful results estained. 90% of the sorties report having attacked Wilhelmshaven - an unusual is high propertien.

BC/S26342/2/OFS. 4th November, 1942.

				Printry Aron.	alturnativo targoto.	Enory	Energy Torritory	nat. known	dianing.	by Plak	bunagad by Enony Airoraft	to Enorry	ALLISKOG	Not Attacked
WILHZELIS-	PFF	Stirling	28	4				<u> </u>		1.1				
HAVEN		Holifax	Ba	<u> </u>				+			14			2
		Lans astor	40	5		1	8 *		+		1.10		_ 1	
	1	Woll. II	98	4			1		1 1				-	
a 8	1 1	Woll, II	0.*	8					-	2 a	-			
S 8		Woll, IV	0	26					-	2 0				2
(c) 13	1 1	Halifax					1					-		
19	3	Woll, III	24	26					1	1 /10				-
	1 .	Stirling	23	17	1		5			1 12				
• · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Service	-						1	1 n				
**	14	Haligna	10	19		1	2 - CO (S)2		-				2	
t. j	1.1	7.11.III				1			1					
SU - 8	1 5	Lamater		56	1	1	5			3 m				
	1						N		1	1 40			1	3
		Harriton	1.0	3	X				-	-		11	And in case of the local division of the loc	
S. 3		Total	202	162	3	1	14		2	3 20	2850	in the second se	222	•
						1		-	1	9.8	1.4	10	£	9
2		1		anna an	anna se									
		<u> </u>	Not f	ding 3 Halifax, do	1 Abortive = 15 Ailod to attack	with the :	oc and sect	an of t	tho Main	Poreu.				- 34
		÷		1 Lancastor, 2 Woll.III,			: :	:					8	
		x x		1 Stirling,					* *		- cč		- 3	
											1			







 0930 hours. The estimated positions, at midnight, of the four fronts now in existence are: (1) a warm front, from 59°N. 17°E. to 54°N.24°E; (2) a cold front, from 59°L 17°E. to 49½ N.11°E; (3) an occluded front, from 58°N.
 14°E. (South Sweden) to immuneim to La Pallice; (4) a second occluded front from 60°N.12°E. (East of colo), to east of Harburg, to east of Cologno, to Nantes. At the bases, there will be little cloud and moderate to good visibility.

At the bases, there will be little cloud and moderate to good visibility. Over Germany, east of the second occluded front, there will be much low cloud with occasional rain; over the North Sec coastal strip of Germany, there will be convection cloud with breaks. Inland over Germany, some 40 to 50 miles behind the second occluded front, the alount of cloud is expected to lessen and visibility should be good.

1255 hours. There is no change i'ven the advice given at 0930 hours. 1600 hours. Bases: All bases are expected to be fit all night.

Targets: 6/10ths. to 9/10ths. c reaction cloud will probably be found in the Prisian Islands region with bases at 2,000 to 3,000 ft (down to 1,000 to 1,500 feet in excasional, thundery shows a) and tops up to 15,000 feet. Preezing lovel is expected to be 5,000 feet. The wind velocity is likely to be 30 m.p.h. at the surface, and 40-45 m.p.h. it 2,000 feet. The position of the Le Pallice target area in relation to the frontal systems is uncertain. It is possible that this area will be well behind the second occluded front soon after midnight; in this event the cloud should then be dispersing; but even if it be found necessary to cross this front in the Le Pallice region; the cloud base is unlikely to be below 1,000 feet.

Sorties: (for details see attached toble)

2. Number of Serties despatched = 40 Number claiming to have mined the primary areas = 35 (87.5%) Abortive Serties: (Engine trouble......2) (Unable to pinpoint....3) = 5 (12.5%)

Mabor of Minos Laid

3. The number of mines laid by aircraft claiming to mine the primary areas=98

Neather encountered

 At bases; fine, little cloud, good visibility. Frisian Islands - Kuch heavy convection cloud, becoming 10/10ths at 1,000 feet, lecally. Some thunderstorms and hail.

Route to Frisian Islands : - Fine in the west, becoming cloudy castwards.

Wind at 2,000 to 5,000 foot; 40 to 50 z.p.h. from W. N.W.

Girondo :- No cloud, slight haze.

Route to Girondo: - Locally, over France, 6/10thsto 8/10thscloud, tops 4,000 feet; elsewhere, little cloud.

In the Brisian Islands area, the moon, which has 31% of full, set after 7 sireraft (out of 26) had laid their minus. In the Gironde estuary, the moon set before minulaying began.

Results

5. <u>Prisian Islands Area</u> 26 aircraft report laying 63 minos successfully in their allotted positions. About half these aircraft were able to obtain visual fixes on the various Gast Prisian Islands, including Langecog, Baltrum, Juist and Schiermannikoog. 11 aircraft, however, rolied entirely on Gee fixes, and 1 dropped minos on E.T.A., being unable to obtain a Gee fix or a visual pin-point. The aircraft which were unable to pin-point sore, almost without exception, the earlier arrivals. This indicates that weather conditions were improving in this area during the minelaying period, which extended from 2052 hours to 2230 hours. Three aircraft abandoned their task, two in the Cuxhaven area and ence in the Sylt Island region, because they were unable to obtain any pin-point.

/6. Gironde ostuary.

. 6. Gironlo estuary. 9 circraft report 1 ying 16 minus in the allottei positions. One rine was seen to explode on hitting the sea.

All these aircraft ware able to fix their positions visually by pin-points on L'Ile de Ro, Ile d'Cleron and Pointe de la Coubre. The period of minelaying in this area was from 2222 hours to 2545 hours.

Casualtius.

7. No aircraft is missing from these operations, but one Wellington crashed on landing, owing to collapse of the understringe, sustaining damage of Catoric в.

There were no reports of attacks or interceptions by anaxy.aircraft.

T	1			Aircrait		Abortiva		Louis
Tarijut	Group	Туро	llo, of Sortics	claining tò ninn primary aron.	No. of ring: leid	Cver Enomy Terri- tory.	Not over encay torri- tory.	Not dus to encry actic
cisian Islando	1	Woll IV	+15	12	24	3	-	1, Cat.3.
		, Woll JIS	· 3	3	6			
а.	3	Woll III	9	3	16		1	
		Stir- lin;		3	17		1	
;irondo Estu s ry	3	Stir- linj		9	35			•
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29th ictobor, 1942. BC/S. 26342/3/ ORS.

See.

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OPY NU

BOUBER CUMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 16/17TH SEPTEMBER 1942.

(ESSEN)

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Contand.

1. <u>0915 hours:</u> The estimated midnight positions of the two existing fronts are: warm front, from $57\frac{1}{2}$ N. 10° W.to south-east Ireland to 47° N.05°W: cold front, from 50° N. 20°Z. to Vienna to north Italy. Over north-west Germany, fine weather is expected inland with good visibility, which should extend to the coast, where there may, however, be broken convection cloud. Moderate visibility and some medium cloud are to expected at home bases. Winds over the North Sea (at 15,000 feet) are expected to vary from about 50 miles per hour south of 53°N, to 60 miles per hour between 53°N, and 55°N. from a direction of about 300°.

1235 hours: A minor warm front, ahead of the main warm front, will probably have reached central England by midnight, by which time medium cloud from it is likely to have spread some considerable listance eastwards, probably as far as the Ruhr; however, it is not yet possible to say how much cloud will be found in that area by midnight. Visibility should be good. The existence of this front is not expected to affect home bases seriously, though visibility may be poor locally.

1600 hours: In the Ruhr, small amounts of modium cloud are likely to be encountered up to midnight, after which the amount of cloud is expected to increase. Conditions at bases are uncertain late in the night. Both these factors favour as early an operation as possible. The wind velocity and direction at 15,000 feet is expected to be 55 miles per hour from 305°, but the velocity will probably be less by the time of return. The route recommended is a southerly outward route and a northerly return.

Executive Orders

2. The very high wind forecast for this night necessitated the choice of a short range target. This condition, and the small amount of cloud expected, were likely to ensure better visibility than usual in the Ruhr, so that Essen was chosen as a specially suitable target in the circumstances. The full strength of the operational Groups, supported by contingents of the 0.T.U.'s was employed.

Sortics (See table for details) /

		10000000
. Number of sorties despatched		= 368
Number reporting attack on pr.	imary	= 244(66,3%)
Number reporting attack on ot		= 12(3.3%)
Abortivo Sorties:		
Technical defects	= 53	
Attacked by fighter	■ 6	• E
Sickness of crew	= 4	53 Statis
Unable to identify	= 3 .	
	= 1 .	š
Reason not stated	= 6	= 72(19.6%
Rosult not known (aircraft cr	ashed on return)	= 1
🜙 Missing		= 39(10.6%)
-		10 ¹⁰

Plan of Attack

4.	Zero hour 2200 ho	urs.	2-
		Period of Attack	
Path	finder Force(planned	to consist of 19 aircraft)	zero hour

Main	((a) aircraft carrying mixed H.E. and incondiaries.		zero	+ 3	to	zero	+	20	mins.
	 (b) aircraft mostly carrying incondiaries and a few aircraft carrying H.E., (c) aircraft carrying incondiaries only. 	4 (1)							mins.

5. In this operation, aircraft of the Pathfinder Force were allotted the task of marking the target between 2200 and 2205 hours for the Main Force. The technique to be adopted consisted in the release by 3 Stirlings of bundles of reconnaissance flares, at 6 second intervals to form long strings across the target area between the positions 51°27'N. 06°57'E. and 51°26'N. 07°06'E. at zero hour. Other aircraft of this force were to endeavour to drop short sticks of reconnaissance flares across the actual aiming-points at 5 or 4 second-intervals. The 4 best crows of Lancasters were then to drop salves of 250 lb. incendiaries on the aimingpoint when it was illuminated.

Bomb loads : - 7 Stirlings - 24 x 3 flares 4 Lancasters 14 x 250 lb incendiaries 2 Lancasters 14 x 4 flares 6 Cillingtons 18 x 3 flares

5. The first wave of the Main Porce consisted of the Lancasters of 5 Group, which were to concentrate their attack on the mark provided by the pathfinders' salves of 250 lb. incendiaries if they were catisfied that this was the correct aiming-point. These aircraft were to be over the target between 2203 and 2220 hours: the majority were to carry loads of 4000 lb H.C. bombande up with 30 lb. incendiaries and these aircraft were to load this phase. A Lancasters (3 of 97 ; and 1 of 106 Sq.) were each to carry 1 x d000 lb. H.C. bomb and the remainder were to carry loads of 4000 lb.H.C. bombs made up with d lb.incent taries. One crow fr each squadron was to be detailed to reconduct the target at 2220 hours and report on the progress of the raid.

7. The second wave consisted of all aircraft of 1, 91, 92 and 93 Groups and al Wollingtons of 3 and 4 Groups. The Wollington 423's and 0.T.U. aircraft with pupil crows were to carry H.E. but all other aircraft were to carry incendiaries. This phase of the attack was to last from 2215 to 2240 hours and the best crews with incendiary loads were to lead. Special recommaissance reports on the success of otherwise of the raid were required from one crew of 12, 142, 150 and 301 squadras

8. The third soction of the Main Force consisted of the Stirlings of 3 Grap and the Halifaxos of 4 Group carrying maximum occnomical incendiary loads. The time over the target for these crows was from 2235 to 2245 hours. No aircraft d the Main Force was to drop flares within 10 miles of the target. Every effort m to be made to adhere strictly to the allotted times over the target. In view of the heavy defences of the target, air bombers were to be cautioned against the danger of undershooting the target and to boware of decoys. Gee fixes obtained the outward journey were to be used to check which volccity and target FTA, which were considered to be of the utmost importance in view of the high wind forecest.

Routos

..

9. The briefed route was as follows : see also the accompanying diagram. All Groups : Base - Kampen - Essen - Altenkirchen - Malmedy - Furnes - Base.

Woathor Encountered

 Bases: Pair, with well broken cloud and good visibility. Route: Broken layer cloud, with good visibility. The wind at 15,000 feet a 45-60 m.p.h. from 300°

.Target: Variable amounts of layer cloud, usually less than 5/10ths, was reported at 4,000-6,000 foet and at 8,000 - 9,000 feet. The amount of cloud decreased during the operation. Apart from some haze visibility was reported " have been good.

Some 15 of the night photographs show thick strato-cumulus cloud, while in other the vague outline of ground detail suggests that haze was present, at least in patches.

The moon, which was 42% of full, set at 2205 hours, 1.0.5 minutes after sero how

Woight of bombs dropped by aircraft reporting attack on primary.

11. H.E. bombs

202 tons, including 1 x 8000 lb. 71 x 4000 lb. 45 x 1000 lb

Incendiarios		299 No.			drappi	n7 6	16	mondiaries	+	H.E.	
	1										- 1
	1					- 4	15			only.	100
						30	15.		120	H.E.	
82	-1					30	12.			hales	
8	1						19.0		100	only.	
	- No	- 21	- 2			410	+ 20	10.	٠	Re De	
						250	16			only.	•

Savigational Aids

12. Reports from 99 aircraft on the performance of Goo show that 6 aircraft succeeded in obtaining fixes at the target (355 miles from Daventry). 1 aircraft bombod blind on Gee, while the other 5 were able to check their fixes by visual identification. The maximum range at which a Gee fix was obtained was 420 miles, which is somewhat greater than the distance of the furthest turning point (Altonkirchen). The average range at which fixes could be obtained was, however, considerably less, namely 307 miles.

Results

Photographic Evidence

13. Number of photographs taken with borhing that have been plotted (see scompanying diagram):

By	ground detail			les	
Зу	firc-tracks(no	fireplot		5 miles	
	available		0 cutside 5 m	iles	19
	* w vas val rev			a	40
	photographs (wi				
that have	recorded ground	detail	(partly built-up	areas)	16 -
			(moon country	1	
		0 - Electric - E		district in the second second	62

with no ground detail but with fire-trecks that might (approx)...... 40

14. The plot of photographs represents the best concentration over achieved against Essen. The 21 photographs within 5 miles is one-third of the total number of photographs with ground detail, while as the diagram shows, some of the aircraft bombing outside 5 miles from the centre of Essen have obtained photographs of industrial or built-up areas in the Ruhr where useful damage may have been done. Some of the 6 unplotted photographs showing built-up areas largely obscured by cloud may well fall within 5 miles, and there is no doubt that but for the cloud and haze the number of photographs with ground detail would have been larger. Many negative frames exposed with bombing have recorded fire-tracks alone, and in some 40 of these the tracks are sufficiently characteristic to give a likelihood of their positions being identified if a fire-plot were undertaken. The evidence is hardly sufficient to permit an estimate as yet of how the existing distribution of photographs would be modified but it is unlikely that there would be any considerable changes.

15. Only six flare-carrying P.F.F. aircraft claim to have reached Essen. these six, four, which were unable to obtain visual pin-points (owing to cloud and darkness) released their flares on Gee or E.T.A. and some undoubtedly fell outside the target area, being reported by crews whose photographs have been plotted at distances of up to 15 miles north, wost and south-west of Essen. The two remaining P.F.F. flare-carrying aircraft report that they succeeded in pirpointing their positions from the Dortmund - Ems canal, 3 to 4 miles North of Esson, and their reports are substantiated by half a dozen creas who were able to bomb the target by th illumination of the flares dropped, obtaining confirmatory photographic evidence of the position. However, as both these aircraft released their flares at approxinctely the same moment, illumination of the target area can only have extended over a short interval, and aircraft which bopbed after 2220 were forced to rely on fires for illumination. Pin-pointing was made difficult by darkness and by the hazo, which coourred at ground level in spite of the strong wind at operational heights. Although the half-moon sot at the beginning of the operation, cloud amount was then large, and there is general agreement that it was vory dark throughout the period of attack. Examination of the reports of 11 those crows who obtained photographs of the target area shows that only a few small scattered fires were burning in Essen before 2215 (15 minutes after zero hour) but that these increased in number and size during the next 10 minutes, later arrivals reporting several large fires and many smaller ones in the town. There are also several references to a large explosion which occurred near the end of the attack. The available evidence indicates that this raid was much more successful in its later stages than during the first half; this was probably due, in part, to the decreasing amount of cloud and better visibility encountered by the later arrivals and to the lack of illumination of the target during the early stages of the raid. Nono of the crews detailed to make a special reconnaissance of the target obtained photographs of the target area. Most of them mentioned the difficulty of assessing results owing to haze and arkness.

..../Timing of the attack

Timing of the attack Pathfinders

16. 6 P.F.F. aircraft, carrying flares, roport having illuminated the primary. Of these, one released flares 10 minutes before zero hour, two in the allotted interval while the remaining three wore late - one by 1 minute and two by 3 minute The three Pathfinders carrying 250 lb incondiaries, who report having attacked Esson, were 3, 5, and 6 minutes late respectively, in releasing their bombs.

<u>Main Force</u> Number of aircraft bombing carly: (by 7 minutes)......

" " " " in planned interval...... = 2 " " " late (0 to 5 minutos)..... = " " " late (0 to 5 minutos)..... = "With the exception of the last section, of which about half bended before their allotted times, timing by the three sections of the main force (all aircra other than the P.P.F.) was accurate, and there was little overlapping in excess the planned amount.

Other targets attacked

18. 12 stroraft report that they attacked this following targets in lieu of the primary: Duisburg (2 aircraft) Hamborn (1) Oberhausen (1) searchlight and flak concentration in the eastern Ruhr (1) and 7 aerodromes in Holland (4 in the Alber district, 2 south of Rottordam and 1 on the east side of the Zuider Zee). Reason for not attacking Essen were technical defects in 7 instances, violent flak or searchlight opposition in 3 more and feilure to find the target in the other two instances. About half the aircraft, which attacked these other targets, saw the bombs burst, but further results were not observed.

Casualties

19. The number of aircraft missing, damaged and reporting interceptions are given below:

Sorties	Missing	Flak	Damago	Not Enemy	Intercep	tions
1217/11-121722			Fightor	Action		
368	39(10.6%	48(13.0	\$ 5(1.4%)	4(1.1%)	Attacks 17(4.6%)	36 (9.5)

The percentage of aircraft missing and damaged by flak is high. The percentage attacks is average, but less than a third of these caused damage. This suggest that a greater proportion than usual of the losses was due to flak.

20. Wireloss intelligence indicates that 44 sorties were made by controlled night fighters, and 9 claims to have destroyed our aircraft were heard but only one corresponds with a report of an aircraft seen shot down,

21. Our own observations indicate that at loast 6 aircraft were shot down by flak over Essen. 7 aircraft were reported to have been seen destroyed by flat other places in the Ruhr, and 3 in the Zuider Zoe area. 2 more aircraft were n ported to have been shot down by light flak at Ostend and Liego, and two were probably destroyed by fighters (including 1 controlled fighter) near Antwerp. losses can, therefore, be assessed as 18 to flak, 2 to fighters and 19 to unknot causes, of which the most probable is flak. These losses were probably due to concentrated flak and searchlight defences of the Ruhr operating under favoure conditions - intense darkness and comparatively little haze.

22. The heavy flak opposition was intense and accurate, though probably not more formidable than usual at this target. The methods of fire control report to have been used included predictor control, "deterrent" (at searchlight inten ions) and barrage. More light flak was reported than in recent raids on the P most of it was probably of 3.7cm.calibre, but the presence of 6 cm.guns is indi by observations of destruction of aircraft by tracer shells at 18,000 feet. Searchlights were reported to have been operating in particularly large cones, co-operation with heavy guns. A number of balloons were observed over Essen at heights of from 10,000 feet to 12,000 feet.

23. Photographic evidence confirms the intensity of heavy flak and searchlid opposition, but gives very little record of light flak. Mearly all the 39 phographs plotted (21 within 5 miles of the target and 18 outside) show heavy flat and searchlights. The measured intensity of the flak was 12.2 single gun discharges per aircraft in the case of these within the 5 miles' radius and 10.4 these plotted outside. These are necessarily minimum figures and probably fall outside. far short of actuality because of the incompleteness of the photographic evidence.

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Surmary.

Caplote results of this attack on Essen cannot be estimated until daylight 24. photographic cover has been obtained, but the night photographic evidence makes it reasonable to expect that considerable damage was done. The relatively large amount of scattered borbing was probably due to (a) the lack of illumination and incorrect placing of flares by some of the P.F.T. and (b) the intense flak and searchlight opposition. .


25. The casualties were probably due mainly to flak.

BC/S.26342/4/ORS 9th November, 19


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142,50	or out		Sartium	reporting attack on primary target.	reporting attack on alternative targets.	Dear Enery Torritory	Not over Enery Torritory	net knows.	(Janin)	Duraged by Flak	by Eonomy Aircraft	Enerty	ALL- acked	Net Att- ackod
IS SET	P.P.F.	Woll.III	- 7	4.		2	1			1 AC	11	10 +	3	1
SCORE !		Stirling	6	2	2.10	1	2		1		eter destruit des			2
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- 1	1.	Well,II	30	3	1				l'and	-	60 C			
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3	3.	Woll, III	32	2]		3	7		1	3	18	2 10	3	. 9
2		Stirling	36	22	1	1	θ		4	1 AC 12 m	1 m		2	2
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		lial' CX	28	19		1	5		3	2 11		1 40	3	5
- 10 E	5.	Lanc - ton	93 .	75	2	2	5		9	9 12			3	2
	91.	Watioy	19	5		1			1	-				
		Woll.Id	40*	29	2	3	5		7	1 10	1 40		2	5
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- à	92.	Hampdon	129	7	1	2	- 2			1 AC				1
	761	manpuon				-		1	•	2 m	And the second second	1		1
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	93.	Well.Is	189	7	3	1	5	1	1	1 B 1 AC 2 B	-			3
1		Woll.III	60	4		1	200 A.		· 1		1 40		1	2
2-		TOTAL	368	344	12 Total Av	22 ortive 72	50	1	39	1 E 6 AC 2 A . 39 m damage.	25 18 140 15	3 AC 1 m	17	56

which attacked .ith the Main Porce.

Aircraft.







357

MOST SECRET.

NIGHT RAID REPORT NO. 155

1.10

+ 4

Banbor Cormand Report On Night Overations 17/18th, Suptember, 1942.


LEAFLETS.

1.4

3 Halifaxes of 4 Group were despatched to release leaflets in the Lyons 3. Etienne, Lille and Paris areas. All claim to have accomplished their successfully without incident.

26342/4/ORS. November 1942.

www.bonnbercom



With an appendix giving leaves of one of the off Errors and essets in the last fow longing.

Hailor Jorical Advice Submitted to the Course 1

1. CO20 hours. A depression, with centre at 57°N,22°E.is over the North same. The estimated positions, at mildlight, of the frontal systems are:- (1) a cold front from 57°N.21°T. to the Wash, to 51°N. 10°W; (2) a warn front from 570N. 250E, to instrarp, to Munich: (3) a warm front from Kunich to 470E. 50E. and (4) an oroluted front, from Munich, to Borlin, to 570N. 70E.

At the bases build the cold fract, the cloud is expected to lift and break, but there will be a bolt of rain and low cloud along the front. Hour the contro of the North Sea deprovaler and on the fronts, rain and cloul, with low bases but with tops excending to great heights; and a . freezing level at 8000 fest are to be expected. In the Holigoland Bight there will probably be much cloud; a why is the night, the cloud base will be above 1,000 feet, but will later beest. lower with the onset of rain. Froken layer-cloud is to be expected along the Beltic coast, and inland

for Genauny. Over north-enst France, variable mounts of cloud are obablo. Over north-west France, there will be much low cloud, with ase above 1,000 fact. South of Mantes, only shall amounts of cloud are ikely. Visibility will become good tahind the cold front over this country; elsewhere it will be moderate.

1235 hours. The contro of the North Son depression is now expected to be 2° further north than the position detinated at 0920 hours. The cold front (1) and the war: front (2) will probably be about 50 miles further east, with a corresponding nove in the frontal bolts of low cloud and rain.

1615 hours. West of 10°Z.8/10th. to 10/10ths cloud at 1,000 to 2,000 ft.is to be exploted with a progressive increase in mount and lowering of base, with rain. Those fasters tould favour an early start for minulaying in this region.

East of 10°E, will broken cloud, with bute at 2,000 to 3,000 foot will probably be found out areas will be fit for minologing all night. Le cold front will have to be created as white to these areas, but no porious difficultics are explosed balan fracting lavel. West of 5°E, the wini, at 10,000 fast, will be from the west at 35 to 40 m.p.h. Further cast it will your to the north-west.

In the Bay of Siscey area no worrish are anticipated. Pasta: - Stations 1,4 and 6 Groups are explained to be fit, most of the hight, but and of 3 Group's stations will probably not be serviceable.

Executive Orders.

 The weather conditions were not expected to be very favourable for tombing but quite good for minelaying, and it was considered that it would be possible to lay minus in all the important areas. It was therefore decided that this was a suitable occasion for a large minelaying operation, which had been planned to introduct a new type of mine, simultaneously, in all the nein minefields.

Sortios.

3. (for datails soo attached table)

/ (-).....

Sorties Continued.

(a) Number of sorties spatched 115 3. 98 (85.2%) (b) Runber claiming to mine printry areas (c) Number claiming to mine alternative areas 1 (0.95) (d) Abortive Sertios:- (Tochnical defects......4) (Inobility to pinpoint ... 5) (Coust ant stat.d......1) 10 (8.7% (0.97) (c) Result not known (sireraft conshed in return) (4.3) (f) Missing . Sumber of mines laid by aircraft claiming to 340 mino primary arcas

11 ...

(for details of numbers laid in each area, see attached table)

Weather encountered.

4. Basos:

Cold front almost stationary from Lincolnshire to N. Wales. Bolt of rain, 50 to 100 miles wild, associated with the front. Cloud base generally above 1,000 ft, but lower patches near the front itself; visibility moderate, but locally poor, in rain. Cutside rain belt, much cloud, with base 2,000 to 3,000 feat; a locate to good visibility.

- Routos:-
- (a) to Western Prance: Variable abounts of layer-cloud over the Channel, with base at 2,000 to 3,000 feet; cloud dispersing; . visibility good.
 - (b) to Prisian Islands and Holigolan: Fight: Warn front at 4° to 5° E. on outward journer, and it 5° to 7°E. on return; 10/10ths cloud along fronte: helt, with base 2,000 to 3,000 feet, and tops above 10,00° sect; occasional low cloud ratches at 1,500 feet, while intermittent rain; local areas of sea fog. Before 2100 hours, cloud broke towards Danish coast to 6/10ths to 7/10ths. After 2100 hours, no breaks encountered until inland over Domark.

Over Baltic, variable amounts of cloud; local showers over Dermark, with one report of an electric storm. Winds, between 2,000 to 6,000 fest, 25 to 30 m.p.h. from the west.

Tarras areas:

- 6. (a) Western France: No cloud; good visibility.
 - (b) Frisian Islands and Heligol and Bight: 7/10ths to 10/10ths layer-cloud, with biss at 1,500 feet, and patches at 600 to 1,000 feet; local areas of sea for.
 - (c) Western Baltic: Shall amounts of high and modius cloud, with very variable, local amounts of low cloud (0/10ths to 10/10ths) with bace varying from 3,000 to 5,000 feet; good visibility.
 - (d) Lastorn Baltic: Shall amounts of layer-cloud, with base at 3,000 feet and tops at 4,000 feet, good visibility.

The moon was 53% of full and abov, the horizon in all areas except Danzig, Glynia and Tillau, there it had not before minolaying legan, and Cope I gen and Brindsunde, where it set during the operation.

..../7.Rosults.

Bornits.

The attached table shows the distribution of effort, which closely 7. corresponded with that intended, 540 winds being claimed as suscess-fully loit cut of a total of 400 vines cardied. One wine was seen to exploie on striking the con and or I fied to leave the sireraft.

All mineralt, which more operating in the five evers off the west-Const of France found excellent visibility, and all were able to obtain visual tim-points. In the Prior Island and Melipoland Bight, half the aircraft which reached their allotted areas were able to obtain vicual fixes, but the runninger relief on Ges fixes, with or without time : rune therefrom. 4 non-Goo aircraft operating in this zone ware usable to obtain any visual pin-points and wore, therefore, mable to fulfil their missions.

All aircraft orgaged in minclaying in Danish waters and further cast, except two, were able to obtain visual fixes. One of the two, which failed to find any pin-point was operating in the Great Holt, and the ether in the Little Bolt, but the latter was able to wine an alternative area near the primary. One aircruit, wheelaying off Scinemunde reported having propped a SOO 1b. Luci an Bad Berg aerodrome and another on the town of Binz. A second aircraft, detailed for the same area, dropped two FOO 15. boubs on the term of Wittow.

Committies.

8. The five diversit which are missing where detaile! for the following areas:- Great Bult (2), Lasso Evad-, The Sound and Danzin . Our out observations inlicate that one diversit was shot down by flak and that the loss of a second the probably due to engine-failure rather than enony action; these is no evidence of cause of loss in the other three instances. Forcentage losses were rather high, but a large proportion of aircraft were open ting at comewhat extreme ranges. Two aircraft received damage of category AC from Flak; .one was hit by fire from a flak-ship in the Scinematic area. The other was ninelaying off Copenhagen. Four other aircraft received minor flak damage, 1 off Lorient, 1 in the Coligon & Bightrogien, and 2 in the Baltic area. One mirerait crash d on inviting and was completely destroyed. " A single interception by the energy aircraft over the Norfolk coast was reported, but no attack resulted.

Survery.

9. 340 mines were laid in the main minefields along the enany or enany - occupied coasts from Pillou, in the East, to Bayerre, in the West. 90, of the direract, which claim to have mined their primary as is, were able to obtain visual fixes. Weather conditions were excellent along the uset French Coast and fair to underate in the other areas.

2-2

LEAFLETS

1 Halifax of 4 Group successfully dropped leadloty in the Wichy and Clernont-Ferrand areas.

PFL DL.

The operation covered by this report represents the largest minolaying offort over undertaken by the Common i in : single might.

In general, it is not ressible to corribe losses of enery ships to the minelaying effort on a particular night; but the present occasion may be taken to raview suscarily what results are known to have been achieved in the post few months. Thus, the "elloving figures, taken from the Air Ministry Took y: Intelligence Surraries give some indication of results in the last three conthe.

Pate	District	Variable Sunk	Tonnaso .
culy th.	Grant Bolt.	Danish Schooner <u>Pinne</u>	unknown/15*>.

3

5.C

1.1140.7	15th	And a state of the	Danich Fiching Vecsel <u>R.U.529</u>	unkr.
unierz	22nd. wn	Cjadsor W. Domaark	4. <u>1991</u> .	321 - 534
A46.	12th.	Little Belt	Denish Making vescel <u>Guirun</u>	urig.
	14th.	Droglan Giannel	Gornen länenwoper	unkr.
1941	17th.	Eatlogat	" transport <u>Muri</u>	boli
	21 st.	Little Belt	" <u>Heinrich</u>	7,0 523
a,	24th.	Enttegat	" Fevar Yon Danzig	869
· · · · ·	· 2864: · ·	• Orosun!	" <u>"Ator</u>	unkr
union	oran	S. of Corenhagon	(" trawlor (Dunich trawlor	wiki
		Beyonno	2 11 vessels carrying or	unkno
		S. of Holigoland	D nish <u>Lise</u>	1,24
Sept	. 17th.	Katuogat	Gernen Anni	172
· · · ·	19th.	(An lborg Boy	(?Danish)Koldinchaus	?674
6		(North Sound	Danish patrol vossol K.I.	unic
	20th.	Groat Balt	Danish <u>Atile</u>	unk
	21. . t.	Sami	Innich fishing vossel Fool	wik
	22nd.	(North Sound 🕖	(Dinito Falkon	369
	е÷.,	(Copenhagen	(Desich Schooner <u>Sara</u> Gertan <u>Heimt</u>	un)a 231
			VESSELS DAMAGED	502
July	· lat.	(?nuar Rotterdam (Great Bolt	Norte fin <u>Trona</u> Danish <u>Folly</u>	80
		(N.W. Donaurk	Denich <u>Ulla</u>	157
1.ug	24th.	Grant Belt	Finich <u>Elco</u>	136
	28th.	St. Naznire.	French motor-fishing vessol Persiverance	unk
date	e unlatourn	Sissnitz'	Smillsh tanker Fallux	847
Sept	t. 6th.	Kattegat	Pinnich Britannic	. 224
	16th.	Kattegat	Ger.er. Scharnhoern (forcerly <u>Color</u>)	299
	18th.	Trollators	Finnich <u>Haviator</u>	565
	22nd.	E. of Great Belt	t. Gomian <u>Hildo</u>	42
	23rd.	Little Bolt	Gornan Hast	uni
	25th	S. Domark	Dutch Velucron (standored) -	1
- dat	o unknora	10 mm m m m ³⁶	Gairtan sargo-ship Hanburg	5-
			/"	38)K

-4-

<u>ج</u>.0

-5-

-) On Sept. 20th, 16 German vescels South bound were detained at Marstrand H. of Gethenburg, because of mines in the Sound.
- i) From about Sept. Sth, the gra-trade between Bilbao and Bayenne was stopped because of min s.

S/CR3. 1942.

				0.Fu8a	to Xiro /ltor- nativo urua	idinou laid,	Over Ducty Consto.	Over Shony Consta	init Imuwei	1992-0256	bullyon by Flak	by Biany Adversely		nekač	nokod.
La Pallice	1	Well.II	1*			100	1		1000	-			-		
	5.1	Woll,III		8		4	12 C	1		1	10				
Intiont	1	Woll.III	3	3		6		1.192.1							
	1	Woll.III		2	1 1	6			e						
Printen	1	Woll, III	2	2		4	· · · · ·						1.		
Islanda		Woll.IV	17*	16		32	11			1.0	Succession in		-	1	
	1	Woll.IV	11.	7		14	3	1			123			-	
S	3	Woll.111	5	5		10		(1				2	
	3	Woll.III	2	1		2				1 1					-
60 2.5 C 2.5 C	20	Stirling	3	1		. 4	1.			1 1					
Lao zo Rondo	3	Sirling	2	2		8									
Prisian Islands	3	Sirlin	n	11		64							-	L	1
	3	Stirling	3 1	3		12							-		
Langelanda Belt.	5	Lang.	2	2		10	1								
The Sound	5	Lano.	7	6 1		25			1	1 1	10		18		
	5	Lano,	4	4		20									
Cadet Channel	5	Lano.	3	3		15							-		
Poimarn						8		1			14		1		1
Channe]	5	LODGA	3	2		9	1				10		-		
Summitz	5	Lund		2		10					-				
Bornholm	5	Lano.	2	3		B			-				-	-	
	5	Lano-	5			20					1 10.				
	5	Lone	1	1	0.000	3							-		
(omia	5	Lano.	7	7		21				-					
	5	Lane,	7	6	1	17	-			1 1	1 10.		-		
Sironde	5	Lano.	3 .	3		12									
aronne	5	Lone.	2	1		4	1		-	des come			-	-	
RAFLETS	4	Halifax	1	1		1.18			e				1		
lichy &			16	99	1	340	8	2	1	5.1	2 16.	5 -	15	1	1
Clement.		. Not Co	1 10	Contraction (Contraction)	tim = 10.						4 n.				

Bomber Corrand Report on Night Overations 19/20th. September, 1945

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Veteorological Advice Submitted to the Command.

1. 0915 hours. The estimated positions, at midnight, of the existing three fronts are: (1) a front with a tendency for depressions to develop on it, from southrest England, to the Wash, to the Frisian Islands, to south-east Brodon; (2) a varm front from south-east Brodon, to Danzig, to 52 N. 19°... (3) an occluded front from south-east Swdon, to 61°N. 10°..., to 572°N. 5°E., to Spurn Head, to north-Falos.

At home bases, a narrow belt of rain is to be expected on the north side of front (1) and a zone of veriable aloud and local showers behind fronts 1 and 3 with cloud lifting add bracking to the north of front (3).

Over Germany, much medium and low cloud are probable, and local. slight rain along the north coast, including the Baltic coast. The amount of cloud will probably decrease inland, becoming small south of 50°N. Industrial haze is likely to occur over contral and south Germany.

1250 hours. Conditions are expected to be much the same as these forecast at 1915.

1615 hours. All stations should be fit for the take-off, and there is unlikely to be any trouble at bases during the first part of the night; after 0200 hours there may be low cloud and difficulties, but these are not expected to be widespread and there is a chance of stics clearing. In the target areas (Munich and Sharbrucken) mall amounts of medium cloud are likely to be found. Visibility should be good at Munich, but haze is to be expected at Sharbrucken. The route to both targets should be free free difficulties.

xocutivo Orders.

Woather conditions were expected to be unfavourable in north Germany, but here were good prospects in the south: Long-range directift were sent to Munich, and Saarbrucken was chosen as the target for the shorter range aircraft, since it as on the route to Munich and aircraft of both forces would therefore pass through the known, defended areas in sufficient concentration.

fortios.

• •		Minich	Saarbruckon	41 - N	Total	Ċ,
	No. of sortios dospatched	89	. 118	,	207	
	No. reporting attack on primary targets	79			170	
	No. reporting attack on other targets	0	. 2		. 2	
	Abortivo Sortics:					
	Tochnical dofects	5	. 12		17	
	Inability to identify target	0	. 4		4	
	Attacked by fighter	0			. 1	
	Damagod by Flak	0			1	
	Late on route	0			2	
		5	20		25	
	Missing	5	. 5	•••••	10	

was to drop one bundle, consisting of 2 reconnaisance flares and one green flar, over the lake to the S.E. of the city. Aircraft of the Main Forces were not to attack before the Pathfinders had illuminated the targets. After zero + 10 mins, individual aircraft could release single reconnaissance flares but these were to be released at 3000 feet. lower than the designed height of the fuse to make sure that they did not ignite too high. Emphasis was laid on the importance of using Gee fixes, obtained within the coverage, to check wind velocity and assist accura D.R. beyond the range of Gee. Navigators detailed for Munich were to make use of every navigational aid at their disposal: in particular an astro-fix was to be taken as seen as possible after leaving Gee range.

Teathor Incountored.

5. Basos: Variable amount of cloud, base generally 1,500 to 2,500 feat; eccesion rain after midnight at bases in 4 and 5 Groups, becoming fairly general towards dawn in all areas, with cloud patches below 1,000 feat.

Routes: Shall mounts of layer cloud over the North Son; no low cloud over the Continent, but shall mounts of high and modium cloud, and ground haze.

Targets: (a) Munich: No cloud, and vory good visibility.

(b) Scarbruckon. Shall encunts of cirrus cloud; no low cloud, ground hazo.

The mean was above the horizon at each target and 75% of full.

Navigational Aids.

6.

Reports on the performance of Gee by 62 aircraft detailed for Munich (620 miles from Daventry) and by 46 for Saarbruckon (418 miles) show that the maximum ranges at which Geo fixes were obtained wore 396 miles in the first instance and 430 in the second, the average ranges being 347 and 330 miles, respectively.

MUNICH

Flan of Attack.

Poriod of Attack.

Main Forco

(H.E. Wavo..... + 15 mins.

The Fathfinder Force was planned to consist of Lancasters and Stirlings carrying bonb loads as under:-

2 Stirlings 18 x 3 flares + 6 x 250 lb. incondiarios.

5 Lancastors 8 x 4 flares + 6 x 250 lb. incondigrios.

2 Lancastors 9 SBC x 4 floros + 2 x 2000 lb. H.C.

The first section of the Main Force was to consist of Lancasters carrying mixed H.Z. and incendiary loads and Stirlings carrying maximum incendiary loads. These aircraft were to be manned by the best crews available. They were to be over the target between 2330 and 2340 hours, but were not to attack before the Pathfinish's had released their flares. The second section of the Main Force was to consist of the remaining Lancasters and Stirlings of No's. 5 and 3 Groups, carrying loads of heavy H.E. and G.P.bohbs. One order of each Lancaster Squadron was to be detailed to make recommissioneeof the target at 2345 hours.

Routos,

8.

The briefed routes was as follows (s.c also dirgram attached):

All Groups: Base - Beachy Head - Lo Treport - Epernay - Lake Constance - Munich - Epernay - Berck - Beachy Head - Base. -3-

borbs dropped by aircraft reporting attack on primary target.

H.E. borb	8			7 tons, in	cluding:	
		43,02		33 x 4000 3 59 x 2,000	1b. H.C.	
Incondiar	ics	•••••		49-tong.	10	
No.	of aircraft	releasing 4 1b.	inconditrios	and H.E.	= 13	

 		4	16.	- 57	alone	-	4
 		30	16.		and H.L.	2	21
 		. 30	1b.		alono	- 2	. 9
			16.		0	=	7
	-						

RZSULTS

istographic Evidence

mbor of photographs taken with bashing which have been plotted (see

t of night photographs suggests that about two-fifths of the aircraft s attack bonbod within 3 miles of the contro of Munich. The weight of ack was however on the outskirts of Munich and swung from west of the city south and oast of it, within at the same time, a tendency to move inwards. the main target. At intervals a suall number of aircraft attacked near tre of the city. The sticks of incondiaries 38 of which have been plotted, vory wide area, the whole offect being that of a scattered raid, and the of incondiary attack some largely to have been dissipated. Fathfinder oport that sticks of flares were correctly placed across the centre of the hilo from the photographs the positions of several small groups of flaros on identified; " the cross in which they have been plotted nove ground the did the attack. One barly bunch of flares burning near Grafelfing 7 miles ost of Kunich may have helped to send sene of the earlier aircraft astray ator aircraft continued to drop incondiaries where others were already

onniissenco.

hylight recommissance which covered successfully the whole of the town and a districts has revealed some 33 incidents sentered throughout the contral there district, of which t he majority were due to H.E., practically all ithin the 3 mile zero. The main items of industrial damage were the total tion by a 4000 lb. both of a small engineering works extending over some s in the centre of the tewn, the explosion of two Eas-holders, and the destruction of a very large shed, probably a tran-depot. In addition a node of varying sizes have been destryed and two mere severally damaged. Haidhausen district an area of about 52 acres has been devestated, involving of flats half gutted, five other buildings destroyed and several damaged. To many sectored incidents in comported and residential districts, where a houses and 25 other buildings have been destroyed and a further 10 houses other buildings damaged.

to total encunt of denoge inflicted appears to be servingt lower, then what two been expected considering the weight of bonds which reached the target is evident from the proponder nee of H.E. incidents that the inconduction very successful in starting fires. This is largely attributable to the it most of the attack foll on this open suburbs of the city but it is also that the control area of lowich; is not so vulnerable to fire attack as are for German targets.

Verrativo of attack.

The attack on Hunich was 10 minutes late in starting, protably dwing to the Thore is difforence between the winds forceast and those actually encountered. no doubt that both the temor Soo and the target itself were correctly marked by the P.F.P. Almost all crows were able to identify the lake, and Lake Constance also preved to be a useful turning-point. Apart from a single reference to a sti of flares alleged to have been dropped 6 miles West of Munich (prebably the bunch dropped at Grafolfing, sou paragraph 10), there is no evidence of a scatter of P.F.F. flaros and it is probable that they were all released fairly close to the target. Bright moonlight and absence of thick hazo made visibility excellent, conditions which made it easy to observe results. The general opinion was of a successful attack; but fairly numerous reports of concentrated fires, which had ebtained a good hold 10 minutos after the beginning of the raid, are not supported b y the daylight photographic cover (see paragraphs 11 and 12). A very large explosion followed by a column of black snoke was reported by 18 of those erews who obtained photographs of the target area. The time of this occurrence was approximatoly 2351 hours, and its cause was probably a direct hit on one of the two gas-holdors, whose Costruction is confirmed by the daylight photographs (see paragraph 11). ... There are practically no references to backs seen to have falles outsido Munich; and the amount of wested offert socis to have been small. Tho last arrivals reported 20 to 25 fires and much make; but the ovidence provided by the daylight photographs indicated that these fires did not properly take hold.

Timing of attack.

Of the 9 flaro-corrying P.F.F. aircraft which claim to have illuminated the target, all released their flares after the planned interval. 5 were between 5 and 10 minutes late, 3 were 15 to 20 minutes late and the remaining aircraft 250 16. released its flare-load 26 minutes after the end of the allotted period. incondiarios wore dropped by 7 of the 9 P.F.F. "marker" hireraft. 3 of these 7 wore 10 to 15 minutos behind schedule, a further 3 were 15 to 20 minutos late, while the seventh aircraft attacked 26 minutes after the end of the planned intorval.

The timing of attack by the Main Force (including 2 P.F.F. aircraft which carried a part-load of H.E.) was as follows:-

No.	of	aircraft	bothing	orrly: by 7 minutes	=	1	
1 11		n		during planno? intorval	=	23	
"			11	1nto: 0-5 mins			
				5-10 mins12			
				10-15 mins 7		2	
				15-20 =ins 6			
				over 20 mins 2	=	48	
	_						

The lateness of attack by the Fathfinders and the Main Force was due to a difforence between the winds not and these which had been forecast.

S. RBRUCKEN

Plan of Attack.

15.

. 2245 hours. Zoro hun

of Attack Forind

Pathfinder Force....(planned to consist of 9 mircraft) .. zero to zero+5 = Main Force (Mixed H.E. and incondiary w.ve, zero to zero + 10 minutos. (Incondicry wave zoro + 5 to zoro + 15 minutes

Two Wallingtons and sovon Halifaxos of the Pathfinder Force were to be detailed illuminato this target between. 2245 and 2250 hours.

Their bonb loads were to be as fallows:-

(5 Halifexes 9 x 3 flages + 6 x 250 lb. incendiaries. (2 Halifaxos . 9 x 3 floros + 6 x f00 1b. G.P. borbs. (2 Wollingtons 12 x 3 floros + 6 x 250 lb. incondicrios.

In addition to the above 4 more Fathfinder mineraft (Wellingtons) were despatched of which two attacked other targets while two were abortive. The first section of the Main Force was to consist of all Halifaxes of 4 Group which were to be over the target from 2245 to 2255 hours and were to attack, with loads of 415, and 30 lb. incondiaries and 2 x 1000 lb. G.F. banks, after the Fathfinders had illuminated the target.

The second section of the Main Perce was to consist of Wellingtons of 1, 3 and 4 Groups, and Stirlings of 3 Group. Wellington 423's wore each to carry their normal load of 1 x 4000 15. H.C. and the remainder were to carry maximum economical incondiary loads. These aircraft were to attack between 2250 and 2300 hours. Crows of No. 1 Group were to endeavour to boob from heights between 5000 ft.

Routos.

16. The briefed route. was as follows (see also Diagram attached): All Groups : Base - Lo Troport - Epernay - Sharbrücken - Berek - Base.

Witht of borbs dropped by aircraft reporting attack on writher target.

RESULTS

Night Thotograthic Evidence

18. Mumber of photographs taken with bombing which have been plotted (see accompanying diagram):

By ground dotail 27	within 3 miles 12
	botwoon 3 and 5 miles 7.
	cutside 5 milos 6
	. 27
Unplotted photographs (with bor	bin:):
that have recorded ground det-i	1 (all of open country) 12
with no ground dotail but with	

plotted.. 9

As the plot of night photographs shows, the operation developed into a rather sentered attack on the western outskirts of Sarbrucken; the 12 photographs within 3 miles represent about 30% of all the photographs with ground detail, but this index is not a very good guide to the success of the attack owing to the clongated shape of the built-up area of the target. Incendiaries were recorded turning in the west suburb of the town, and in the triangle of country between Völklingen, Sharbrücken and Forbich.

Norrativo of Attack.

19. Visibility at Snarbrüchon was much restricted by local mist in the Saar valley. A fair properties of crows were able to identify the river and a large percentage of these claiming to attack Snarbrüchen relied on the course of the Saar for fixing their positions. This proved to be an unreliable method of pin-pointing. West of the town, the Snar's crurse is almost straight and completely lacks any characteristic bonds; the first of these pocurs about 6 miles west of Snartrücken where there is a fairly gentle curve convex to the north, which superficially resembles the northward are of the stream fin Snarbrücken. At least 10 crows who claimed to have identified the target by the river-course mistook the former are for the latter and took photographs which mayo been plotted in the vicinity of the river, 5 to 7 miles due west of the former. The attack started punctually with illumination by the P.F.F. There wrs. however, a 20 minuto interval in the middle of the attack when no flares or 'blob' incendiaries were released. The flares which were dropped after this interval were soon by several crows who photographed the target, and they seen t have been more accurately placed than the earlier flares, which were reported The last arrivals reported 3 good fires in to have been scattered. Saarbrucken and many small fires, scattered over a wide area. Guservations wore howover severaly restricted by the ground mist. There has been no subsequent daylight reconnaiseance of the town.

' Timing of attack.

• • • •

20. only 5 P.P.P. aircraft claim to have released flares over Snarbrucken. 1 during the plannod interval and 4 late (by 2,25, 30 and 31 minutes respective) 4 of those 5 aircraft also dropped salvess of 250 lb. incondicries, 1 on time of 3 late (by 2, 25 and 30 minutes.) The timing of attack by the Main Force (including 2 P.F.F. aircraft carrying H.E. loads) was as follows :-

	No.	of	circr .ft	boubing	carly	: 1	by 1	minuto	<i>(*</i>	(÷ ;	3	1
•			1 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	. "	during	pla	nnod	interval		<u> </u>	Sat	15
					lato:-			interval		0 -		
					Second Laboration					-		

0 - 5 mins,....

5 -10 mins,

15 -20 mins..... cvor 2J mins..... 11

12

23

wthor Targots attackod.

21. Two Wollington 111's of the P.P.F. claim to have attacked Saar Union and Sarroguominos in licu of Snarbruckon. Both snw thoir bombs burst in built-up groas; the gircraft which att ckod Saar Union reported several secttored fires. In both instances the reason for hot attacking Saarbrucken was failure to find the target. In one instance this was partly due to the failure of Goo.

Casualtics (both targots).

22. The numbers of aircrift missing, draged and intercepted on each target wore:

			1	ogunute(Inter	coptions
Sort	ios	Missing	Flek	Fighter	Not cnowy retion	Att cks	<u>Othara</u>
Munich	89	5 (5.6%)	2(2.2%)	1(1.1%)	1(1.1%)	3(3.4%)	3(3.4
Saarbruckon	118	5 (4.2%)	4(3.4 %)	-	4(3,4%)	2(1.7%)	11(9.5;1
Total	207	1J (4.8%)	6(2.9,)	1(3.8%)	5(2.4;-)	5(2.4%)	14(6.8%)

The proposition of aircr if missing on the Sarbruckon attack/appreximately There are no equal to the average figure for this target in recent months. figures for comparison with the Munich missing rate, but this does not seen Cur own to be high in view of the distance flow over energy territory. obsorvations and wircless intolligences indicate that 2 aircraft word shot der at Munich, probably by flak, and that a further 2 were destroyed by the saw means, 1 at Abbovillo and 1 near Boulegno; 1 aircraft was shot down by : 2 aircraft fightor to the cast of St. Quentin and 1 in the St. Dizier area. were soon to fall in flamos, cause unknown, 1 at Rhoims and the other 40 mild south of Amions. To claims to have destroyed our mireraft were heard, but a these only 1 can possibly be identified with observation of an aircraft shot down. Our losses may be allocated as 4 to flak, 2 to fighter and 4 to unknow causes. The propertions of both fick and fighter drange for both targets " axirusely low. The one aircr. ft de said by a fighter was only a minor casualty.

Defences (both targets)

23. A moderate amount of accurately predicted heavy flak was reported to have been emountared at lumich, with heavy small ineffective searchlight cones. At Saarbrucken there was seen less accurate heavy flak and also size light flak. En route, flak was heaviest at Abbeville.

24. Right photographic evidence of the defences at Munich show that here'y flak opposition wis only inderate, that a contain amount of light flak wis encountered and that seachlight activity wis considerable. Over half the 48 photographs plotted within 5 miles of the aiming point show he vy flak;

the measured intensity, and this is necessarily only a minimum figure, is 4.1 single gun discharges per mircaft. Four heavy flak batteries have been identified on the night photographs, two of them being shown in action. Railway guns were also chotographs, two of them being shown in action. Railway guns were also chotographs, two of them being shown in action. Solvers of 3 guns being recorded in each of two photographs. Less then one-third of the photographs show light flak, but more than three-quarters give evidence of searchlight activity. A triple searchlight at Harlaching was photographed several times during a 15 minute period in the middle of the attack; the photographs show that the 3 beams wer working independently, though on one coession they were converging on a single point.


25. At Satrbruckon the night photographs show very little evidence of light flek or seachlights but indie to that heavy flek exposition, though releatively forble, was the highest yet recorded for this target. The measured intensity for for the 28 photographs plotted was 2.8 single gun discharges per directft which is twice the figure obtained for the reid on August 28/29th. Both are necessarily minimum values.


Surtary.

26. In spite of accurate marking by the Pathfinders the whight of Attack on Munich foll mainly on the southern part of the city where/Belerate amount of damage caused was largely due to H.Z. Although a considerable number of inconditries foll on Munich, the first which they started apparently failed to get a good hold. Visibility, which was excellent at Munich, was restricted by low-lying mist at Sarbrucken; the attack on that target was seat ored, a substantial part of it falling to the west of the city close to the river Saar. Damage cannot be assessed owing to the absence of day photographic cover.

BC/S.26342/4/ORS 28th November 1942

Frgot Gru	μġ		No of Sortics	Aircraft reporting attack on printry trout.	nireruft roparting attack on alternative terget.	Ubortiv Ovor Ehony Torritury	Nut	Rosult not known	-	Committies	ary ir	ist hory lotin	A.	-Not
INICH P.P.	F.	Suirlis	v 2	2		id non providen	80						_	
		kane.	7	7		_	1.00	- S.	_				-	
3		Stir.	19	17		200			×.		1	Cat.E	100	
5		Lano	61	53	Sec. 2 margan	1	4		3	20	la		3	3
TOTAL (MUNICH)			89	79		1 '	4		5	.2	1	1	3	3
ARPHUCKEN P.F	. F.	Woll.1	1 6	1	2.	2	1		1		-1	CAT.E	_	
		Stir.	1	1+			_		_		_			
		Hax	8	59		2	- deres		1.					
1944 - 19	1	Wol1.11	.4 5	4		1		_					1	<u> </u>
		Woll.11	11. 15	13		1			1	14	10	at. IC		1
		Wo11.11	.4 15	13	4	2					51		-	1
	3	Well.11	1. 26	23		2			1				1	2
ALL STREET		Stir.					1				1			1
	4	Well.11	1. 5	3	10	1	1						_	1
10		Hax.	33	25		2	5	_	1	1 Cnt.40 2m	10	at.E		5
TUTLE (SA/REAL	ENI.	00.000	128		- 2	13	7		5	4	4	_	2	11
TOTAL (BOTH TARG	(LTE:		2.7	170	2 ⁴ .	14	n		L.	1 7at 40 1s	30	at Z	· 6	14





NIGHT RAID REPORT NO. 158.

COPY NO. 16

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT C. LITIONS, 21/22nd, SEPTEMBER, 1942.

Mine: 17 42.

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Comment.

1. <u>0920 hours.</u> The midnight position of irents is estimated as follows: (1) cold front 60°N 16°E - Danzig - Munich - term Alps (2) cold front Orkneys - 55°N 6°E - Brussels - Nantes with a depression in the vicinity of 55°N 6°E. At home bases there will be variable cloud, and shele 5 or rain locally. Much medium and low cloud is expected over north Germany way, of 10°E, and further coast there will be medium cloud with breaks, and patches of low. Medium cloud with breaks will persist over contral and south Germany, together with some relidual convection cloud. Apart from some industrial has in the south, visibility should be moderat to good over most of Germany. Over state, south of front (2), there will be some broken layer cloud inland and provide considerable quantities near the coast. Visibility at home bases will delevate to good.

<u>1245 hours</u> Complex development now thing place, especially over France, make a detailed forecast for all are times wible, but it may be said with some assurance that the southern North Section area of rain and low cloud, that cloud base over Denmark and the mestern Baltic will generally be well above 2,000 ft, and that convection cloud with sectored showers will be experienced in the Bay of Biscay. Home bases should ran in fit all night, though occasional local rain is possible.

1600 hours. Thundery rain must be expected in east England, with the prospect of more continuous rain later at some bases, particularly in the north, but cloud will rarely be below 1,000 ft. 91, 97 and 12 groups should be able to provide diversion bases. The route to the first will be rather bad, with thundery or other rain, and cloud at time fre: CC-.,000 ft. Over east Denmark and the west Baltie, cloud will not be low : cloud at considerable heights in place. A Bay of Biscay should be cloar of the major cold front late at night, the solution cloud not below 1,500 ft. Rain will fall on the second (less in the cold front.

2. Executive Orders In view of the erder a small minelaying operation was ordered.

Sorties

3.	(a) Number of Sorties Despatched	17
	(b) Member reporting Mines laid in printry area	11 (64.9%)
	(c) Number reporting Minos laid in it inative area	1 (5.9%)
	(d) Abortive sorties (Technical . Act. 2)	2 (11.6%)
	(e) Hissing	3 (17.7%)

Tarrot	Group	Туре	No. of Sortio.	132 70	Drting laid. Alternat- ive Area.	No.of mines laid	Abor- tive Not ovor Enemy Coasts	ing	-Damagod by Flak.
Minelaying							8		2
Great Bolt	3	Stirling	2	2	-	8	-	-	- ,
Kiel Harbour	3	woll.111	15	G.	1	18	2	3	. Im.
Ŧ	. •.	Total	17	Ľ	ì	26	2	3	ln.

..... Woather Experienced.

Weather Experienced.

4. Visibility at bases was moderate to poor; there was local rain and much clo The same conditions provailed over the North Son, the cloud base sametimes fulling to below 1,000 ft. But approaching the Dutish Coast the weather improved considerably, and both target areas were clearly visible, the moon being above to horizon and 84% of full.

Rosults.

5. All the aircraft reaching the princey wear opert that they identified their positions visually and laid their mines correctly. All except one report having seen the parachuto's of their mines open, or plaches as they struck the water. Three aircraft encountered flak, and one su tained minor damage off Aero Island, the front gunner being wounded and the fract turnet rendered unserviceable.

Casualties

6. Three sireraft despatched to Kiel Erbour Failed to return. One of these we last heard at 0207 hours over the North Son, presumably on the homeward journey. Another was given a fix at 2057 when it was only its course near Toxel, and was given at 2130 hours. No signal was received from the third missing aircraft. Danish radio stated that one British aircraft way shot down by a fighter at 2355 south Jutland.

It therefore secus possible that one aircraft was lost to night fighters. ; other two.must be put down to "causes unknown".

BC/S.26342/2/ORS. 6th November, 1942.

MIGHT RAID FILORT NO. 159.

CUPY NU. 15

BOMBER CONSAND REPORT ON SIGHT OPERATIONS, 23/24th SEPTEMBER, 1942.

(Wishar, Flonsburg, Votos ch, and Minolaying)

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. <u>0920 hours</u>. A depression centred to north-west of Scotland is moving southeast. At present there is no ovidence of a frontal system associated with it, but the possibility of a minor discontinuity in the polar air cannot be excluded. At home bases visibility will be good, with variable amounts of cloud, but a minor front may pass across during the night. There will be an occluded front over the Continent at midnight from 60°2 19°E to Danzig to Munich. To the north and west of this front, over Germany, there will be well broken medium cloud and patches of residual convection cloud. Near the front, there will be much medium cloud. Convection cloud will be present in considerable-quantities, with showers, ther north-west France, and in variable abounts over central France. Visibility will be good everywhere over France and Germany behind the front. North of 48°N there will be a westerly wind of 60-70 n.p.². at 10-15,000 feet.

1300 hours. It must be exphasised that doep polar air is spreading across this country, the North Sea and North Germany. Convection cloud will extend to great heights over the North Sea tonight, will severe icing above 4,000 ft; it will persist with showers in the Flensburg area, but will be well broken, with scattered showers, on the Baltic coast just east of Demark and in the Harburg area. Some broken medium cloud is to be expl. tod in the whole area, but visibility should overywhere be good.

<u>1610 hours</u>. All bases should be fit. Over the route enstwards there will be towering cumulo-mumbus cloud; the freezing level will be at 4,000 ft, and cold air may have penetrated to Denmark. There will be convection cloud above 1,500 ft. over Flensburg with a risk of showers. Rather less cloud is expected over the Baltic deast cast of Denmark, (5/10-7/10 at best) and cloud base will not be lower than 2,000 feet, except for showers. The area west of Hamburg will not be more than half covered with cloud, which will be above 2,000 ft. All areas will have good visibility except in showers. While velocity at 10,000 ft. will be 45 m.p.h. North Denmark will be fit for including with cloud above 1,000 ft. Well-broken cumulus will assist good visibility over the Bay of Biscay.

• • · · · ·

Executive Orders

2. In view of the fair weather conditions expected over North Germany, and the excellent visibility predicted, it was decided to attack the submarine building yards at Wismar, Flondburg and Vegeste' with comparatively small numbers of low-flying heavy aircraft, each target being allotted to one group. In addition, a few aircraft were detailed to lay minus in areas ranging from the Little Belt to "... Bay of Biscay.

Sortics.

3.	6					Burne		L.R		FLENSBU	IRG	VI	CES/CK
	(a)	tio.	of	sorties	despate	ched .		83 .	 •••	28			24
	(b)	"		" cl	aiming P.A.	attack	c o:.	50	 •••	16			5
	(c)		"	" cl altorn	aising ativo t	attac) arget:	c (). 5	7.	 	4	•••••		8
	(d)	Abo	rtiv	vo Sorti	os			°ч					
				(Technic (Inabili (Navigat (Coned i (1/C str	ty to i ional c n searc	donti target rror hlight	fy t] ts	1) 1) 8 1)	 	3	 	3)) 7)	10
				140 301	wire by	2		-1					

) Weigt	아 소망		v aircraft Claimin, at	tack on Primery Targots	
4. ((a)	(Wismar	H.E. 50.9 tons	Incendiary 33.7 tons.	
		Dornier Fcc	tory near Wismar		
		$\gamma^{\hat{\ell}}$	H.E. Stons	Incondiary 28.3 tons	
	(ъ)	Flansburg	H.E. 42.9 ton:	Incendiary 5.1 tons	
	(c) =	Vegesack	H.E. 15 tons.	Incendiary 1.3 tons	

-2-

No bombs weighing over 1,000 lbs. were carried.

Plan of Attack.

5. Wisner, Flonsburg, Vogestch and Minolay'ng

Marer	2000 hours	- 0200:	peric.	95'	aticok	-	0200-021	5 🔿	
Flonsburg		- 0300 :				_	shortest	time	possible
Vegesack	Seve hour	- 0200 -	-	-		-		-	-

The above three targets were choses for statical attacks by 3, 4 and 5 Groups; in addition Wellingtons of 1 Group were to may sines off La Pallice, St. Nazaire, Lorient, Heligoland, the Little Bolt, Lense Roots and (in conjunction with some Stirlings of 3 Group) off the Frisian Internet.

In view of the high winds forecast and date from one y fighters, crees was to fly at 1000' over the sea and to clines a proaching the energy coast reducing height again before bombing and returning the clines low as possible.

Wismar.

The attack on this target, by Lancasters, was to be in two sections. Between 0200 and 0205 hours, about one quarter of the aircraft were to attack with maximu incendiary loads, and the best crows in this section, carrying 30 lb. incendiariwere given the Dornier aircraft factory as their special target. The remaining aircraft were to be over the target between 0215 and 0215 hours, the majority to attack the town with inconductions and H.C., while the rest were to aim delayed action 1000 G.P. bombs at the Dornier Fratery.

The attack was to be carried out Transat to east, down wind, and from ball cloud level, but no from less than 1200". In view of the low height of attack, aircraft were to carry neither cameras air flarus. Crews were warned of a decy factory sited 1 mile north of the Dornier Factory.

Flensburg.

Experienced Halifax crows each carrying 0 x 1000 lb. G.P. + 4 lb. inceniis were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This were to approach Plensburg up the fjore . Attack from north to south. This in the shortest possible time in order . A the to be accomplished in the target.

Veresack.

This target was to be attacked by Stirlings each carrying two containers 30 lb. incendiaries and the maximum is ber al 1000 lb. G.P. bombs, only if the was clear of clead. Crows wore ware hat the strong winds forecast would be likely to clear the target of cloud is the becured on arrival, and were instructed, therefore, to stand off for a war to the north-cast of the target if considerable cloud were encountered.

Briofod Routos

- <u>3 Group</u> Bass-Crossr- 54°30'N 6°10'E Kouwerk 53°20'N 9°0'E Vogeenst-Bad Zwischenan - 54°30'N 6°10'E - Cressor.
 - 4 Group Base- Hornsca- North of Remo- Bhage Flensburg Hooge -Hornsca-5 Group Base- Mablethorpe- Ring. doblrg- Bajevo- Hismar- Sejevo- Rink jobb Mablethorpe.

Waathor ancountered

7. Flansburg was the only target where via chility was really good, with full moonlight and 5/10ths cloud at 2-3000 ft. At Vegosack there was 8/10ths - 9/10ths cloud down to 700 ft, below which conditions were fair, despite heavy rain. At Wismer the target was obscured by 10/10ths clout with icing to below 1,000 ft. Ead weather with electric storms was encountered over the North Sea, especially on the return journey.

Rosults.

WISHR.

8. Wismar appoars to have been the sector of this night's most successful operation. 50 of the 83 sorties despatched are reported to have bended the Primary Area. Although no photographic evidence is available, as cameras were not carried; the last crews to leave the target reported large times in the town, and a big building in the area of the Dernier works, possibly are of the factory, was seen to be blazing fiercely. Bad weather ever the North Dea caused soveral aircraft to shandon their task, and one was struck by lighting and barely escaped crashing into the water. Over the target there tas 10/10 hs cloud with ising down to 1,000 ft.; below that height visibility as addriate, but, as one pilot reported "The weather was the friend of the Hun all the time".

From 0200 to 0215 hours, 31 aircra " rout having been over the target. Mearly two-thirds of the total weight of the dropped consisted of H.E. At 0203 hours a large fire was seen burning in . to wort of the town; at the same time one pilot reports that he scored a direct hi. on it i factory from roof-top height. Mimorous sticks of bombs were dropped approx a surge building in this area clready on fire; by 0210 hours it was burning round the chimney stacks, and soon afterwards the roof seemed to cave in, at pictor of masonry were thrown into the ci MA see, no evidence of bombs having in les outside the target-area, and mentioned two medium-sized fires in the region of the port. Incondiarios were burning on the acrodromo, and a fire in the fjord 24 miles from the target at 3150 prosurably indicated a ship ablazo. Several flak ships did in fact address the . sireraft as they left; but the term's defences, though accurate, were not heavy. One searchlight blow up on boing machino-gunnal. About nine balloons ware sighted east of the town, flying at four thousand feet.

Timing of attack

1 - 5

No. of aircraft attacking late:)- mining s 8

FLE 3. Cr.

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..... 5

..... 1

16

1. 1.1

11. Only 16 of the 28 Halifaxes do a black to Flensburg reached the primary area. Ten of these attacked in the livet five minutes, and four more in the next five. The crew of one of the livet five minutes, and four more in the their boxbs caused a big explosion, for all of a vast red fountain 500' high and 100' ccreas", which was observed by other aircraft. A large explosion in the shipyards was also reported. V within over the target, with cloud base at 1500', was excellent, and the premer in the the yards are situated could be pinpointed by these aircraft able to the line integer of gaps in the cloud. Fires started in the terms seemed to take in the cur aircraft left. Leaflets were dropped on the Danish equat.

VEGE

12. The target at Vegeseck was the Brager-Velecul shipyard, now engaged entir on submarine building. Five of the 26 stirlings despatched reached the prime Area, but found the target invisible except below the cloud, which was 9/10ths 9/10ths down to 700'. Only two aircrait report visual incentification of the target, while a third remained in the all for seminutes without being able to pinpeint. The majority attacked flak a scentrations on F.T.A.

Other Targets Attacked.

13. Most of the aircraft attacking other targets than the primaries were ear to do so through bad weather, and were accordingly unable to report the result their bonbing with accuracy. Three of the Lancasters despatched to Wisner attacked flak concentrations in the target tree on E.T.A., and four others dra their bonbs respectively on a railway bridle over the river at Silkesburg; a town of Randsburg; in the Lubeck area; and chan unidentified town. Four Halifaxes bombed Kiel, Niebull, a small team nearby and Kleinwohlstep, definit damage being reported in the last case. Wingareage, Oldenburg (which was clu identified by the Ems Canal), Wilhelmshown, Bulturn Island and a village neri of Elsfloth, were attacked by Stirlings cont to Vegesack; in addition, one extinguished the flaropath at Ardorf accourse, while two jettisoned their burn in the area of Bremon.

Defances.

14. At Wis in most of the aircraft bergen and plow 2,500 ft. so that little opposition was encountered from the heavy of a, which were thought to number a the heavy of the boost the north of the town. The low-level attacand the brilliant moonlight combined to provide encellant opportunities for high flak engagement. Crown reported about 2.20 light guns, mainly 20 mm. At 2 Dornior factory, some light tracer was believed to be coming from moving leric fitted with machine-guns. Searchlights the tile in evidence; about 6 to exposed intermittently, but were negative of the in evidence; about 6 to exposed intermittently, but were negative of the in evidence; about 6 to as dark coloured) were reported ever the and the machine-gund from evidence is no were class-houled and the remainder flying at heights between 1, 6 and 4, 00 ft.

Et Flensburg, an attempt scens to block the light of put a "curtain" of fir up to 3,000 foot along the fjord; but although light flak was consistent its intensity was below expectations. About 12 searchlights were in operation, : the north and 4 to the south west of the term. These attempted to form cents, and were fairly successful in illuminating aircraft for the benefit of the liggund. In addition, about 10 searchlights were reported along the sides of to fjord. Some fire from heavy guns was encountered: but it was all well about the aircraft.

Cwing to weather conditions at Versea's, finocinting was extremely diffiand no fresh information was obtained as as the alrength or disposition of the defences there.

Casualties.

15. The number of mircraft missing, de and and intercepted, on each of the main targets are given below:-

\mathbf{P}_{a}	Sortios		Missing	Bar_	-	TAXABLE PARTY OF TAXABLE PARTY.	otiona Other
Wismar F' Jourg Jogosack	3.	83 28 24	$\begin{array}{c} 4(4.83) \\ 5(17.93) \\ 1(4.23) \end{array}$. <u>14</u> 1. (15) 4(115) 1/10.45)	<u>Pirhtor</u> 1(3.6%)	<u></u>	<u>Other</u> 1(1.25) 2(8.35)
Total	1000	135	10(7.45)	23(17.35)	1(0.7%)	2(1.5%)	3(2.2)

The losses on Flensburg were unusurity hold, considering the small number of sorties. For all targets, the proposition for flak damage is high and the proportion of interceptions low, which the majority of our less were due to flak.

10 10 10 10

- Aller

ි

Light flak was reported from all three targets. At Flensburg it was considerable, with searchlight co-operation. Heavy flak was encountered at Vegesack.

Our own intelligence sources indicate that one aircraft was shot down, probably by light flak, at Flensburg, and another by flak at Korsor. One aircraft was shot down by fighters near kingkjobing, and it is possible that a fourth aircraft was destroyed by light flak at Curhaven.

The dispersal of our aircraft and the poor visibility made the identification of further losses impossible. 3 aircraft were lost to flak, 1 to fighter, and the remaining 6 to causes unknown. It is probable that flak was the chief cause of these, although the weather may have been partly responsible.

Sumary


16. Although no photographic evidence is yet available, it appears from the Orews' reports that the attack on Sismar and the Dornier factory achieved considerable success. Weather conditions at Vegesack were such as to make good results unlikely but the raid on Flensburg, though of a limited nature, seems to have been accurate and damaging.

Minelaying

17. 26 Wellingtons of 1 Group and 8 Stirlings of 3 Group were despatched to lay mines in the following creas: Lorient, La Pallice, St. Nazairo, Frisian Islands, Heligoland Bight, Laeso Rende and the Little Belt. 28 aircraft claim to have accomplished their mission successfully and 69 mines were laid, including 39 in the Frisians area. Two aircraft are missing, but there is no evidence, to inducate the cause of loss.

BC/S. 26342/2/ORS. 9th November, 1942.

Zarco1	Pp.	Type		to attack Primary		ABUR	a beeb Prinary		Danged	Demagod	Not due	Attacked	Not
-				41	other target	Territory	Not Over Enony Territory	-	by Plak	by Energy Aircrift		Sector .	Attacke
Winner		Lancaster		50	7	16	6	4	8+44.C.		-	-	1
Fleneburg		Maltinx	28	16	- 6	3	-	5	5+11.C.	1 4.0.*	-	2	
Veznagck	3	Stirling	24	5	8	5	5	1	5	1.00	-	-	2
i (Lorient	11	Well.III	1	1					-	-	-		-
	-	Woll. III	2		-					-			-
- (La Pallice		Wall.III	5	-			-		-	-	-		-
L (St. Nazeli		Well.IV.		3		-	-						
A (Prisian Is 7 (Heligoland			8			-	7			-			
	13	Nol		(- P - 1	1		5.0	-		-	
* (Bish* 13)	51	Wall. III	4	3	-	1		and the second			1		
i interes and	r	W	_	1	-	-					-		
Little Ol	ŧ	Wet1	u 1	1	-	-							
Tatel	Ť.		34-	28	-	2	2	8	11		1		
TOTAL			169	99	19	20	13	18	19+64.C	14.0.	1	3	3
				sireraft wore not		52	12 ¹⁰ 1			0		S. 1950 B	



NI GIT RAID REPORT NO. 160

COFY NO. 1

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OFET . LICES 21/25th. SEPTEMBER 1942

MUELYLIG

steorological Advice submitted to the Comman'

<u>1920 hours</u>. A depression controd over the Irish Sea is moving south-eastwards, no by midnight will probably be controd over East inglia. At home bases visibility ill generally be good, though near the centre of this depression there will be hundery rain locally, and elsewhere residual convection cloud. Over the North Sea ni the edastal strip of North Germany there will be much convection cloud with there and local thunderstorms; inland, cloud will decrease, and there should be imparatively little in the Be of high ground in the Middle Rhine. In the Ruhr, invection cloud is likely to persist on the edge. of high ground, but it should concrally be well broken. A cold front will be over South Germany from the Alps to Frague to Broslau, with a small wave near little. There will be much medium cloud in areas adjacent to the front, and thunderstorms are likely near the front itself. Visibility will be good overywhere over North Germany.

1245 hours. It must be explasised that connection cloud with local thundersterms ill be present over the North Sea, Denmark and the coastal strip of North Germany. Intense convection cloud is also expected off North-West Prance, but this should be that intense, and with good breaks, over the Bay of Biscay, south of Nantes. In the extreme south-cast of the Bay, frontal conditions are expected, at least in the list part of the night, ewing to a wave of the sound now off north-west Spain. Therewise, there are no changes from the forecast given at 0320 hours.

<u>1600 hours</u>. Bases will mainly be fit, sport from very local visibility trouble bout dawn. On the routes to Donmark and the Boltic, to the Bay of Biscay, and as in east at 10° E, there will be towering studies about with base above 1,500', recept in showers. There is some risk of thunkerstorms. Further east the amount is cloud is expected to decrease, and cast of 15° E, visibility should be particularly bod. The wind velocity on the Southerr poute will be 45 m.p.h; it is not expected be above 40 m.p.h at 10,000; and may be less for the castern route.

cocutino Orders.

(c)

In view of the weather conditions, minelying operation was ordered.

ortios.

roporting mine: if it. iternative frea.....4

(c) Missing......1

ther Incountered

Vispility at baces was worse than tracted; rain fell in northern and stral areas and some diversions word : "screenty. Electric storms were encountered for the Frisians and Heligoland Bight, a conduction 10/10ths, cloud based at 800 ft., it generally there was medium cumulus a cumulo-nimbus at 2,000 ft, and the target bis were visible in full moonlight. In we door over the Baltic was less sturbed during operations, and visibility was clear except when 10/10ths. cloud 4-5,000' obscured the full moon.

...../4. Roaults.

Rosults.

4. 44 aircraft roport 128 minos successfully laid in the areas allotted to them. 66 of those were laid off the Frisiane and in the Heligoland Bight, and 62 in the Baltic and its western approaches. Four Lancesters laid minos in alt native areas, and one other, in addition to its trimary task, dropped two G.P. bombs on Praesto aerodrome and michine- would a domain army convey between Videband Endon. A Wellington IV was struck by-highting over Heligoland, but suffer no damage beyond losing its trailing aprial.

BC/S.26342/2/ORS. 7th. November 1942.

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				1 2	71.r	(in PA)	Coarts	Contra		1 1	- altineers 1		I want	5.
Holigoland Bight (St	1	Woll.IV	5	5	-	10 ~		-		ı	-	-	-	
Prisian Islands	1	Woll.IV	15	15	1.50	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
S. of Texal	3	Viell.III	5	4	-	- 8	-	1	-		8	-	-	
Prisian Islandu	3	Stirling	3	3		18	107			3 5 3	5 1	-	-	
Bornholm Is.	5	Lancastor	4	3	1	12	-	-		10			· -	37
Pehasan Channel	5	Lancaster	1	1	10 C	.4	-	-		13	28	2	+	
Seinemmée 🚽 🦂	5	Lanenates	8	1 <u>5</u> /	-	2	-	÷		1	Ξ.	8	-	
komita	5	Lenonstor	2	1	2		<u></u>	÷		2 4 3)	¥ 8	2		
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Jdymia V	5.	Lancastor	3	В	12	4		1				-	-	
Cadot Chamol	5	Lancastor	2	1		5	-		1	-	=		870	
The Sound	5	Lancastor	2	2		. 10	-	-	-	-			-	
	=		51	44	4	128	-	8	ı	3 (18,210	2 (29)	2	-	

MIGHT . AID REP. RT N .. 161.

CUPY NO.

BARER CLAMPER P. RT .N MICHT .TE.A.I. 3 25/26th BE TRABER, 1942.

Heteorological Advice Submitted to . to and.

1. 0350 hours.

The midnight as the stor fronts is estimated as follows: (1) cold front from the N, 10°E, to Layder 700 to Cherbourg to England (2) from 55°N, 15°E, to Mumberg to We in mid, with a wave at 49°N, 9°E. But these calculations are subject to a greater margin of error than that, wing partly to lack of data but also to the cold in of the situation. At home bases convection close will be well broken inland, but will be accomparied by the well broken inland, but will be accomparied by the solution of the latter conditions will compare to great heights, with freezing level tobe to below 5,000°. There will also be cloui to greated to great heights, with freezing level tobe to below 5,000°. There will also be cloui to greated to great heights, with freezing level tobe to below 5,000°. There will also be cloui to greated to great heights, with freezing level tobe to below 5,000°. There will also be cloui to greated to great heights, with freezing level tobe to below 5,000°. There will also be cloui to greated to great heights, there will be broken to the cloud and patches of low cloud. Along front (2) the is likely to be a belt of rain and low cloud. This is the leve of the good at home bases and, choose the procipitation, on the Continent.

1245 hours. The midnight position of front(1) is now expected to be as follows: Sylt to lexel to Thames Estuary to Portland Bill to Brittany, then south-westwards. There will be a bolt of rain over this country, probably affecting East Anglia, most of te-night. Over the couthern North Sea and the Bay of Biscay thundory showers are anticipated, with more continuous rain near the front.

1515 hours. All Groups are three ended with sporadic cutbreaks of rain and low cloud, which will tend to persist locally, osticially in the methern half of the country, where occasional local clourances of sky may lead to local fog formation. If the north half of the home base area, the weather are the rows slowly with clearing skies inland; but showers with persist near the coast. On the route to the Frisian formula, and over the area itself, the weather will norably be showery with local thunderstorms; cloud base and the from 1,000 to 1,500 ft, with high tops. Over the Base and the from 1,000 to 1,500 ft, with high tops. Over the Base and the from 1,000 to 1,500 ft, with high tops.

2. Executive orders. In view of the meather, a small minelaying operation was ordered.

Sortios.

3. No. of serties despatched 10 claiming to bay minus in Primary area....10

Wathor.

4: At home bases, local mist and rog, developing during the night, rendered visibility moderate. Cloud was generally above 1,500' though patches below 1,000' were reported south of a line from Polizatowe to Luffenham to Bristol. In the route to the missions cloud conditions were similar, though wind velocity at 2000' was 15-20 m.p.h. row (100, over the target area, visibility was excellent; there are 90, noon, and the small accunts of cloub were based at 2,000'.

4 22 34

Results.

www.bor

BC/s. 26342/2/ URS. 7th Nevember, 1942.

BOMBER COMMIND REPORT ON LICHT OPER, TIONS, 26/27TH SEPTER, 1942.

FILLISBURG & MINEL/YING

Metoorological idvice Submitted to the Control.

1. <u>0925 hours.</u> It is estimated that the minipht position of fronts will be as follows (1) warm front 62°N.6°E. to Paris 47°Ph.0°E. (3) cold front from just south of Hamburg to 50° N.5°E. to Paris 47°Ph.0°E. (3) cold front from just southwest of Paris to 47°N. 3°E. to 44°N.4°E. (4) Warm front from Danzig to Numberg to 46°N 5°E. At home bases in north Eugland rain will spread with increasing cloud from the north-west; further south there will be variable amounts of cloud, with fog patches towards data. Over the North Sea convection cloud will be high-topped, and freezing level till be at 4,000'. There will be well broken cloud, mainly medium, over the cold strip of north Germany from Wilhelmshaven to Stettin; inland over Germany, south of 53°N, there will be increasing emounts of medium cloud, thigh min. to 10/10 the around 51°N and towards Danzic. Over forth-test Prince there will be variable amounts of convection cloud, with some good breaks. It will be conscally cloudy over Contral France. Visibility over Germany will be moderate, with industrial haze, and rain is to be expected near front (4).

1250 hours. There is no evidence of a ways on front (4). This will mean nore medium cloud along the Baltic coast between Kiel and Stottin than was suggested earlier. It is not possible to place the edge of this cloud sheet exactly, but there is still a high expectation of the medium cloud breaking between Kiel and Rostock. East of Ro that, every, there will be much medium cloud, and low cloud with rain is also rescable.

1610 hours. Targets: 10/10ths median cloud and possibly low cloud and rain are to be expected over Wilmar, but prospects are much better in the area of Bremen Enden and Wilhelmshaven. Over the Frisian Islands there will be broken convect: cloud, base 1,500'. Shall emounts of dying convection are anticipated over the Kattegat and Flonsburg, together with 5/10ths - 7/10ths medium in the latter region. At home bases, 2 and 3 Groups should be free from fog all night; but in 91, 92 and 93 Groups fog will become tre blescere after midnight, and very trouble some by 6200 hours. Eastern stations will high stations in 1 and 5 Groups will b fit all night, but in other parts of these Groups, and in the whole of 4 Group, there will be patches of fog by 0200-0300 hours.

Executive Ordora

2. A small force of heavy bombers was aspected to attack the shipbuilding yas at Flensburg, but a final study of the settion conditions led to the cancellation of this operation and to the recall of the settion affect which had taken off. Aircraft were also detailed to lay mines in the Baltic approaches, Kiel Harbou and off the Frisians, but many of these test, h d to be recalled.

S. 1.105.

3.	(a) No of Sorti (b) " " ". (c) " " "	es despatched An claining to barb Primer An """"""	rea
	(d) Abartiva so	rtios : -	
		cal Defects	2
	Inabil	ity to identify ter at	1
	(c) Missing	du locarr co base	1
	1999 - Tables		
<u>Zo i</u>	sht of bosbs drop	ted by adveraft algining itta	sk on Prinary Target
4.	- H.E.	2.68 tons, (6 x 1,000 1b.)	
	Incondiary	0.32 tons.	32

...../Routo briefed.

Route briefed

5. South end of Ringkjobing Fjord to Standarberg to south-west of Odense Fjord terFlensburg.

Woather

6. Cloud on the route was 3/10ths to .../10ths, based at about 2,000', with smaller amounts locally. The weather was plightly burny. Wind velocity varied from 10 to 15 m.p.h. up to 7,000'. Stat meen was above the horizon and 99% of full; visibility was from 10-20 miles, later was above the horizon and 99% of Denmark and north Germany, although it was a conted as good over the target

jitself, where cloud was 6/10 uns at 4,000!.

Rosults

7. 27 Halifexes were sent to attack the shi building yards at Flonsburg, but, owing to unfavourable weather conditions at body, a general recall signal was despatched, which provented most airer is from completing their task. One, however, had almost reached the target, so it receeded to carry out its attack from 4,000 ft; the bombs were thought to have fallen on the dock area. Shortly after leaving the target, this aircraft from control leaflets, as did two others; one in East Schleswig-Helstein, the other in central Demark at a point 55°56' M 9°0' Z. The former of these two shot down in Kello which attacked at 2325 hours off the North Frisien Islands; is clear reported scoing the aircraft hit the sea in flames and sink immediately.

Casualtios

6. The missing aircraft was attacked and prosumably damaged by a fighter at 1 2303 hours, and this may be hold to be the cause of loss.

MINCLAYING

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5 47

9. 25 Wellingtons of 1 Group, and 27 Wellingtons and 18 Stirlings of 3 Group, were despatched to lay mines in the following reas; Frisian Islands, Great Belt, Little Belt, Kiel Harbour, Laese Rande and the Kattogat: Bed weather led to the recall of 29 aircraft before they reached nemy territory, and three others were prevented from accomplishing their task by poor visibility. 36 aircraft reported laying 75 mines in their price, areas, including 50 off the Frisians. In addition, two Stirlings detailed is the is they areas, including 50 off the Frisians. In addition, two Stirlings detailed is the is they areas on landing and lost its port wing; otherwise, there were few ensulties, two aircraft sustaining slight damage from fits and one from an oner fighter. A Wellington despatched to Kiel Harbour is missing. There were sould a baser stions of an aircraft seen falling in flowes off the west coast of Schlossie, worth of Esbjorg, at about 2310 hours, which may be relevant, although the position is a long way from the route. There is no indication of the cause of loss, although there is a possible fighter success about this time.

1.50

BC/S. 26342/2/ORS.

			Po. of		porting	Abortivo		20.00					
Tarjot	Cp.	Type	fortios	attack Frim-	ivo iron	Sortios Over Bhony Territory	Not over Energy	Missing	Damged by	Damagod by	Not duo to	Into Attackod	Not Attackod
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Moleying	114					1					and the best		254
Prisian Islands	÷ 1	W-21 TTT	8	a					1 10				379
Proven Interne	3	Well.IV *		9					A rite				
U. 30 REALE	3	Well.III Sirling	8	8			4						
2.02012	3		15 12	6	2		9 18		1	1.10		<u>1</u>	
12 12	3	THUI .	4			3	4						
LLG. H. RHOUR	1	7.U.IV	2	2 2				1					
PULL SHURL	4	Helifax II	28	1	1	18	7	1	_	8 40	1	2	.03
										0.10			1
WTAL .	j.		99	37	3	21	36	2	1 10	3 40	2	3	1

DAY RAID REPORT ND. 163.

BOMBER CONTAIND REPORT ON OFERATIONS - 29/30th SEPTEMBER, 1942.

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command.

1. <u>O920 hours</u> The midnight position of fronts is estimated as follows: (1) occluded from south-west Ireland to south-rost England to Prris to the Pyrenees (2) occluded from 50°N. 10°E to 60°N. 2°E. to Danzig (feeble over-north-west Germany). At home bases there will be variable amounts of cloud, based generally above 1,000 feet, and fog patches must be expected locally. The situation over the British Isles is complex, however, and to forecast for home bases may have to be modified later in the day. Over Germany, variable amounts of cloud are generally expected, but there should be some good breaks except near the frontal belts. There will be much low cloud and rain over central Prance. Convection cloud will be broken over west France, and visibility should be good in this area.

1250 hours At a Group Conference, there was disagreement as to the likelihood of sufficient cloud cover to justify a low-level attack at dusk over northwest Germany. With regard to bases, 1, 4, and 5 Groups are worried by the prospect of low stratus from about 2400 beers, while 2 and 3 Groups are expecting rain and low cloud. It seems certain that in the area from 52°N. to the Wash and from 7° to 11°E, there will be a rapid increase of medium cloud, and possibly also of low. But the situation is a plox, and cannot accurately be forecast. By this afternoon views may have changed, particularly concerning bases.

By this afternoon views may have changed, particularly concerning bases. <u>1600 hours</u> All Groups expect low shout to fall to between 600 and 1,000 feet and all except 4 Group, who are chost towards dawn, frontal trouble may have moved north of their area. 91, 92 and 93 Groups do not offer diversions. 91 Group expects cloud to be based at 1,000 roce, with visibility from 1 to 2 miles. There is no definite information to partit of an accurate forecast for the north plain of Germany, but an increase of todius, and perhaps of low cloud may be anticipated. In the Baltic, there will be much cloud and rain, and possibly thunderstorms. Rain and cloud with high tops will prevail on the route southwestwards to the Bay of Biscay; the Channel will be three-quarters covered, and over the Bay itself cloud will be based at 1,500 foet.

Exocutive Ordors

2. In view of the weather, a small minute ing operation was ordered.

Sortios

3.

(a)	No. of sorties despatched.	14
(b)	No. reporting having laid stars in primary area.	2
(c)	No. reporting having laid wines in altornative area.	9
(a)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2
(0)	Missing.	1

We thor encountered

4. At home bases, mist and fog paidles aff stad 5 Group by 0200 hours. After 0300 hours rain spread rapidly from the Gath coast to 1°W, but cloud remained above 1,000 feet. Visibility improved some that after 0600 hours. Rain and low cloud were encountered over the North Box. The target areas in the Baltic were visibile only through breaks in the cloud, which was 10/10ths down to 500 ft. and in many places dropped to see level. The moon was 72% of full, and above the horizon.

/Results

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.. Results ...

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mand?

5. Only two aircraft woro able to identify their targets in the Baltic through broaks in the cloud, one off Sassnitz and one of Szingmunde. In noither case could any results be observed, and the latton-aircraft was forced by flak and searchlights to lay mines slightly south of the target. Each carried, 3 mines. The Kattegat had been given as an alternative area, and here the cloud breaks were frequent enough to allow of pinpeinting. 7 aircraft report having laid 17 minos in this area, although in some ere: it is impossible to see them strike the water. The crow of one shot up a collection of 4 fishing snacks at 55° 15° 05° 20' E. Two other aircraft laid 6 sines off the wost coast of Rormark, north of Ringkjobing. One aircraft detailed The Chinemunde flew over the town at 500 feet, and on encountering intenso flak the milet descended to roof-top height. This aircraft and one other was forced by ... weather to abandon their mission. One aircraft despatched to Swinomunde is making, but there is no ovidence to indicato the causo of loss.

BC/S. 26342/5/ORS. 17th Novomber, 1942.

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Might 257	/30th Supta	sbor, 19-2.		2			" Þ. f.		
128687	GRUUP	TYPE .	No. of Sortion	a/c reporting mines laid in Primery Alternative Area Area	Abortivo (Over enomy cuast)	MISSING	No. of mino; laid in pfinary ages	Count Inte	creoption
STREAME	5	LUCASTER	4	1 1	1	ı	3	-	-
SLSSN17Z	6	- LUNCASTER	6	1 5	-	-	3	-	_ 38
5R.11. IX:	5	LUNCTOR	4	- 2	1	-	5		
		20.202	¥		2		-6		

Ringhjobing, as altornative areas.

CUPY NU

BOYER COLVAND REPORT ON NIGHT OF HATTCHS, 30TH, SEPT/1SF. OCT. 1942.

(MINELAYING)

steorological Advice Subgitted to the Command.

0915 hours. The exect position of midulint fronts is doubtful, but it is stimated that there will be a warm front from the Orgneys to Solway Firth, ecoming cold to Humber to Thames Estuary to 48 1.0, becoming warm to a centre of low pressure over Spain. There is a problematical warm front from 55 N. 0. to Cologne to north of Munich. Rain and clead the expected locally at home bases, with fog developing in places. Over Gerrary that will be variable amounts of phium cloud and small amounts of low cloub, except mear the front, where there will an increase in both medium and low clou . There will be much cloud and occasional min over north-east and contral France, and iroken convection cloud over north-west Prance. Visbility will be modorate over Con any, and moderate to good over Prance.

The threat of an early once of icg at home bases is serious. 1230 hours. herever the cloud breaks. Cloud and rain expected to persist in parts of East England, making this throat most sories in the Midlands. Ovor the plain and reast of north Gormany thore will be broken medium cloud, and little or no low cloud. There is now no evidence of the ward front over the Continent.

1615 hours. 1,4,5,91 and 92 Groups cannot heral for from 2890 hours onwards, becoming general at 2400 hours. The situation is arding 2 and 3 Groups is doubtful, owing to the threat of very low cloud and rain from the south. South-cast ictland, north-west England and 92 Group : c successed as diversion areas; also the south coast mest of the Islo of Wight, lither here, too, rain may have spread up from the south towards dawn. All Ger. the call on the north coast from Wilhelms-haven to Rostock are expected to have clear which or small amounts of medium cloud. A front over the North Sea at about 2 or 2 E. will have to be crossed on the route to North Gormany; but this is only a narrow belt of bad woather.

Executive Orders.

In view of the weather conditions, a shall simpleying operation was ordered. 18 B - 486 C - 40 T ²⁰

orties,

(a)	No.	of	sorties	dospatched	1						25 1	
. (b)	No.	of	sortios	reporting	to he	Wa	lain	ine	s in	34		
100050030			alter a see)	I	ri.		r.a.,			21(84%)	
(c)	No.	of	sortios	reporting	to he	0.74	aid	.ine	s in			
											.1	
(d)	Abo	rti	o Sorti	os (technic								
- 1 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 -											1 M . 1 A M .	

10

12

Wather Encountered.

"isibility at bases was moderate, it do., and occasional rain. Petchy as experienced in Yorkshire ftor mi int. 10/10ths, medium cloud, based at 1,000 feet, was encountered over the Friday; the moon was 64% of full, but did ot rise until most aircraft had started r norm. It was very dark, and there was thick see haze. Visibility was poor. Conditions wors slightly better off the Dutch coast, where there was 8/10ths. - 10/10ths. cloud based at 3,000 ft., but even here visibility was only fair.

osults,

b. Dospite the woather conditions, 21 inlaying their minos in the primary armas, inticue, one is reported to have dropped safe, owing to the fusing-eatch failing to hold. One Wollington dotailed for the risians planted mines at pdint 55° 47'N. 05° 15'E. through a navigational error, file enother reached its target south of Yexol, but was unable, owing to a technical lofeet, to release its mines. A little light flak was encountered from Don Holder

and the Prisian Islands, and more intense socities: was not from ships, and in particular from one convoy off Torschelling. Two A/C were hit, though not soriously. Two others are missing, but there is no evidence to indicate the cause of loss.

BC/S. 26242/5/ORS. 17th. November 1942.

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Tergot	Group	Туро	2010/001	Primary Area.	Altornativo Aron.	Abortivo Sortico.	Missing	No. of Minde L Primery Area.
South of Texol	1	Woll.II	2	2	<u> </u>	-	-	4
	1	Woll.III	3.	2	-	-	1	3
Frisian Islands ,	1	W011.111	5	. 4	-	1	1940	. 8
	3	WILLIE	30	e	1	-	-	1,
		stirlin -	5	٤	-	-	1	63
TOTAL	X	Y	25	21	1	1	2	57

13