

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS, JULY 31ST/AUGUST 1ST, 1942.Dusseldorf, IntrudersMeteorological Advice submitted to the Command.

1. 0925 hours. - Estimated midnight positions of fronts (1) warm front, 59° N. 1°E - Newcastle then southwestwards (2) cold front 59° N. 1°E - Inverness - Tyne then west-southwestwards.
- Target areas:- Fine weather over Germany, Holland Belgium and N. France with industrial haze over Germany.
- Home Bases:- Medium cloud over north of England but fine elsewhere. Local mist or fog particularly near coast but extent uncertain.
- 1245 hours. Ruhr:- Cloudless, industrial haze, light easterly wind.
- Home Bases:- Visibility troubles expected by all Groups for return. 4 Group, eastern part of 1 and 5 Groups, 2 and 3 Groups and northern bases of 91 and 92 Groups most likely to be affected.
- 1715 hours. Ruhr:- No change.
- Home Bases:- 4 Group probably unfit for return. Eastern bases of 1 and 5 Groups expected to be unfit from 0300 hours. Half 2 Group bases unfit from 0200 hours. 3 Group fear widespread fog from 0200. 91 and 92 Groups should have most bases fit.
- 2130 hours. Home Bases:- Bad fog at dawn likely in whole of 2 Group, 3 Group east of 1/2°E. and all 4 Group except Middleton St. George. Local fog also likely in 1 Group and 3 Group between 0° and 1/2° E. 1 Station in 91 Group, 2 stations in 92 Group and 3 in 5 Group may also have fog.

Executive Orders

2. Dusseldorf was chosen as the target for an attack on a large scale because of its high priority as a large industrial town and because it was within convenient range for the O.T.B.'s whose crews had less experience than those in the operational Groups and were taking part in the operation.

Sorties

3. 636 sorties were despatched on this night, 630 of them to Dusseldorf. For details of the operations see attached table.

102 (16%) sorties were abortive. The reasons were as follows:-

...../Technical defects

Technical defects	95
Sickness	1
Late take off	1
Faulty Navigation	1
Attacks by Enemy Fighters	3
Flak Damage	1

Moon

4. The moon was above the horizon and 79% of full.

Weather at Home Bases

5. There was little cloud in the home base area during this night but mist and fog developed in East Anglia and locally in 1 and 4 Groups towards dawn.

DUSSELDORFPlan of Attack

6. Zero hour was at 0200 hours and the attack was to last 50 min. It was to be opened by 110 heavy aircraft attacking between 0200 and 0210 hours, carrying either H.E. or incendiary bombs, the best crews leading the wave with maximum loads of 4 lb. incendiary bombs. The medium bombers were to attack from 0205 and 0245 hours with incendiary loads or, in the case of Wellingtons Type 423 from 1 Group, with 4,000 lb. bombs. The remaining heavy aircraft, and the Wellingtons Type 423 of 3 Group, were to finish the attack with large H.E. bombs from 0235 hours - 0250 hours.

7. A correction was made to the Gee ground stations to eliminate 2nd. decimal place from the co-ordinates of the target. Gee aircraft were to approach the target from N.W. to S.E. along the B. lattice line from a point not less than 30 miles from the target. Bombs were to be released visually when the target was identified, Gee aircraft confirming their position by fix.

Weather

8. There was no cloud en route or over the target; slight haze was, however, encountered in the target area. Many aircraft attacking after 0225 hours report much smoke which hindered the identification of ground detail.

Results

9. 484 (76.6%) of the 630 aircraft despatched claim to have bombed the target. These aircraft dropped 339 tons of incendiaries and 582 tons of H.E. including 170 x 4,000 lb. bombs. An 8,000 lb. bomb was carried on this raid but the aircraft which was carrying it is missing. Fires were started in the town at the beginning of the attack and by 0230 hours they were numerous and large. Aircraft which attacked late report that by 0300 hours the town was a mass of flames and smoke.

10. 191 photographs taken with bombing show ground detail. 33 of these show one of the two aiming points in the town and a further 58 have been plotted within 5 miles of the town centre. It is noteworthy that nearly half of these 91 photographs were taken by Lancasters which obtained 23 of the 33 photographs showing one or the other of the aiming points and 20 more within 5 miles out of a total of 77 showing ground detail. In the photographs of the target fires are seen burning in the docks and in the area of the town between the docks and the main railway station.

11. A large number of photographs show open country which suggests that a proportion of the effort was scattered. The reports of crews whose photographs show that their target identification was accurate indicate that this scatter was all to the west of the target and that Krefeld and ...
.../Munich Gladbach

Munchen Gladbach were both attacked by a number of aircraft. Those photographs which have been plotted more than 5 miles from the town centre confirm these reports and also indicate that a number of other aircraft, which presumably mistook the Maas for the Rhine, bombed Venlo.

12. Reconnaissance has revealed that Dusseldorf has suffered very severe damage and that a large part of this has been inflicted on factories, more than 20 of which have suffered damage to varying extents. Severe damage has been caused to a machine tool factory, a steel castings factory, two engineering works, a rolling mills, a chemical works, a paper factory, an alcohol factory, a worsted mills, a petroleum company's factory and a petroleum receiving depot. In addition three factories making steel tubes, a dycstuffs factory, a silica works, a cement works, and factories making roofing felt and cattle cake have also suffered damage although to a lesser extent. A number of warehouses and sheds in the docks and the customs house have suffered severely. In addition the municipal disinfecting station was wholly demolished and a sewage works damaged. Some of the above items are included in an area of 25 acres near the docks which has been completely devastated. There is substantial damage to public buildings and railway communications and 400 business and residential buildings have been destroyed. More than half of these are situated in the main business and shopping centre of the town where great havoc has been caused. 60-70 of the houses destroyed are in industrial districts and are probably workmen's dwellings.

13. Ground sources report that in addition to the above damage a machinery factory and an iron and steel works have been badly damaged. Several sections of the latter are stated to be out of action. The rolling mills damaged are reported to have been compelled to cancel a contract for 250 tons of gas and water pipes for delivery to Turkey.

Timing

10

14. Two of the attacking aircraft were early, one by minutes and the other by 3 minutes, 15 bombed after the time at which the attack was planned to end, 11 of them less than 10 minutes and 4 between 10 and 20 minutes late.

Casualties

15. 29 (4.6%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation, and 39 (6.2%) suffered damage to varying extents. Of those damaged 1 had to be written off, 12 were seriously damaged (Cat. B and Cat. AC) and 26 received minor damage. In 28 cases the damage was caused by flak and in 2 by enemy fighters. The damage to the remaining 9 was not due to enemy action. One aircraft received damage from a 4 lb. I.B. from another aircraft, whilst over the target.

16. There is little indication as to the cause of losses except that flak was responsible for a number of them. Heavy flak at the target was intense and accurately predicted in co-operation with searchlights, Light flak was also co-operating with searchlights.

17. Interceptions at 76 (12.1%) were high, but of these only 19 developed into attacks. The moonlight and lack of cloud cover doubtlessly aided the enemy's night fighters. Our claims to have destroyed enemy night fighters were 6 claimed as destroyed and 1 more as probably destroyed. 4 were Ju. 88's 1 a P.W. 190 and the remaining 2 were not identified though one was a single engined machine and the other twin engined.

18. Groups 1 - 5 (inclusive) lost 14 or 3.35% of the sorties. This is a normal figure for the Ruhr area. On the other hand losses by 91 and 92 Groups were 15 or 7.1% of the sorties despatched.

19. Types to show relatively heavy losses were Wellington III (3 Group) with 5 (6.8%) Halifax (4 Group) 4 (6.25%) Wellington Ic (92 Group) 6 (9.5%). Lancasters (5 Group) had only 2 (1.8%) missing out of 113 sorties.

Summary

20. Although a proportion of the attack fell in open country to the west of the target, sufficient concentration was achieved to inflict very severe damage

...../ on Dusseldorf

on Dusseldorf, and the operation was undoubtedly successful.

21. Weather conditions favoured the enemy defences in that there was little cloud cover against searchlights. The losses were mainly incurred by 91 and 92 Groups possibly influenced by the relative inexperience of the crews from these Groups.

INTRUDERS

22. Intruder operations against St. Trond, Venlo and Twente aerodromes were carried out by Blenheim aircraft of 2 Group, 2 being despatched to each of these three aerodromes.

23. Neither of the aircraft despatched to St. Trond was able to identify it. One bombed Brussels aerodrome and the other bombed an aerodrome believed to be Lille. Bursts were seen on the airfields, and at Brussels on aerodrome buildings, in which fires were started.

24. One of the two aircraft despatched to Venlo had engine trouble as it approached enemy territory and bombed Haamstede as an alternative. Bursts were seen on the airfield and two fires left. The other aircraft is missing.

25. Both aircraft which set out to attack Twente aerodrome were successful in accomplishing their task and both claim that their bombs fell on the aerodrome buildings starting fires.

BC/S. 26342/3/ORS.
15th August, 1942.

31st July/1st August, 1942.

Target	Group	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary				Casualties				Interceptions		
				Primary	Secondary Area	Reached Target Area	Over Enemy Territory	Not over Enemy Territory	Missing	Down by Flak	Down by E...	Not Due to Enemy Action	Attacked	Not Attacked		
DUSSELDORF	1	Well. II	21	17			1	2	1	3 m.			1			
		Well. III	12	8		1	3							2		
		Well. IV	12	35			2	5		4 m.			2	5		
	3	Whitley	3				2	1								
		Holifox	6	5		1				1 m.				2		
		Well. III	73	62			2	4	5	2 m.		2 A	1	3		
	4	Stirling	53	43	3		4	11		2 m.		1 B.	2	7		
		8 "										1 m.				
	5	Holifox	64	47			3	7	3	4	5 m.	1 E 1 AC	1 A	4	6	
		Hampden	24	18	1		1	2		2					1	
	5	Lancaster	113	101		1	2	3	4	2	1 B 1 AC 1 m.				9	
		91	Well. Ic	92	67		1	2	18	4	1 B 2 AC 1 m.			2	9	
92	Well. III	5	5													
	Whitley	9	6	1		1	2		1 m.		1 B	2				
92	Well. Ic	63	43		1	1	2	10	6	1 m.			3	9		
	Whitley	12	7					3	2				1	1		
	Hampden	30	20			2	2	3	3	1 B 1 AC		2 AC	1	3		
TOTAL			630	484	4	4	12	27	71	29	28	2	9	19	57	
ST. TROND A/D	2	Blenheim	2			2										
VENLO A/D	2	Blenheim	2			1			1							
TWENTE A/D	2	Blenheim	2	2												
TOTAL			636	2	484	6	4	13	27	71	30	3 B 1 AC 21 m.	1 E 1 AC 1 m.	2 B 2 AC 1 m.	19	57

Not fitted Gun

Total abortive 102

NIGHT RAID REPORT NO. 124.

COPY NO. 16.

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 5/6TH AUGUST 1942.
(Essen, Bochum; Minelaying, Leaflets.)

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command.

0930 hours. Home Bases: Variable amounts of cloud, moderate visibility.
Route & N.W. Germany: Much convection cloud, tops above 15,000 feet, with severe icing above freezing level, at 4,000 feet. Baltic coast east of Stettin most likely to have cloud breaks.

1245 hours. Home Bases:- No change in outlook.
N. Germany & N. Sea:- Cloud tops not likely above 10,000 feet; otherwise no change from report at 0930 hours.

1700 hours. Bases:- No difficulties expected.
Ruhr:- Strato-cumulus and cumulus cloud, tops to 15,000 feet, with severe icing above 7,000 feet, probable.
Route:- Conditions similar to those over target.
Frisian Islands:- Good deal of cloud, base 2,000 feet.
W. Coast of France:- Little cloud, none below 2,000 feet.

Executive Orders.

No good bombing area was apparent and the night's operations were limited to sea mining, blind bombing by a small force and some dropping of propaganda leaflets.

Sorties.

97 sorties were despatched. For details see attached table.

17 (17.5%) of these sorties were abortive. In 9 cases this was due to technical defects; 1 minelaying aircraft was unable to obtain a pinpoint owing to thick layer cloud; 7 aircraft attacking the Ruhr turned back owing to lack of cloud cover.

Icon

The moon, which was 31% of full, rose during the operations.

Weather at Home Bases

Variable layer cloud with good clearances; visibility moderate.

ESSEN & BOCHUM

Plan of Attack

Zero hour for 4 and 5 Groups was to be 0100 hours, while zero hour for 3 Group was to be coordinated with the other Groups at the Station Commanders' discretion.

The operation was to follow the same plan as the attack on Essen on the previous night. (See Night Raid Report No. 123).

Weather

Over the N. Sea layer cloud varied from 1-9/10, base 2,000 ft., tops 6-7,000 feet. 7/10 layer cloud was encountered at first over the Ruhr,

breaking to 2-3/10 later. Cloud base was 3,000 feet, tops 8-9,000 feet.

Results

Only 4 (16%) of the 25 aircraft detailed claim to have reached the target area and all these bombed on Gee or E.T.A. This very small proportion is partly due to lack of cloud cover which forced 7 aircraft to return early, and partly to jamming of Gee. Only 1 aircraft reached Essen, dropping 5 x 2,000 lb H.E. bombs. Parachutes were attached to these bombs and the burns were not observed. 3 aircraft attacked a steelworks at Bochum dropping 11 tons of H.F. bombs.

Other targets attacked

2 Halifaxes dropped their bombs on Cologne, another in the Bonn area and a fourth on Munster, after their Gee apparatus had failed. Bonn was also attacked by another Halifax which turned back owing to lack of cloud cover.

Casualties

5 (20%) of the aircraft detailed are missing from this operation. One of these is thought to have been shot down by flak and another by enemy fighters but nothing is known of the remaining three. 1 Halifax sustained serious damage, (subsequently Cat.E), when attacked by an enemy fighter, while flak caused Cat.AC damage to another Halifax and minor damage to 4 more aircraft. A Stirling despatched to Essen, was approached by an enemy fighter but no attack developed.

Summary

Lack of cloud cover and failure of Gee due probably to jamming by the enemy prevented most of the aircraft detailed, from reaching the target area. The resulting low concentration of our aircraft probably explains the high proportion (20%) of missing aircraft.

MINELAYING

53 of the 58 aircraft despatched laid mines in their allotted positions. The majority of the Wellingtons, Hampdens and Lancasters and most of the Stirlings relied solely on Gee fixes and E.T.A. Altogether 198 mines were laid: 69 in the Gironde estuary, 16 at La Pallice, 11 at Lorient, and 102 off the Prisian Islands.

All aircraft carrying auxiliary bombs brought them back since no suitable targets were seen.

1 aircraft, despatched to Lorient, is missing, but it is not certain whether this loss was due to flak or enemy fighters. 2 aircraft sent to La Pallice sustained damage from flak, 1 suffering Cat.AC damage, the other only minor damage. A Lancaster detailed to the Gironde estuary also suffered minor damage from flak. No enemy fighters were sighted.

LEAFLETS

14 aircraft were despatched to distribute leaflets and 12 completed their task successfully, dropping leaflets over Paris, Amiens, Rouen, Lille, and Rennes. The 2 abortive sorties were due to technical defects.

All the aircraft detailed for these operations returned safely. One aircraft, a Halifax, was approached by an enemy fighter but no attack developed.

Target	Group	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft remaining to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary			Result not known	Casualties			Interceptions			
				Primary	Primary Area	Bomb other Target	Abortive	Bomb other Target		Abortive	Not over Enemy Territory	Missing	Damaged by Flak	Damaged by Enemy Aircraft	Not due to Enemy Action	Attacked
ESSEN	3	Well.III	4					3		1						
		Stirling	5				1	4							1	
		Lancaster	8		1		4	2			1	2m		1m		
BOCHUM	4	Halifax	8		3					3	1AC 2m	1E		1		
MONELAYNE																
Gironde Estuary	5	Lancaster	15		14		1				1m				260	
La Pallice	1	Well.IV	5*		5						1m					
	3	Well.III	3		3						1AC					
Lorient	1	Well.IV	5*		4					1						
	5	Hampden	5*		3			2								
Frisian Islands	1	Well.IV	4*		4											
	3	Well.III	7		6			1								
		Stirling	12		12											
	5	Lancaster	2		2											
LEAPLEYS																
Amiens & Rouen	3	Stirling	1+		1											
Idylla	3	Well.III	3+		2			1								
Paris	4	Halifax	8+		7			1						1		
Rennes	5	Hampden	2*		2											
		Total	97		69		1	5	9	7	6	2AC 6m	1E	1m	1	2
			* Not fitted Gee				+ Freshmen			Total abortive 17						

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BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 6/7TH AUGUST, 1942(DUISBURG, INTRUDERS, LE HAVRE, MINELAYING)Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0920 hours. Anticyclone over Bay of Biscay moving Eastwards
- Germany:- Layer cloud with breaks in Coastal strip West of the Baltic; small amounts of layer cloud and haze in Ruhr-Rhine area.
- France:- Fine
- Home Bases:- Local patches of mist towards dawn.
- 1250 hours. No change from advice at 0920 hours.
- 1715 hours. Ruhr. Probably only small amounts of strato-cumulus, but possibility of 10/10 cannot be ruled out.
- Frisian Islands:- 5/10 Cumulus and strato-cumulus tops 7,000 - 10,000 base 2,000 - 3,000.
- Paris:- Fine; visibility good.
- Home Bases:- Local smoke troubles, otherwise no worries.

Executive Orders

2. The weather prospects were good enough to justify the use of all medium and heavy bomber units at full strength on the chosen target which was Duisburg. This target, being situated on a river, was considered to be suitable for attack on a dark night and gave a comparatively simple run for the less experienced crews.

Sorties

3. 227 sorties were despatched; 215 of these were ordered to attack Duisburg. 28 (12.3%) sorties were abortive, for the following reasons:-

Technical defects	16
Sickness	2
Unable to locate target	6
Severe Icing	1
Late in take-off	3

Moon

4. The moon, which was 22% of full, was above the horizon during these operations

Weather at Home Bases

5. The weather was cloudy but the cloud base was above 2000 feet. Visibility was moderate apart from local patches of mist at dawn in No. 1 Group's area.

DUISBURGPlan of Attack

6. The target was to be illuminated by flares dropped by 20 aircraft from
...../zero hour

zero hour (0230 hours) until zero + 25 minutes. Three aircraft were to drop their flares at zero hour, and three at zero + 3 minutes. Thereafter the remaining 14 aircraft operating in pairs were to release their flares at 3 minute intervals. Each aircraft was detailed to release its first bundle of flares on Gee fix on co-ordinates B 6.91, C 37.10. The bomb loads of these flare carrying aircraft were to be made up with 500 or 250 G.P. bombs. The flare carrying force was to be followed by aircraft carrying maximum economical incendiary loads, which were to attack between zero + 2 minutes and zero + 20 minutes. Aircraft carrying 4 lb. incendiaries were to lead this force of the attack. The main force, carrying maximum load H.C. or heavy G.P. bombs were to attack between zero + 5 minutes and zero + 30 minutes.

7. All Gee aircraft were to approach the target along the "C" lattice from West to East and to release their bombs on the co-ordinates B 6.90 C 37.10 with visual confirmation.

Weather

8. 7-10/10 layer cloud with base 2-3,000 feet, tops 6-7,000 feet was encountered over the North Sea. Over the target area layer cloud was reported in very variable amounts (2 - 9/10); the heaviest cloud occurred during the early phases of the raid, later arrivals reporting clearer conditions and large gaps. These, however, appear to have been of short duration. Moderate to thick surface haze was reported over the target area by almost all crews.

Gee Interference

9. Reports on Gee performance received from 122 aircraft showed that in 20 instances the signals were blotted out in the target area, and that, in 46 further instances interference occurred but was not sufficiently intense to suppress the signals entirely. Most of the remaining reports stated that the signals were weak or that they faded. It is now clear that this was the first large scale attack in which enemy interference with Gee was experienced.

Results

10. 179 (83%) of the 215 aircraft detailed claim to have reached the target area, dropping 178 tons of incendiaries and 240 tons of H.E. including 60 x 4000 lb. bombs:

11. Only 1 aircraft of the incendiary force attacked early, but 10 of the H.E. carrying aircraft dropped their bombs before the appointed time. The attack lasted 70 minutes instead of 30, as planned, 24 aircraft bombing late. About one-third of the flare force were late in dropping their flares, but illumination appears to have been continuous from 02.33 until 02.57 with the exception of a 1 minute break at 02.41. In many cases it was impossible, owing to cloud and haze, to identify the target visually and many aircraft bombed with navigational aids.

12. Haze and searchlight dazzle made observation of results extremely difficult. Owing, largely, to the weather conditions in the target area, the attack does not seem to have been concentrated and reports from crews show that a considerable proportion fell to the West of Duisburg, where dummies were successful in attracting some attention. Some of the later arrivals, however, report several fires including two large ones at the aiming point.

13. 77 photographs were taken with bombing, 3 of these show the target and an additional 1 is within 3 miles. The photographs suggest that the major part of the attack fell in open country to the West of Duisburg; there are a number of photographs of two areas in particular, one just West of Mors (5 miles West of Duisburg), the other 12 to 15 miles West of the target.

14. Subsequent reconnaissance only covered the districts of Wanheim, Hochfeld and Wedau and these incompletely. One point of fresh damage was revealed, an Engineering Works and Foundry having received at least one direct hit, a large building being completely wrecked.

Casualties

15. 5(2.3%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation. 21 (10%)/were damaged

were damaged by flak (3 Cat. AC, 18 minor), 2 (1%) were damaged by fighter (1 Cat. B, 1 Cat. AC) and 5 (2.3%) received damage not due to enemy action (2 Cat. E, 2 Cat. AC and 1 Minor). Searchlights were generally ineffective owing to haze but moderate heavy flak was predicted through the haze. Light flak was little in evidence. Most of the flak damage suffered was of a minor nature and the greater part of it was received by the heavies. These aircraft of which 122 were despatched reported 14 out of the 21 cases of flak damage.

16. Interceptions were low at 8 (4.7%) and of these four developed into attacks, three of them being on heavy aircraft. The two cases of damage by enemy fighters were also received by heavy aircraft - one Halifax, one Stirling.

17. Of the 5 aircraft missing, 2 (4.7% of sorties flown) were Stirling, 2 (6.3% of sorties flown) were Halifaxes and the remaining aircraft was one of the 11 Wellington II's despatched by 1 Group. From the evidence provided by our own observations, it would be reasonable to assess the losses of three to fighters and two to 'caused unknown'.

Summary

18. This raid was only moderately successful largely owing to ground haze in the target area, which made target identification difficult, and caused the attack to be rather widely scattered. Enemy interference with Gee made fixes unreliable, or, in many instances, impossible to obtain. This doubtless contributed to the dispersal of the attack.

INTRUDERS

Trente

19. One of the two Blenheims which set out to attack this aerodrome successfully accomplished its task, bombs being seen to fall along and to the right of the flare path. The other sortie was abortive owing to engine trouble.

Gilze Rijen

20. One of the two Blenheims detailed to attack this aerodrome was unable to locate its target owing to very poor visibility. The other did not reach Gilze Rijen owing to engine trouble, but bombed Hamstede aerodrome instead; results could not be observed.

Venlo

21. One of the two Blenheims which set out to attack Venlo aerodrome was forced to jettison its bombs owing to technical trouble; the other was unable to find its primary owing to extreme darkness and ground haze, and bombed Detham aerodrome instead.

LE HAVRE (FRESHWATER)

22. Five aircraft from No. 3 Group which were detailed to attack Le Havre reached the target area, but had visibility, due to heavy cloud and surface haze, made identification impossible and no attack was made.

MINELAYING

23. One aircraft detailed to lay mines in the Frisian Islands area successfully accomplished its mission, 5 mines being dropped after a timed run from a pinpoint visually obtained.

EC/S. 26342/3/ORS.
15th September, 1942.

5/7th August, 1942.

181084

Target	Group	Type	No. of Articles	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary			Result not known	Casualties			SERVICIAN Interceptions		
				Primary	Area	Reached Target Area	Over Enemy Territory	Not over Enemy Territory		Missing	Down by Flak	Shot down to Enemy Action	Not att- acked	Not att- acked	
DUISBURG	1	Well.II	11*	7				3							
		Well.III	9					1	1	1 m.		1 E			
		Well.IV	18		1							1 E			1
	3	Hnl.II	4	2					1						
		Well.III	41	35	1				5						1
	4	Stirling I	43	34			3	1	3		2		1 AC	1	1
		Hullfax I	32	26			3		1		2	4 m.	1 AC	1	1
5	Lauchester	47	44				1	2		5 m.					
	Hampden	10	8				1	1		1 m.	1 B		1		
TOTAL		215	179	2		7	5	15	2	5	21	2	5	4	4
WYBANTE A/D	2	Blen. IV	2*	1				1							
ELZE RIJEN A/D	2	Blen. IV	2*			1		1					1 AC		
VENLO A/D	2	Blen. IV	2*			1		1							
3 HAVRE	3	Well.III	4				4								
3 HAVRE	3	Stirling I	1				1				1 m.				
3 HAVRE	3	Lauchester	1				1								
				327	1	180	4	5	7	6	17	2	5	4	4

3 AC 1 B 2 E
19 m. 1 AC 3 AC
1 m

+ Freshmen *Not fitted Gee Total abortive 28

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BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 8/9TH AUGUST, 1942.

(Minelaying)

Meteorological Advice submitted to the Command.

0920 hours. Occluded front: 60°N 5°W - 59°N 0°E becoming (1) warm front to N.E. Holland - Ruhr; (2) cold front to Wash-Western Channel.

Home Bases: Cloud breaking and lifting behind cold front; belt of heavy rain and extensive cloud to great heights near cold front.

Target Areas; Overcast with medium and low cloud near and just ahead of warm front, medium cloud sheet probably extending to 10°E at midnight. Fine east of 10°E and in S. Germany. Mainly medium cloud in Ruhr area, probably broken to the south of Ruhr.

N.W. France: Much low cloud with base sometimes below 1000 feet.

1240 hours. Home Base:- Cold front now more developed. 2 or 3 Group bases available for return until 0100 hours. After this time low cloud and rain will effect all groups. No clearance expected until after dawn.

Target Areas:- Outlook as before.

Executive Orders.

2. Bad weather caused operations to be restricted to a small amount of mining in the Baltic.

Sorties.

3. 10 sorties were despatched as follows:-

Minelaying Area	Group	Type	Sorties	Laid Mines in Primary Area	Abortive		Casualties Damaged by Flak
					Reached Mining Area	Not over Enemy Territory.	
Kattegat	5	Lancaster	8	6	1	1	
Langelands Belt	"	"	1	1			
Pehmarn Channel	"	"	1	1			1 minor
Kiel Harbour	"	"	2	2			
Total			12	10	1	1	1 minor.

2 sorties despatched to the Kattegat were abortive, these aircraft being unable to locate the target owing to bad weather conditions.

...../Hocn.

Moon.

4. The moon was not above the horizon during these operations.

Weather Experienced.

5. 10/10 cloud was encountered over the N. Sea, and 4-6/10 strato-cumulus cumulus over the Western Baltic, Heligoland Bight was covered with 10/10 Nimbostratus cloud at 3,5000 feet. The cold front passing over England had cleared all but 2 Group's bases by 0500 hours.

Results.

6. 8 aircraft completed their task successfully, and all those reached their allotted positions on D.R. after obtaining visual pinpoints. Altogether 50 mines were laid; 30 in the Kattegat, 5 in the Langelands Belt, 5 in the Fehmarn Channel, and 10 in Kiel Harbour.

Casualty.

7. 1 aircraft suffered minor damage from flak from light defences.

DC/S. 26342/1/ORS.

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON OPERATIONS 9/10TH AUGUST, 1942.OSNABRUCK, LE HAVRE, INTRUDERS, MINELAYING

16 SEP 1942

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0920 hours. Midnight position of cold front: 50° N 10° E - Hamburg - Mannheim - La Pallice - Corunna.
- Home bases:- Conditions satisfactory until 0300 or 0400 hours, but local visibility troubles early in the night.
- Target area:- Good cloud cover expected at 2000 hours from 7°E to 11-12° E. Further east, medium cloud only, probably thin and becoming broken in the Berlin- Stettin areas.
- Route:- Variable cloud with thundery showers over N. Sea.
- 1300 hours: Home Bases:- May remain clear until dawn.
- Target areas:- Good medium cloud cover from 7°E to 11° E, becoming much thinner and more broken further east.
- Route:- Low cloud cover over Denmark not very good; freezing 10,000 feet; medium cloud 10-12,000 feet and upwards.
- Home Bases:- No serious difficulties expected before dawn.
- Route:- Cloud cover over Denmark unreliable.
- Target areas:- 7/10 medium cloud over Stettin; 3-5/10 residual cloud over Osnabruck late in the night.

Executive Orders

2. A variety of targets was available but all required an early return to bases in advance of the onset of bad weather. Osnabruck was selected and as the later forecast for the bases showed a slight improvement, the Groups were used at full available strength.
3. An armed raider was thought to be berthed in Le Havre docks, and this was given as a target to a number of the less experienced crews.

Sorties

4. Altogether 227 sorties were despatched, 193 of these being ordered to attack Osnabruck.
5. 25 (11%) of the sorties were abortive. 18 of these were due to technical defects, 6 sorties were unable to locate the target area, and 1 aircraft crashed on taking off.

Moon

6. The moon was not above the horizon during these operations.

Weather at Home Bases

7. Conditions were fair most of the night, Towards dawn there was/slight rain

slight rain in the extreme north, and patches of low stratus in the extreme south.

OSNABRUCK

Plan of Attack

8. Zero hour for this attack was planned at first for 2330 hours, but was changed subsequently to 0200 hours in view of an improvement in weather conditions at base. The later time made better use of the hours of darkness.

9. The target was to be illuminated by 15 flare-carrying Wellingtons from zero hour to zero + 24 minutes. These aircraft were to attack, at three minute intervals, in pairs with the exception that, at zero + 6 minutes, three aircraft were to release their flares simultaneously. Between zero + 2 and zero + 15 minutes incendiary-carrying aircraft were to attack, aircraft carrying 4 lb. incendiaries leading this phase. The main force, carrying maximum H.C. or heavy G.P. bombs, were to attack between zero + 10 and zero + 20 minutes.

10. All aircraft were to approach the target from west to east along the "B" lattice. Flare carrying aircraft were to release their first bundles of flares on the coordinates B.5.60, C 38.11, and the remaining bundles at 8 second intervals. Other Gee aircraft were to set up the coordinates B.5.60, C. 38.10.

Weather

11. 8-10/10 layer cloud with scattered cumulonimbus was encountered near 3° or 4° E, but only small amounts of cloud further east.

12. Aircrews found little or no cloud over Osnabruck and visibility was good.

Results

13. 168 (87%) of the 193 aircraft detailed claim to have reached the target area, 149 tons of incendiary and 308 tons of H.E. bombs being dropped.

14. 3 sorties dropped their bombs in the target area before the first flare carrying aircraft arrived, 6 minutes after zero hour. After this time flare-carrying aircraft arrived at irregular intervals and the target area was illuminated very unevenly for 32 minutes instead of 24, as planned. Some crews reported that the flares were scattered over too wide an area, although others found them of great assistance, stating that the town was well illuminated.

15. The incendiary attack commenced a minute after the release of the first flares and was spread over a period of 33 minutes instead of 13, as intended.

16. The attack by the main striking force seems to have begun quite punctually; only four aircraft were early, but 23 sorties were over five minutes late, 11 of these being over 10 minutes late.

17. Most aircraft bombed visually, but some bombed blind on E.T.A. or flares. Only one aircraft claims to have bombed blind on Gee, most of the crews reporting that Gee was unserviceable while the aircraft were over the territory, and, in fact, consultation with the R.D.F. officers at Groups left no doubt that Gee had been effectively jammed between the Zuider Zee and the target.

18. Some quite large fires and many scattered fires were seen in the target area. From the reports of crews who photographed the target with bombing it seems that the N.E. Quarter of Osnabruck suffered considerably.

19.

93 photographs taken with bombing show ground detail. 6 of these show the aiming point while 17 were taken within 3 miles of it. On account of the haze, however, many of the photographs taken show very little ground detail, but many of those which remain unplotted are definitely of open country. Those plotted on the target show incendiary tracks, but there is not much evidence of fires taking hold. Daylight reconnaissance photographs were not secured until after a second raid on August 17/18th. They show considerable damage, an account of which will be included in Night Raid Report No. 134.

Casualties

20. 6 (3.1%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation; 4 (2.1%) reported minor flak damage and one received damage (Cat. AC) not due to enemy action.
21. The number of interceptions, 15 (7.8%) was somewhat high, but only 3 of these developed into attacks.
22. There was considerable searchlight activity at the target and moderate, but inaccurate, heavy flak. The searchlights were operating in cones on a large scale; in fact, larger than would be expected by comparison with the intensity of the flak. Light flak was reported as slight to moderate. At Rheine heavy flak, fired into large searchlight cones, was also reported.
23. Our own observations do not give much evidence of the cause of the losses, but it is probable that two of our aircraft were shot down by fighters. The reasons for the loss of the other 4 aircraft cannot be determined.

Summary

24. It seems that flares were dropped over too wide an area partly due perhaps to effective Gee jamming, and fires were widespread rather than concentrated in any one area. Enemy night fighters were very active during this operation, the weather conditions being favourable for them.

LE HAVRE

25. 18 sorties were detailed to attack the docks at Le Havre. 8 of these claim to have bombed the primary targets and 6 more dropped their bombs in the target area.
26. 4 sorties were abortive, 3 of these being due to technical defects. 1 aircraft was unable to identify the target after taking a wrong pin-point on the coast of France.
27. All aircraft bombed visually, some confirming their position by a Gee fix. Many sorties report that they saw their bombs burst across the docks. 30 tons of H.E. bombs were dropped.
28. 5 photographs taken with bombing show ground detail, 3 of these showing the target. 3 aircraft certainly bombed the docks though no bursts are visible in the photographs. The other 2 photographs show sea or open country.
29. 2 aircraft sighted enemy night fighters but no attacks developed.

INTRUDERS

Venlo

30. 4 aircraft were despatched to this aerodrome, but only 1 of these claims to have found and bombed it, dropping H.E. bombs on the centre of the aerodrome and incendiaries in buildings at the western end. 2 aircraft were unable to locate the primary target and returned to base with their bombs. The remaining Blenheim was forced by engine trouble to attack Hamstede aerodrome as an alternative target and reports that six bomb bursts were seen and four fires started.

Twente

31. 1 Blenheim of the 3 detailed attacked this aerodrome dropping bombs across the runways. The other two aircraft were unable to locate the primary target. One of these believes that its bombs fell across the runway to Deelan aerodrome, and the other attacked an unidentified aerodrome near Eindhoven, dropping bombs across the flarepath.

Vechta

32. 3 aircraft were despatched to this aerodrome and 2 of them claim to have hit the western end of the flarepath with some of their bombs. The third aircraft could not locate the target but dropped its bombs on an unidentified aerodrome in the Vechta area causing a very large explosion.

Leeuwarden

33. 3 aircraft were despatched to attack this aerodrome, 1 of them dropping its bombs across the target. The remaining 2 aircraft were unable to identify the primary target and one returned with its load of bombs. The other attacked Texel aerodrome and claims to have dropped its bombs along the flarepath.

MINELAYING

34. The 3 aircraft detailed laid their mines successfully off the Frisian Islands. The crews reported that they obtained visual pin-points before making a D.R. run to their allotted positions. All of these aircraft returned safely. Altogether 7 mines were laid.

BC/S. 26342/ /ORS.
16th September, 1952.

9/10th August, 1942.

Target	Group	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary				Casualties			Interceptions		
				Primary	Primary area	Reached Target area	Bombed other Target	Over Enemy Territory	Not over Enemy Territory	Missing	Down by Flak	Down by E.A.	Not due to Enemy action	Attacked	Not Attacked
OSNABROCK	1	Well II	8*		8										200
		Well III	10		6				2	2					1
		Well IV	29*		25				1	1	2 n.	1 AC			2
	3	Well III	45		41		4				1 n.			1	1
		Stirling	40		38				2		1 n.				4
	4	Halifax	19		14				1	1				1	
	5	Lancaster	42		36			1	3	2					
	TOTAL	193		158		4	1	4	10	6	1 n.	1 AC	3	12	
L'Y HAVRE	3	Well III	12	8	2				2						1
	5	Stirling	2		1		1								1
	5	Lancaster	4+		3			1							
INTRUDERS															
	2	Blenheim	4 a		1			1	1	1					
	2	Blenheim	3 a		1		2								
	2	Blenheim	3 a		1	1	1								
	2	Blenheim	3 a		1		1	1							
PENINSULAR															
	5	Heasden	2 a		2										
		Lancaster	1		1										
TOTAL			227	12	178	3	7	3	6	12	6	4 n.	1 AC	3	14

* Not fitted Gee

+ Freshmen

Total Abortive 25.

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BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 10/11TH. AUGUST, 1942.MineslayingMeteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0920 hours. Estimated midnight position of fronts:- (1) cold front: 60°N 13°E - 55°N 15°E - Prague; (2) occluded front: S.W. Scotland - Orkneys - Shetlands - 55°N 5½°E - Zuyder Zee; (3) warm front: Zuyder Zee southwards; (4) cold front: Zuyder Zee - Brussels - Paris - Nantes.
- Home Bases:- Convection cloud dispersing, scattered showers probably persisting.
- Target Areas: Broken medium cloud in N. Germany and in Mainz area. Much medium and low cloud over Sweden, Wilhelmshaven, and inland to the Ruhr. Conditions fine over S. Germany.
- Route:- Occluded front active over N. Sea.
- 1255 hours. Home Bases:- Secondary cold front through East Anglia at midnight, giving a line of showers,
- Target Areas: Cloud tops to 15,000 feet and high icing index along cold front
- 1615 hours. Probable position of occluded front; Yarmouth - Lyme - Le Havre.
- Home Bases:- Early in night cloud at 1,000 feet or less with intermittent slight rain. Cloud breaking up later, lifting to 1,500 or 2,000 feet.
- Mainz area:- 5-7/10 medium cloud, increasing later.
- Route:- Thundery conditions likely en route to Mainz. Layer cloud with good gaps along main cold front; on return, thick solid cloud along occluded front; broken low and medium cloud over S. Denmark area.

Executive Orders

2. No bombing operation was ordered because of indifferent weather and because it was desired to provide a force to mine the route which would be used by a naval unit thought to be moving from Norway to a N. German port.

Sorties

3. 52 sorties were despatched. For details of operations see table below.

...../Table over

Laying Area	Gp.	Type	No. of Sorties	Laid Mines in Primary Area	Abortive		Not over Enemy Territory	Missing
					Reached Mining Area	Over Enemy Territory		
Baltic Sea	1	Well. II	7 *	2		5		
	3	Stir. I	28	17	6	2	2	1
	5	Irnc. I	17	11	2	1	2	1
Total			52	31	8	8	4	2

* Not fitted Gee

Total Abortive 19

4. 19 (36.5% of the sorties were abortive. 3 of these were due to technical defects and 8 to inability to pinpoint, while 8 more turned back early owing to the severe weather conditions.

Moon

5. The moon was not above the horizon during these operations.

Weather Experienced

6. Cloud increased to 10/10 off the east coast of England the cloud base being 1,000 - 1,500 feet, tops 10 - 12,000 feet, but visibility was good.

7. Rain was encountered west of Denmark with severe static conditions in the cloud. Aircraft found layer cloud over Denmark and the laying areas with moderate visibility.

Results

8. 31 aircraft laid their mines successfully in the areas ordered. The crews of all these aircraft obtained pinpoints from nearby land before making a D.R. run to their allotted positions. There were no reports of interference with Gee being experienced. Altogether 130 mines were laid. Details are as follows:-

Aalborg	10	The Sound	4
Kattegat	94	Kiel Harbour	5
Great Belt	13	Fehmarn Channel	4

Casualties

9. 2 aircraft are missing from these operations, but there is no information about any possible cause of loss.

BC/S. 26342/2/ORS.
16th September, 1942.

COPY NO. 16.

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 11/12TH AUGUST, 1942.Mainz; Le Havre; Hinslaying; Leaflets.Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0915 hours. Estimated midnight position of fronts:- (1) cold front: 62°N, 5°E - 55°N, 11°E - 50°N, 10° then south westwards; (2) occluded front: 60°N, 0° - 55°N, 7°E - Sweden.
- Home Bases:- Convection cloud dispersing apart from a few scattered showers.
- Germany:- Convection cloud dispersing to small amounts in Ruhr and Middle Rhine; much low and medium cloud in north, and variable amounts of convection cloud in N.W.
- N. France:- Variable amounts of convection cloud.
- 1240 hours. No change in outlook.
- 1600 hours. Home Bases:- Generally fit; showers decreasing during night.
- Mainz:- 5-8/10 medium cloud and variable amounts of cumulus cloud, tops to medium levels; thundery showers likely. Time over this target should be as late as possible.
- Le Havre:- Varying amounts of cumulus with base above 2,000 feet except in scattered showers.
- Elbe estuary:- Much convection cloud, base about 1,000 - 1,500 ft. tops to medium levels.

Executive Orders

2. Mainz was chosen as the target because, apart from its importance as an industrial town, it was in the best weather area within range in the high wind expected. Also, as it was not likely to be heavily defended, it was suitable for attack by the small force which was available.

Sorties

3. Altogether 192 sorties were despatched, 154 of these being detailed to attack Mainz.

4. 21 (11%) of the sorties were abortive. 12 of these were due to technical defects, and 8 to inability to identify the primary target.

Moon

5. There was no moon on this night, it being the night of the new moon.

Weather at Home Bases

6. There were only small amounts of cloud over most bases, but scattered showers. Visibility was good.

MAINZPlan of attack

7. The attack on Mainz was planned as a normal bombing attack with the aid of

aid of reconnaissance flares, the target being beyond Gee coverage. Crews were therefore warned that flares would not necessarily indicate the position of the target.

8. Zero hour for the operation was fixed at 0055 hours. Aircraft carrying maximum 4 lb. incendiaries were to lead the attack followed by those carrying maximum 30 lb. incendiaries. One third of the whole force carried only H.E. bombs and two thirds of the aircraft from 4 Group carried 1,000 lb. H.E. bombs, the load being made up with 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries.

9. One crew from each squadron of 5 Group was detailed to reconnoitre the target at the end of the allotted period.

Weather

10. 7-10/10 cloud with tops up to 12,000 feet was encountered over the N. Sea, breaking to small amounts in the Rhine valley. Over Mainz aircraft found 0-4/10 cloud, tops 4-5,000 feet, and very good visibility.

Results

11. 124 (80.5%) of the 154 aircraft detailed claim to have reached the target area.

12. Some aircraft dropped flares on the way to the target and these helped other aircraft also to obtain pinpoints. Flares were also dropped over the target area and it appears that the town was well illuminated for quite a long period during the attack.

13. The operation commenced rather later than was planned, only two aircraft attacking during the first 5 minutes after zero hour. The whole attack lasted 46 minutes during which 133 tons of incendiary and 171 tons of H.E. bombs were dropped. This number included 26 x 4,000 lb. bombs.

14. Reports by crews indicate that Gee was again effectively jammed by the enemy, Gee becoming ineffective over Belgium from between Long. 04° and Long. 05° East. The majority of crews were able to bomb visually, the target area being well illuminated much of the time by flares and fires, but a few aircraft bombed blind on E.T.A.

15. Many crews report that there were very large fires concentrated about the aiming point and that few bombs were observed to fall outside the target area.

16. More than half the aircraft claiming to have attacked returned night photographs, 68 photographs showing ground detail being taken with bombing. 8 of these show the aiming point, while 31 more were within 3 miles of it. Those plotted at the target show many incendiaries burning which, by 0115 hours, had developed into good fires in the town area. Smaller fires were also seen at Biebrich and Wiesbaden. Subsequent daylight reconnaissance fully confirmed the success of this raid, but, as it was not carried out until after a second attack had been made on this target, description of the damage is deferred to Night Raid Report No. 130.

17. 4 aircraft took photographs with bombing in the Koblenz area; and it therefore appears that some crews who claimed to reach the primary area dropped their bombs in this area owing to similarity in ground detail at Mainz and Koblenz.

Other Targets Attacked

18. Two aircraft which were unable to locate the primary target attacked what was believed to be Bingen, and a built up area on the bank of the Rhine about 15 miles N.W. of Mainz. The crew of a third aircraft report that they attacked Koblenz, being misled at the time of bombing by similarity in ground detail.

...../Casualties.

Casualties

19. 14 (9.1%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation; 5 (3.25%) reported flak damage (2 Cat. AC and 3 minor); 2 (1.3%) were damaged by fighters (1 Cat. B and 1 Cat. AC) whilst 3 (1.95%) received damage which was not due to enemy action (3 Cat. E).

20. Slight to heavy flak and moderate light flak with a few searchlights all being inaccurate were reported at the target. Reports were also received of heavy and light flak cooperating with searchlights at Cologne, Bonn, Frankfurt and Munchen-Gladbach.

21. 5 (3.2%) of our aircraft reported interceptions by night fighters, two of these developing into attacks.

22. Wireless Intelligence suggests that possibly 7 aircraft were lost to enemy night fighters. The remainder conceivably have been lost to flak owing partly, perhaps, to the fact that a number of aircraft strayed from their briefed routes and passed over the heavily defended Ruhr area. That the failure to adhere to the proper route did occur is confirmed by the number of reports concerning the defences of areas away from the proper route. Apart from this there is no reason to account for the unusually high losses on this operation. There is equally nothing to account for the losses being almost exclusively incurred by Wellington III's and Halifaxes.

Summary

23. The weather conditions were good during the operation and it was possible for most crews to bomb visually. Gee jamming was still experienced. It seems that extensive damage was done to Mainz and this attack and that of the following night together constitute an outstanding success. The technique of using reconnaissance flares adopted on this occasion produced good results.

24. Casualties were high, however, and the only suggestion is that single aircraft strayed from their briefed routes and thus became individual targets over well defended areas.

LE HAVRE

25. 16 sorties were despatched to attack the shipping and docks at Le Havre, and 12 of these claim that they dropped their bombs in the primary area. 30 tons of H.E. bombs were dropped.

26. 4-6/10 cloud was encountered on the way to the target with some curulus also over the target. These conditions made it difficult for some aircraft to observe the results of their bombing but many crews observed bombs bursting in the dock area.

27. 4 Photographs taken with bombing show ground detail, 3 of these show open country but the fourth is probably of Le Havre though the photograph is of very poor quality.

28. 2 aircraft are missing from this operation and it seems likely that these were shot down by flak. Another aircraft suffered minor damage from flak and a Halifax was approached by an enemy night fighter but no attack developed.

INTRUDERS

29. Intruder operations were carried out against the following aerodromes:-

Juvincourt

30. 1 of the 2 aircraft despatched claims to have reached and attacked this target, dropping a stick of bombs across the aerodrome. The other, owing to engine failure, was forced to abandon its task not long after taking off.

St. Trond

31. Both Blenheims detailed successfully attacked this aerodrome and dropped bombs on buildings, runways and dispersal areas. Crews report that the flares used in this attack were very useful.

Gilze-Rijen

32. Neither of the 2 aircraft detailed attacked this aerodrome. 1 Blenheim was unable to identify the primary target and bombed Wealhaven aerodrome, bursts being observed among buildings at the S.W. end. The other Blenheim could not obtain a pin-point and returned with its load of bombs.

Venlo, Leeuwarden, Ardorf, Jever

33. 1 Blenheim was despatched to each of these aerodromes but none was able to identify the primary target. 1 aircraft returned with its load but the remaining three attacked other targets. Bombs were dropped along the flarepath of an aerodrome in the Oldenburg area, and Ardorf aerodrome was attacked by the Blenheim detailed to Jever. The remaining aircraft bombed a searchlight and flak position.

MINELAYING

34. Only 3 of the 9 Hampdens detailed laid their mines successfully in the Elbe estuary. All these made D.R. runs to their allotted positions and obtaining pinpoints on nearby land. Another Hampden dropped its mines in an alternative position off the Frisian Islands, but the remaining 5 aircraft were completely unsuccessful owing to the bad weather conditions. Altogether 4 mines were laid. One aircraft suffered minor damage from fl

LEAFLETS

35. The 8 Lancasters despatched to Vichy to drop leaflets all completed their task successfully and without incident.

BC/S. 26342/2/ORS.
21st September, 1942.

Target	Op.	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary					Result not known	Missing	Interceptions		Not due to enemy action	Interceptions not attacked	Not attacked	
				Primary	Area	Bombed other Target	Abortive	Over enemy Territory	Scattered other Target	Abortive			Not over enemy Territory	By Flak				By E.A.
MINE	1	Well. III	8		7						1							
		Well. IV	25*		23	1					1							1
	3	Well. III	25		24	1	1					8						1
		Stirling	28		25						1	2		1 AC	1 AC	2 X		1
	4	Wellfax I	25		16				3		1			1 AC				1
	Lancaster	33		29			1			2					1 R			
	Total	154		124	2	1	1	3		7	2	14	5	2	3		2	3
LE HAVRE	3	Well. III	3		2		1											
	4	Wellfax III	8		7							1						1
	5	Hampden	2*		1						1			1 m.				
	Lancaster	3		2								1						
INTERCEPTORS																		
Juvincourt	2	Blenheim IV	2*	1						1								
St. Tropez	2	Blenheim IV	2*	2														
Gales-Rien	2	Blenheim IV	2*			1				1								
Verle	2	Blenheim IV	1*				1											
Leeswarden	2	Blenheim IV	1*			1												
Jordorf	2	Blenheim IV	1*			1												
Jever	2	Blenheim IV	1*			1												
UNCLAYING																		
Elbe Estuary	5	Hampden	9*		3		4	1	1				1 m.					
LE FLATS																		
Vieky	5	Lancaster	3*		3													
Total			192	3	142	6	7	2	5	9	2	16	2 AC 5 m	1 B 1 AC	3 X		2	4

* Not fitted Gee

+ Pressmen

Total Abortive 21

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BOMBER COMPLAINT REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 12/13 AUGUST, 1942

Mainz; Intruders; Minelaying; Leaflets;

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command.

1. 0920 Hours. Home Bases:- Conditions expected to be satisfactory; increasing medium cloud.
- N. Germany:- Residual convection cloud; more in amount near coast; visibility good.
- France:- Small amounts of convection cloud over Central and East France; medium cloud over N.W. France.
- 1230 hours Home Bases:- Minor occlusion expected at midnight from S.E. Yorkshire to N.W. France, bringing a narrow belt of thundery rain.
- Target areas:- No change in outlook.
- 1550 hours Home Bases:- No serious difficulties expected.
- Mainz area:- Small amounts of cloud possible.
- Route:- 7-10/10 cloud, base 2,000 ft. breaking to small amounts at times.
- Frisian Islands:- 7/10 or more convection cloud. Base 1500 ft. with showers.

Executive Orders

2. The weather conditions at bases and for the southern targets were good, and it was decided to exploit the success obtained the previous night by making another attack on Mainz.

Sorties

3. Altogether 155 sorties were despatched; 138 of these were ordered to attack Mainz.

4. 31 (20%) of the sorties were abortive, the reasons being:-

Technical defects	15
Inability to locate target	8
Severe Icing	5
Attacks by enemy fighters	2
Sickness	1

Moon

5. The moon was not above the horizon during these operations.

Weather at Home Bases

6. There were variable amounts of cloud with base about 3,000 ft. Visibility was good at most bases.

MainzPlan of Attack

7. This operation against Mainz, like that on the previous night, was planned/as a

as a normal bombing attack with the aircraft using reconnaissance flares to locate the target since it is outside the reliable Gee range. Zero hour was fixed at 0040 hours and the attack was to last for 20 minutes.

8. Two thirds of the aircraft of 1 and 3 Groups were to carry maximum incendiary loads, one half of these carrying 4 lb. and the other half 30 lb. incendiaries. Those aircraft carrying 4 lb. incendiaries, together with aircraft of 150 Squadron, were to lead the attack between 0040 and 0045 hours, followed by all other aircraft carrying 30 lb. incendiaries between 0045 and 0050 hours. Lancasters were to carry loads of either 1 x 4000 lb. H.E. made up with 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries or 4 x 2000 lb. H.E. bombs. All other aircraft were to carry maximum H.E. or heavy G.P. bombs.

9. One crew from each squadron of 5 Group was specially selected to reconnoitre the target at the end of the period.

Weather

10. 9/10 cumulus cloud was encountered over the eastern N. Sea continental coast, tops 9-10,000 feet, but towering to 12-13,000 feet inland. There was moderate to heavy icing in the cloud with occasional heavy rain and electrical storms. Visibility was good.

11. Over the target aircrews found 8-10/10 stratocumulus in layers with 7-10/10 cumulus or cumulonimbus. The cloud base was 6-7,000 feet, tops 12,000 feet.

Results

12. 101 (73.5%) of the 137 aircraft detailed claim to have reached and dropped their bombs in the target area.

13. An incendiary carrying aircraft began the attack punctually at zero hour but only one other aircraft dropped incendiaries during the next five minutes and 27 aircraft of the incendiary force were over 10 minutes late.

14. The main attack by aircraft carrying H.E. bombs seems to have started early, 5 aircraft dropping their bombs before the time scheduled, but 15 more were at least 10 minutes late.

15. Early in the attack most aircraft bombed blind on E.T.A., Gee jamming being again experienced, but later in the raid some aircraft were able to bomb visually by the light of existing fires, although a few bombed blindly on fires seen through gaps in the cloud.

16. Many crews were not able to observe the results of their own bombing owing to the cloud which often obscured the target area. There are many reports, however, of good fires in the centre of the town although it appears that in general the attack was more scattered than on the previous night. A few aircraft which arrived over the target early in the attack report that the glow could be seen of fires which had been started the night before.

17. 26 photographs taken with bombing show ground detail. 2 of these show the aiming point while 10 more are within 3 miles of it.

18. Although the sample of night photographs was considerably smaller than in the previous raid, it provided evidence that a good proportion of aircraft claiming attack did in fact reach the target area.

19. Daylight reconnaissance on August 15th fully confirmed the success of the two raids and revealed that Mainz had suffered very extensive devastation amounting altogether to about 135 acres. By far the most severe damage has been to public and municipal buildings and to business and residential property in the heart of the city. Between 600 and 800 buildings have been destroyed, the largest single area of devastation being about 50 acres. Damage to industrial buildings has occurred chiefly in the north and east of the town where a chemical works, a shipyard, and a sawmill have all suffered severely. In the city area 3 warehouses, about 10 industrial buildings, and several other small factory buildings have been destroyed. There is also considerable damage to railway property,

...../4 goods yards

4 goods yards being affected and buildings destroyed over areas amounting to about 5 acres. There have also been a number of hits on railway tracks and main roads. Mainz is an important garrison town, and of the numerous barrack buildings and military depots, 8 have been effected. This included the complete destruction of 5 large and 6 small buildings. Altogether the results of these two raids may be classed among our most successful achievements.

Other Targets Attacked

20. Frankfurt and Eltville were attacked by 2 aircraft which were unable to identify the primary target, and a third aircraft, for the same reason, dropped its bombs in an unidentified built-up area. The crew of a Stirling report that they were repeatedly coned by searchlights in a heavily defended area west of the Rhine and dropped their bombs in this area.

Casualties

21. 5 (3.6%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation; 9(6.5%) reported damage from flak (1 Cat. AC and 8 minor), 4 (2.9%) were damaged by fighters (1 Cat. AC and 3 minor) whilst 5 (3.6%) were damaged by causes other than enemy action (1 Cat. E 3 Cat. B and 1 minor).

22. Moderate light and heavy flak and a few searchlights were reported over the target. Both heavy and light flak and searchlights were encountered on route.

23. Our own observations indicate one possible loss to enemy fighter, but do not confirm other intercepted claims by enemy fighters to have shot down other British aircraft. 1 loss was probably due to flak at Mainz and the other 3 were probably due to flak on route.

Summary

24. It seems that this attack was slightly more scattered than that of the previous night, probably due to much less favourable weather conditions. Considerable success was, however, achieved, while our losses, 3.6% of the sorties despatched, were much smaller than on the night before (9.1%).

25. It seems likely that the lower losses on this night compared with the previous attack were associated with the weather conditions, cloud hampering the operation of searchlights.

INTRUDERS

Juvincourt

26. 2 Blenheims were ordered to attack this aerodrome and the crew of one aircraft claims to have seen their bombs burst on the runway. Engine failure caused the other aircraft to return soon after taking off.

St. Trond

27. 1 of the 2 aircraft detailed claims to have dropped its bombs in dispersal areas at St. Trond aerodrome. The other aircraft could not identify the target and returned with its load of bombs.

Venlo

28. Neither of the 2 Blenheims despatched attacked this aerodrome. 1 aircraft was driven off its course by bad weather and attacked Deurne aerodrome but was unable to observe the damage done. The other aircraft turned back after trying in vain to locate the target.

MINELAYING

29. Mines were laid successfully off the Frisian Islands by 8 of the 9 aircraft detailed, all of them reaching their allotted positions by a D.R. run after obtaining visual fixes. A Wellington which was unable to pinpoint abandoned its task and returned with its load of mines. Altogether 24 mines were laid.

LEAFLETS

30. 1 Lancaster was sent to Amiens and another to Chalons-sur-Marne to drop leaflets. Both aircraft completed their task successfully.

IC/S. 26342/2/ORS.
22nd September, 1942.

Target	Group	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary				Casualties				Interceptions	
				Primary	Primary Area	Reached Target Area	Aborted other Target	Over Enemy Territory	Aborted other Target	Not over Enemy Territory	Missing	Down by Flak	Damaged by Enemy Aircraft	Not due to Enemy Action	Attacked
MINES	1	Holl. II	8	6		1			1		2 n.	1 n.		1	1
		Holl. III	6	4				1	1				1 E		
	Well. IV	23	16	1	1			4	1	1 n.	1 n.		1	1	
	3	Well. III	31	24		4		1	2		2 n.		2 B	4	3
		Stirling	27	17	1	1		2	5	1	2 n.	2 n.	1 B	2	2
	5	Hampton	10*	6	1				2	1	2 n.				
Lancaster		33	29	1				1	2	2 n.		1 n.		1	
Total		156	102	4	7		4	16	5	8	4	5	8	6	
UPPER MERSE									1						
Juvincoart	2	Blen. IV	2*	1											273
St. Trond	2	Blen. IV	2*	1				1							
Wenle	2	Blen. IV	2*			1	1								
<u>MINELAYING</u>															
Frisian Islands	1	Holl. II	2*	2		1									
		Holl. IV	2*	2											
	3	Holl. III	2*	2											
		Lancaster	2*	2											
LEAFLETS	5	Lancaster	2*	2											
Total			156	2	112	5	10	4	17	5	1 n. 8 n.	1 n. 3 n.	1 E 2 B 1 n. 1 n.	8	8

* Not fitted Geo

+ Freshman

Total Abortive 34

NIGHT R. III	REQUEST NO. 131
COPY	19 SEP 1942
TIME	

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS - 13/14 SEP 1942

Mineslaying

19 SEP 1942

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0920 hours. Home Bases:- Cloudy, occasional breaks in layer cloud.
 N. Germany:- Much layer cloud with occasional breaks especially towards the south.
 N. France:- Variable amounts of layer cloud.
- 1245 hours. Home Bases:- Outlook unchanged.
 Target areas:- Much cloud along N. and N.E. coast of France; cloud base in Brest, Lorient, Nantes area 1,000 feet or less. Over Heligoland Bight and Denmark cloud base expected at 1,500 - 2,000 feet. Outlook unchanged in other areas.
- 1545 hours. Home Bases:- Conditions fairly satisfactory, but some slight rain and occasional patches of very low cloud; low stratus cloud very likely south of 91 and 92 Groups.
 Target Areas:- Conditions similar to those at bases over Heligoland and S.E. Denmark.
 Route:- Large amounts of layer cloud, not below 1,500 feet, with occasional patches of rain. Visibility good under cloud.

Executive Orders

2. The weather conditions were such that operations were restricted to mineslaying.

Sorties

3. 36 sorties were despatched. For details of the operations see attached table.
4. 6 of the 10 abortive sorties were due to inability to locate the target and 3 were owing to technical defects, while 1 aircraft jettisoned its bombs after meeting with heavy flak.

Moon

5. The moon was not above the horizon during these operations.

Weather Experienced

6. 8-10/10 layer cloud with occasional rain, heavy at times, was encountered over the N. Sea but cloud was breaking over Denmark becoming 3-5/10 over Kiel Bay, with base 2-3,000 feet.
7. There was much cloud over home bases with local rain, and fog developed towards dawn in N. Lincolnshire and Yorkshire.

...../Results

Results

8. 23 (64%) of the 36 aircraft despatched laid their mines in their allotted positions and two aircraft laid their mines in alternative positions. Most aircraft determined their positions by visual fixes but a few aircraft laid their mines off the Frisian Islands solely on Gee. Altogether 90 mines were laid: 14 off the Frisian Islands, 6 in the Heligoland Bight, and 70 on the Baltic Plan.

Casualties

9. 1 Stirling is missing from this operation, but the cause has not been clearly determined. Another aircraft suffered minor damage from flak.

BC/S. 26342/4/ORS.
16th September, 1947.

17/16th August, 1942.

Minelaying Area	Group	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary				Casualties				Interceptions	
				Primary	Primary Area	Reached Target Area		Over Enemy Territory		Missing	Dam. by Flak	Dam. by E.A.	Not due to Enemy Action	Attacked	Not Attacked
						Bombed other Target	Abortive	Bombed other Target	Abortive						
Baltic Plan	3	Stirling	9	5		1			2	1					
Heligoland Bight	2	Leicester	11	8		1		1	1						
Frisian Islands	1	Well-III	6	3		3									
	3	Well-III	10	7		3					1 B				
		Total	36	23		1	7	1	1	2	1	1 B			

* Not fitted Gee

Total Abortive 10

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 15/16TH AUGUST, 1942Dusseldorf; MinelayingMetecrological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0915 hours. Home Bases:- Much low cloud, but base mainly above 1,000 feet.
- Target areas:- Much medium and broken low cloud in Heligoland Bight and adjacent areas. Small amounts of cloud with ground haze inland over Germany. Much low cloud, base below 1,000 feet over N.W. coast of France.
- 1230 hours. No change in outlook.
- 1630 hours. Home Bases:- 10/10 low cloud, base 1,000 feet and down to 800 feet locally; 4 Group may have cloud base at 1,500 feet. Slight rain or drizzle in early part of night with poor visibility.
- Target areas:- A little cloud with local smoke haze over Ruhr area. Low stratus over Frisian Islands and light cumulus, base above 1,000 feet, in Heligoland Bight.
- 2115 hours. Home Bases:- Conditions greatly improving except in south of 3 Group where difficulties for take-off are expected.
- Target areas:- No change in outlook.

Executive Orders

2. Western Germany offered a variety of targets with prospects of hazy conditions. Dusseldorf was selected because it was so placed that it was likely to have less smoke than the middle of the Ruhr. It was not too deep in the defences to be unsuitable for attack by a small force and its position on the river was such that the water would give crews some assistance in finding the target without a moon.

Sorties

3. 140 sorties were despatched; 131 of these were ordered to attack Dusseldorf.
4. 25 (18%) of the sorties were abortive. 18 of these were due to technical failures, 6 to unfavourable weather conditions, and 4 aircraft returned after being attacked by an enemy fighter.

Moon

5. The moon was not above the horizon during these operations.

Weather at Home Bases

6. There was much low cloud, generally above 1,000 feet, with some rain S.E. of a line from the Wash to Bristol. Further north the cloud base was 2,000 feet or above, with a few breaks but local showers. Visibility was moderate.

DUSSELDORFPlan of Attack

7. Since it was expected that Goo would be of no assistance to navigation east of 5° E. this operation was planned as a normal bombing attack on Dusseldorf. Crews were warned that hazy conditions in the Rhine Valley might make identification of the target difficult, and they were advised therefore to make full use of reconnaissance flares for locating the river and the city at Neuss and Dusseldorf before bombing. It was emphasised that the first raid on Mainz (11/12th August) was a good example of the value of this flare technique. Crews were also advised to obtain as nearly accurate fixes as possible west of 5°E. The attack was to be made from heights at which visual identification of the target was possible. Zero hour was fixed at 0210 hours.

8. The bomb loads and time of attack for aircraft of 1 Group were laid down so that two thirds of the aircraft were to carry incendiaries, 150 tons attacking between 0210 and 0215 hours and the rest between 0210 and 0225 hours. The remaining aircraft of 1 Group, carrying H.E. were to spread their attack between 0210 and 0220 hours. One third of the aircraft of 3 Group were to carry 4 lb. incendiaries and another third 30 lb. incendiaries; the remaining aircraft of this Group were to carry maximum loads of H.C. or heavy G.P.M. after the incendiary carriers. About half of the aircraft of 5 Group were to carry H.E. loads made up with 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries and were all to attack between 0210 and 0220 hours. The remainder of this Group were to carry H.E. bombs only and attack between 0220 and 0230 hours.

9. One experienced crew from each Lancaster squadron except 49 Squadron, from 12 Squadron and one from 103 Squadron were detailed to make reconnaissance of the target at the end of the period of attack (0230 hours) and report on the success or otherwise of the raid.

Route1 Group

Out:- Base - cross coast between Saltfleet and Cromer - Leyden - Target.
Back:- Target - turn right - Ouddorp - cross coast between Cromer and Harwich - Base.

3 Group

Out:- Base - Southwold - Leyden - Target.
Back:- Target - turn right - Ouddorp - Orfordness - Base.

5 Group

Out:- Base - cross coast between Skegness and Southwold - Leyden - Target.
Back:- Target - turn right - Ouddorp - cross coast between Southwold and Clacton - Base.

Weather

10. 10/10 thick cloud was encountered over the N. Sea with tops about 6,000 feet although up to 13,000 feet over Holland; electrical storms were also encountered. The cloud became thinner inland and 5-9/10 thin layer cloud between 4,000 - 8,000 feet with poor visibility was reported over Dusseldorf.

Results

11. 100 (76%) of the 131 aircraft detailed claim to have reached the target area. 98 tons of incendiary and 127 tons of H.E. bombs were dropped.

12. The attack began punctually, two aircraft dropping incendiaries at 0210 hours, and the intensity of attack was fairly even during the next 20 minutes.

13. 7 incendiary carrying aircraft bombed after the time scheduled and 10 aircraft altogether dropped their bombs after 0230 hours, the time at which the attack ended.

attack was to end. 32 x 4,000 lb. bombs were dropped.

14. Interference with Gee was experienced again although there were some reports indicating that the frequency of the modulation was a little lower than was previously thought to be the case. There were also a few reports suggesting that there might have been two different jamming stations being received simultaneously near the target itself. Jamming prevented most aircraft from obtaining Gee fixes east of 6°E, although 7 aircraft claimed to have obtained fixes over the target and bombed blindly on Gee. The remainder of those who attacked bombed visually, or blindly on E.T.A. or existing fires.

15. Results were unobserved by many crews although a glow on the cloud and scattered fires were seen. One crew reports that fires and flares seemed to have been scattered over the whole of the Ruhr area. Dummy fires were also reported in the target area.

16. 33 photographs taken with bombing show ground detail, but only 1 of these shows the target. One more has been plotted within 3 miles of the target.

17. Most of these night photographs show open country, about 20 being plotted at distances varying from 7 to 20 miles W. or S.W. of the target. The attack appears to have been very scattered and it is unlikely that more than a small proportion of aircraft reached the target. No daylight cover has yet been obtained of this target since the attack.

Other Targets Attacked

18. Bombs were dropped on Meerdt by 1 aircraft which had been coned by searchlights, and another, unable to locate the primary target, bombed an unidentified built-up area in the Ruhr. A third aircraft, which was late in taking off bombed the docks at Rotterdam blindly on Gee.

Casualties

19. 4 (3.5%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation. 14 (10.7%) were damaged by flak (2 Cat.AC and 12 Minor) and 2 (1.7%) by fighters (2 Cat.AC). There were no cases of damage not due to enemy action.

20. Moderate heavy flak, firing both in predicted and box barrage form was reported from the target area. Many searchlights operated but were mainly rendered ineffective by cloud.

21. 7 aircraft reported interceptions, 4 of these developing into attacks.

22. Losses were probably kept low by the prevalent weather conditions, the large amount of cloud affording cover for our aircraft whilst the fact that there was no moon, reduced visibility for fighters. The cloud also prevented cooperation between flak and searchlights.

23. From our own observations it would appear that 3 of the missing aircraft were shot down by flak and the fourth by night fighters.

Summary

24. Poor visibility and considerable cloud made it very difficult for aircraft to locate the target. Gee jamming was experienced again by nearly all the aircraft, and as a consequence the attack was rather scattered. In the absence of reconnaissance cover the actual damage done cannot yet be assessed.

MINELAYING.

25. 9 aircraft were despatched to lay mines off the Frisian Islands. 7 of these completed their task successfully, 6 of them fixing their positions by Gee and another obtaining an H.F. fix. 1 Lancaster could not locate the target and returned with its mines. Altogether 38 mines were laid.

...../ a few reports

26. A few reports from aircraft indicate that they had picked up Gee interference near the Frisian Islands, but it did not appear to have reduced the range of Gee appreciably.

27. 1 aircraft, a Stirling, is missing from these operations. It is known that this aircraft developed engine trouble and from signals received it is thought probable that it made a forced landing in the Frisian Islands.

DC/S. 26342/1/ORS.
9th. September 1942.

15/16th August, 1942.

Target	Op.	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary				Casualties			Interceptions		
				Primary	Primary Area	Reached Target Area	Bombed other Target	Over Territory	Bombed other Target	Not over Enemy Territory	Killed by Flak	Damaged by Enemy Aircraft	Not due to Enemy Action	Attacked	Not Attacked
DUSSELDORF	1	Well. II	10 *		8				1	1		1 AC 1 m.			27%
		Well. III	5		3					2					
		Well. IV	21 *		18				1	2		1 AC 2 m.	1 AC	2	2
		Halifax	6		3				1	2					
	3	Well. III	25		18	1	1		2	2	1	4 m.			1
	Stirling	18		11				2	3			1 AC		1	
	5	London	7		5				1		1				1
London	29		24	1			1	1		2	5 m.				
		Total	131		100	2	3	1	8	13	4	14	2	4	2
MUNSTER															
Frisian Islands	3	Stirling	1+		7						1				
	5	London	8+												
		Total	140		107	2	4	1	8	13	5	2 AC 12 m.	2 AC	4	3

* Not fitted Gee

+ Freshmen

Total abortive

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS, 16/17TH AUGUST, 1942.

23

MinelayingMeteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0930 hours. Estimated midnight position of fronts (1) cold; E. of Denmark - Hamburg - S. of Brussels - Brest; (2) feeble warm: Hamburg - 51°N, 09°E.
- Germany:- Medium cloud becoming broken E. and S. of a line Saarbrücken to Stettin. Slight chance of a clearance behind the front on the N.W. coast of Germany.
- Denmark:- Cloud cover below 6,000 ft. cannot be guaranteed.
- N.W. France:- Large amounts of very low cloud on coast.
- Home Bases:- Small amounts of cloud with local visibility troubles.
- 1225 hours. Western Baltic and Skaggerak area will be subject to frontal conditions with rain and low cloud. Otherwise no change from 0930 hours.
- 1600 hours. Previous forecasts confirmed.
- Frisian Islands area:- broken cloud at 2,000 - 3,000 ft.
- Western Baltic:- Much medium cloud and rain with base below 1,000'.
- Gydnia area:- Little or no cloud.
- Home Bases:- Some medium and low cloud but serious deterioration in conditions unlikely.

Executive Orders

2. Weather conditions were only suitable for minelaying and an operation of this type was accordingly ordered. Advantage was taken of this opportunity to lay mines in the Southern Baltic as far east as Gydnia.

Sorties

3. 56 sorties were despatched on minelaying. 9 (16%) of these were abortive, 6 owing to inability to pinpoint, 2 owing to technical failures, and one owing to heavy flek opposition in the Kiel area.

Moon

4. The moon was not above the horizon during these operations.

Weather

5. Home Bases:- Fine with moderate to good visibility except for local fog patches near South and East Coasts.
- Frisian Islands:- Little cloud; good visibility. Small amount of thin cloud at about 1500 ft. over North Sea.

...../s/ etc

Baltic:- Frontal conditions between 11°E. and 13°E, with 10/10ths cloud from 600 ft. to 15,000 ft. with tops to 20,000 ft. in places, also rain and electrical storms. At 14 E. 10/10ths cloud with base at 2,000 ft. clearing to cloudless further east; good visibility.

Results

6. 45 (80%) of the 56 aircraft despatched laid their mines in the positions allotted to them. Most aircraft obtained visual pinpoints but a small number of those despatched to the Frisian Islands relied entirely on Gee fixes.

Mines were laid as follows:-

Frisian Islands:-	94
Sassnitz :-	12
Swinemunde :-	14
Gydnia :-	12

7. 4 of the aircraft despatched to the Frisian Islands carried an auxiliary bomb load, and two made use of this, one against a flak ship and one against ground defences on the W. end of Terschelling Island.

Casualties

8. 2 (3.6%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation and 2 others received minor flak damage. Both missing aircraft were detailed for the Southern Baltic. The only information as to the cause of their loss is a report in the Danish newspaper "Nationaltidende" that one aircraft was shot down by a fighter and crashed south of Fano and that a second was shot down off the west coast of Jutland. It is not stated whether this second loss was due to flak or fighters.

BC/S. 26342/4/ORS.
16th September, 1942.

16/17th August, 1942.

Target	Group	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary			Casualties				Interceptions		
				Primary	Primary Area	Reached Target Area	Over Enemy Territory	Not over Enemy Territory	Miscellaneous	Down by Flak	Down by E...	Not Down to Enemy Action	Attacked	Not attacked	
MINDELAYING Frisian Islands	1	Well IV	14*		10		4								
	3	Well III	12		12										
	5	Stirling	11		11										
	5	Langston	2		2										
Baltic Plan	5	Langston	17		10		3		2	2	2 m.				
			56		45		7		2	2	2 m.				

* Not fitted Gee

Total Abortive 9

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 17/18TH AUGUST, 1942.Osnabruck; Intruders; Mineslaying.Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0920 hours. Home Bases:- Rather extensive fog likely over southern bases, but broken cloud expected north of the Wash with only local visibility trouble. 4 Group may have 10/10 cloud with occasional rain.
- N.W. Germany:- Variable amounts of strato-cumulus on coast; small amounts of cloud just inland but increasing amounts of medium cloud further inland.
- 1225 hours. Home Bases:- Outlook unchanged in general; likelihood of rain in 4 Group decreasing.
- Target area:- Well broken medium cloud expected.
- 1600 hours. Home bases:- Local visibility troubles especially towards dawn, but all Groups consider no serious difficulties.
- Target areas:- Small amounts of medium and strato-cumulus cloud over Osnabruck; strato-cumulus and threat of low stratus in Heligland Bight area.

Executive Orders

2. Results of the previous attack had not been confirmed, but the weather at Osnabruck was expected to be suitable.

Sorties

3. 141 sorties were despatched, 129 of these being ordered to attack Osnabruck.

15 (10.6%) of the sorties were abortive for the following reasons:-

Technical	8
Inability to identify target area	4
Illness	2
Flak damage	1

Moon

4. The moon was not above the horizon during these operations.

Weather at Home Bases

5. Conditions were satisfactory at most stations although there were local visibility troubles.

OSNABRUCKPlan of Attack

6. For this operation, the force was divided into two sections. The first was to attack between zero and zero + 5 minutes, and the second Section's attack was to start 30 minutes after the end of the attack by the first section, and was to last 15 minutes. The object of the interval was to allow time for the fires to take firm hold. All aircraft were to carry reconnaissance flares and crews were instructed to make every effort to identify the target and not be misled by duffies which might be located nearby.
...../The aircraft

Two aircraft of 1 Group (one of 42 and one of 103 Squadron) and four aircraft of 5 Group (two of 44 and two of 49 Squadron) were detailed to make special reconnaissance of the target at zero + 50 minutes. Zero hour was fixed at 2340 hours.

7. Section 1 consisted of 15 Stirlings of 3 Group, carrying 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries, and 15 Lancasters of 5 Group each carrying 1 x 4,000 lb. H.E. load made up with either 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries. In this section, the first 3 aircraft of 7 Squadron were each to carry 6 12-second searcher flares which were to be dropped in a stick to facilitate searching for the target. All the other Stirling crews were to be informed that these sticks of flares were to be dropped, and any crew observing them was to render a report on their effectiveness.

8. Section 2 consisted of all aircraft of 1 Group, two-thirds (carrying incendiaries) attacking between zero + 35 and zero + 45 minutes, and one third (Wellington 423's and Halifaxes, carrying H.E.) attacking between zero + 45 minutes and zero + 50 minutes, together with the remaining aircraft of 3 Group (two thirds carrying 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries and one third carrying H.E.) and of 5 Group (two thirds of the Lancasters carrying 4,000 lb. H.E. bombs made up with 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries, and one third of the Lancasters and all the Hampdens carrying H.E. only) who were to spread their attack between zero + 30 and zero + 50 minutes.

Route

9. 1 Group

Out:- Base - Mablethorpe or Saltfleet - Vlieland - Dummer See - Target

Back:- Target - Vlieland - Mablethorpe or Saltfleet - Base.

2 Group

Out:- Base - Cromer - Vlieland - Target

Back:- Target - Vlieland - Cromer - Base

5 Group

Out:- Base - Mablethorpe - Vlieland - Dummer See - Target

Back:- Target - Vlieland - Mablethorpe - Base

Results

10. 111 (86%) of the 129 aircraft detailed claim to have reached the target and dropping altogether 138 tons of incendiary and 129 tons of H.E. bombs, including 35 x 4,000 lb. bombs.

11. Owing to ground haze flares were not of much use in illuminating the target but some crews report that they were useful in guiding them to the target area.

12. The timing of the attack by the first section did not adhere very closely to the plan since only 3 of the 30 detailed aircraft dropped their bombs between zero and zero + 5 minutes and only 8 more during the next 5 minutes. The attack by the second section, however, began punctually, but lasted for about 35 minutes instead of 15 minutes as planned. For the first 20 minutes of this period there was a fairly even concentration of aircraft over the target area.

13. The reports on Gee interference indicated that it was exactly similar to that experienced previously. Most crews obtained the last fixes W. of 7°E, but a few claimed to have reached 8°E. Several aircraft of 5 Group were fitted with a simple filter which enabled them to obtain Gee fixes over the target. Except for the small number of aircraft who were able to identify the target visually the remainder bombed blindly on E.T.A. or existing fires.

14. Crews who were in the first section of the attack reported that fires were small and rather scattered, but it seems that, after the first 10 minutes
...../of the

of the second section's attack, large and quite concentrated fires were burning in the target area, and a good concentration of bombs were dropping on the town.

15. Out of the 50 photographs showing ground detail which were taken with bombing, 3 show the target while 12 more have been plotted within three miles of it, and these photographs suggest that this attack was a fairly successful one.

16. Daylight reconnaissance reveals that the total damage inflicted by this raid and that of August 9/10th is considerable although there are no extensive areas of devastation.

17. Round the Kanal Hafen destruction extends over about 25 acres, at least 30 warehouses having been destroyed, while 3 neighbouring factories have suffered moderate damage. A study of fire tracks suggests that this damage was probably a result of the second raid. Important damage has been inflicted on the Gods and Shunting Stations where parts of the main building have been destroyed by two direct hits and nearby warehouses or stores have been gutted for a length of 750 feet. Damage to residential property and public buildings is scattered over the whole town and suburbs the largest single devastated area measuring about 7 acres. Over 200 buildings have been destroyed including two barracks buildings. The Head Post Office has been damaged by a direct hit.

Other Targets Attacked

18. Owing to cloud and haze a Stirling was unable to locate the primary area and dropped its bombs on Emden.

Casualties

19. 3 (2.3%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation; 5 (3.9%) reported damage by flak (2 Cat. B and 3 Minor) and 3 (2.3%) were damaged by enemy fighters (1 Cat. E, 1 Cat. AC and 1 Minor). There were no reports of damage not due to enemy action. 1 aircraft received Cat. E damage the cause of which is not known.

20. Moderate light and heavy flak, accurate at times, cooperating with a few searchlights, was experienced at the target and many independent searchlights were active. Heavy flak and searchlights were also experienced on route.

21. 5 (3.9%) of our aircraft reported interceptions, three of these developing into attacks.

22. One loss may possibly be ascribed to night fighters, but there are no indications as to the causes of the other two losses.

23. Weather conditions were such as to severely hamper enemy flak and searchlights, and the cloud also offered cover against night fighters. This probably accounts for the small number of interceptions and the relatively few losses.

Summary

24. Ground haze made it difficult to locate the target visually but most crews seem to have found and bombed the primary target successfully by Gee, E.T.A. or existing fires, considerable damage being done. Casualties were not heavy.

INTRUDERS

25. 2 Blenheims were despatched to each of the aerodromes, Twente, Rheine, Vechta and Leeuwarden. Those sent to Twente successfully bombed the runways and flarepath, but neither of the two detailed to Vechta could locate the primary target, and attacked Eld and Nordham aerodrome, bomb bursts being observed among buildings at Nordham and on the west perimeter of Eld aerodrome. One of the aircraft sent to Rheine dropped its bombs in the centre of the aerodrome but the other aircraft could not locate the target. Neither
...../Blenheim

Blenheim despatched to Leeuwarden could identify the primary target. One of them dropped bombs near searchlights at an aerodrome on Borkum while the other returned without making an attack.

MINELAYING

26. 1 Wellington, sent to the Frisian Islands, and 2 Lancasters, sent to the Gironde Estuary, laid their mines successfully as detailed, determining their position by visual fixes. A fourth aircraft which was unable to obtain a pinpoint returned early. 10 mines were laid in the Gironde Estuary and 2 off the Frisian Islands.

BC/S. 26342/1/ORS.
23rd September, 1942.

Target	Op.	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb primary				Result	Casualties			Interactions		
				Primary	Secondary Area	Bombed other Target	Abortive	Bombed other Target	Over Enemy Territory		Not over Enemy Territory	Missed by Flak	Damaged by Enemy Aircraft	Not due to Enemy action	Attacked	Not attacked
OSN BRUCK	1	Well. II	7*	7							1 n.	1 n.			1	
		Well. III	5	5								1 AC			1	
		Well. IV	17*	15					1							
		Halifax II	3	2		1										
	3	Well. III	25	20					4	1	1	1 n	1 n		1	1
		Stirling	29	24	1				2	1		2 B		1 n		
	5	Knutson	10*	9						1						1
Lancaster		32	29		1				1		1 n.					
7	Total	129	111	1	2		1	9	2	3	5	3		3	2	
INTERDICT																
Twente	2	Blen IV	2*	2												
Beine	2	"	2*	1		1										
Veichte	2	"	2*			2										
Leeuwarden	2	"	2*			1	1									
MINELAYING																
Frisian Islands	1	Well. IV	1*	1												
South of Texel	5	Humber	1*						1							
Gironde Estuary	5	Lancaster	2*	2												
			141	3	114	4	4		1	10	2	3	5	1 n	3	3
														1 B		
														1 AC		
														1 n.		

* Not fitted Gee

* Freshmen

Total abortive 15

Cause of damage unknown possibly enemy action

MOST SECRET

784
NO. 1824207
AIR MIN. 135
NIGHT-RADIO REPORT NO. 135
20 SEP 1942
COPIES NO. 18
124
88 SEP 1942

BOEMER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 18/19TH AUGUST 1942.

Flensburg; Mineslaying.

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0925 hours. Estimated midnight position of fronts:- (1) Occluded: Orkney - Aberdeen; (2) warm: Aberdeen - Spurn Head, becoming feeble further south; (3) cold: Aberdeen - S.Wales - southwards.

Home Bases:- Broken medium cloud with fog patches in Yorkshire; generally cloudy in Midlands; low stratus developing in S.W. England.

Germany:- Variable, generally small, amounts of medium cloud in north; small amounts in Central Germany; local haze over whole of Germany.

France:- Much cloud, base probably very low, over N.W. coast.

- 1230 hours. Home Bases: Fog patches expected to be confined to areas near coast of E. Anglia and S.E. England; amount of cloud in Yorkshire probably small.

Target areas:-No change in outlook.

- 1600 hours. Home Bases No serious difficulties are expected.

Target areas:-Haze may make pin-pointing difficult on Dutch Coast; pin-pointing likely to be more easy in Danish and Baltic area.

Route to Flensburg:- Expected to be fine.

Executive Orders

2. The number of crews available was small and Flensburg was chosen as a suitable target for attack on a dark night, because it was situated on water and comparatively easy to find.

3. This was the first time the Pathfinder Force was used, but the conditions over the target were not as good as they were expected to be when the operation was first planned, and were in fact unfavourable for crews to have a fair chance of finding such a small target.

Sorties

4. Altogether 127 sorties were despatched, 118 of these being ordered to attack Flensburg.

5. 19 (15%) of the sorties were abortive; 13 were due to technical failures and 6 to inability to identify the target.

Moon

6. The moon set shortly before this attack.

Weather at Home Bases

7. Weather conditions were fair, cloud being well broken and visibility good.

...../ver

FLensburgPlan of Attack

8. This operation was planned with target finding and fire raising aircraft of the Pathfinder Force operating between zero hour and zero + 5 minutes, and no other aircraft were to release bombs or flares before zero + 5 minutes. Aircraft of 5 Group were given the submarine building yard as their aiming point while the aiming point for all other aircraft was a position 2000 yards south of this. Zero hour was fixed at 2300 hours and the attack was to last for 20 minutes.

9. The 4 target-finding aircraft were to release bundles of three flares at 8 second intervals while the fire-raisers, 17 in number, were each releasing 30 lb. or 250 lb. incendiaries in a salvo to cause "blobs" of fire which were expected to be quite unlike any dummy fires which the enemy has yet produced. The fire-raisers also carried 6 flares each.

10. From zero + 5 to zero + 15 minutes the remaining aircraft of the Pathfinder Force, loaded with H.C. or heavy G.P. bombs and all aircraft of 1 Group, except the Halifaxes and Wellington 423's loaded with 4 lb. incendiaries, were to attack. During the same period aircraft of 5 Group, all loaded with H.E. bombs, were to attack the submarine building yards from a height at which the target could be visually identified.

11. All aircraft of 3 Group, two thirds of them carrying 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries and one third carrying H.C. or heavy G.P. bombs, were to attack between zero + 5 and zero + 20 minutes. The Halifaxes and Wellington 423's of 1 Group were to attack between zero + 10 and zero + 20 minutes.

12. 2 crews from each Lancaster squadron and one each from 103 and 12 Squadron were specially detailed to make reconnaissance of the target at the end of the period of attack and report on the success or otherwise of the raid.

13. Normal reconnaissance flares could be used in searching for the target but none were to be dropped, other than by the target-finders and fire raisers of the Pathfinder Force, before zero + 5 minutes.

14. Since the southern chainway in operation Gee could not be used. It was suggested that the best approach to the target was down north to south so that the fiord could be used as a lead in; a study of the defences also made this route seem the best.

Weather

15. Frontal conditions were encountered between 08° and 13.5°E at 55.5°N; except for haze, conditions improved to the east. Little or no cloud was found in the target area, but visibility was poor owing to ground haze.

RoutePathfinder Force

Out:- Base - Cromer - N. of 54°N 5°E - Amrum - Target.

Back:- Target - turn right - N. of 54°N 5°E - Cromer.

1 Group

Out:- Base - cross coast between Donna Neck and Hablethorpe - Amrum - Target

Back:- Target - Amrum - cross coast between Donna Neck and Hablethorpe - Base.

3 Group

Out:- Base - Cromer & N. of 54°N 5°E - Amrum - Target.

Back:- Target - turn right - N. of 54°N 5°E - Cromer - Base.

...../5 Group

Group.

Out:- Base - Skegness - N. of 54°20' N 5°E - Arrun - Target

Back:- Target - N. of 54°20' N 5°E - Skegness - Base.

Results

93 (79%) of the 118 aircraft detailed claim to have reached the target area, dropping altogether 68 tons of incendiary and 154 tons of H.E. bombs.

The 4 flare-carrying sorties of the Pathfinder Force were abortive but reconnaissance flares dropped by other aircraft were reported to have been useful as guides to the target area and to have illuminated the target to a certain degree although the heavy ground haze greatly impaired their usefulness in this direction.

The attack began 10 minutes after the time scheduled and during the next 5 minutes only 3 aircraft dropped their bombs. The last aircraft to attack dropped its bombs at 2350 hours, 30 minutes after the operation planned to end. Between 2315 and 2340 hours, however, there was a high concentration of bombing aircraft. 14 x 4,000 lb. bombs were dropped.

86 of the aircraft detailed were equipped with Gee but, as the northern Chain stations were in operation, the Eastern Chain could not be used. A few crews, however, were making use of the Southern Chain and the evidence available shows that jamming was present. Most crews bombed visually while a few bombed blindly on E.T.M. or existing fires.

From the reports of aircrews it seems that both flares and fires were scattered over a large area. Many sticks of incendiaries were seen burning but it seems that a few of these were observed to develop into large fires.

All the 47 night photographs taken with bombing show open country and those which have been plotted are widely scattered. They all lie to the north of the target at distances varying from 7 to 21 miles. Subsequent reconnaissance revealed no new damage to Flensburg and it seems fairly certain that this attack achieved no results of any value.

Other Targets Attacked

A Lancaster which was unable to locate the primary target dropped its bombs on what it believed to be Sylt, while another aircraft for the same reason bombed a flak concentration believed to be between Flensburg and Kiel.

Casualties

4 (3.7%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation. There are no reports of damage.

Target defences consisted of moderate heavy flak, as predicted fire in cooperation with searchlights. Firing was spasmodic and searchlights were adversely affected by the heavy ground haze.

5 interceptions were reported, 1 developing into an attack.

Our own observations indicate 2 losses to flak and 1, possibly 2, to night fighters.

Summary

Visibility in the target area was very poor so that it was extremely difficult for aircraft to identify the target. As a consequence if any, aircraft actually dropped their bombs in the target area. The flare-carriers of the Pathfinder Force could not identify the target and reconnaissance flares dropped by other aircraft were almost useless owing to ground haze. Casualties were not high.

...../SHELVING

MINELAYING

28. All of the 9 Wellingtons despatched laid their mines successfully off Frisian Islands, arriving at their allotted positions by D.R. runs after obtaining visual pinpoints. Altogether 18 mines were laid.

29. 3 of the aircraft carried an auxiliary load of bombs. 2 of them made attacks on flak ships but the third returned without dropping its bombs.

BC/S. 26342/3/ORS.
24th September, 1942.

10/19th August, 1942.

Target	Op.	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary				Casualties			Interceptions		
				Primary	Primary Area	Reached Target		Over Enemy Territory		Blissing	Damaged by Flak	Damaged by Enemy Aircraft	Not due to Enemy action	Attacked	Not attacked
						Bomb other Target	Abortive	Bomb other Target	Abortive						
FLISSBURG	P.F.F.	Well. III	8	5			1			2					
		Stirling	7	5			1			1					
		Halifax	10	5		1	2			1	1				
		Lancaster	6	2			4								
		Well. II	7*	6							1				
	1	Well. II	9*	9										1	
		Halifax	1	1											
	3	Well. III	18	13						4	1				2
		Stirling	16	14						1	1				
	5	Harrier	15*	14			1			1					1
Lancaster		20	19						1					1	
		Total	118	83		2	8		11	4			1	4	
<u>MINELAYING</u>															
Frisian Islands	1	Well. II	9*	9											286
Total			127	102		2	8		11	4			1	4	
* Not fitted Geo									+ Freshmen			Total abortive 19			

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS, 20/21ST AUGUST, 1942Minelaying; LeafletsMeteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0920 hours. Estimated midnight position of fronts (1) minor cold; N. Denmark - E. of Hamburg - 48°N., 10°E. (2) major cold: 60°N., 4°E. - 55°N., 6°E. - 48°N., 5°E. - 45°N., 3°E.
- Target areas:- Rain and thunderstorms along major cold front. Local thunderstorms between the fronts extending slightly to east of minor cold front. Further east fine and hazy. Broken convection cloud and local showers over N.W. France.
- Home Bases:- Convection cloud dispersing; fog patches developing.
- 1240 hours. Major cold front expected to be slightly further east at midnight than was predicted at 0920 hours; otherwise no change..
- 1625 hours. West Coast of France:- broken cloud with base at 2,000 ft.
- Dutch Coast:- broken cloud with base above 1,000 ft.
- Kiel-Rostock area:- much cloud and local thunderstorms.
- Bornholm - Rognsberg:- fine but hazy, with possibility of local thunderstorms reaching as far east as Bornholm area.
- Route to Baltic:- Cold front with cloud to great heights and base about 1,000 ft. to be negotiated.

Executive Orders

2. Weather was more suited to mining than to bombing. Part of the mining force was sent to a field in the Baltic with the intention of embarrassing the enemy's object of moving the Scharnhorst which had been disclosed by reconnaissance.

Sorties

3. 65 sorties were despatched. For details of the operations see attached table.
4. 5 (7.7%) sorties were abortive. 3 of these were due to technical defects, 1 to an attack by an enemy fighter and 1 to inability to pinpoint in the Kiel area.

Moon

5. The moon, which was 67% of full, set during these operations.

Weather

6. Home Bases:- well broken cloud; good visibility.

...../West Coast of France

- West Coast of France:- Little or no cloud; good visibility.
- Dutch Coast:- Little or no cloud; good visibility.
- Denmark and Western Baltic:- frontal conditions with cloud from 1,000 ft. to great heights, thunderstorms and electrical disturbances.
- Southern Baltic:- Little or no cloud but hazy east of 13.5°E.

MINELAYING

Results

7. 46 (77%) of the 60 aircraft despatched laid mines in their allotted positions and one other in an alternative. The positions were identified; visual pinpoints in all cases. Mines were laid as follows:-

Ijmuiden	6 mines
Brest	12 mines
Lorient	10 mines
St. Nazaire	14 mines
La Pallice	10 mines
Gironde River	16 "
Kiel Harbour	4 "
Fehmarn Channel	11 "
Cadet Channel	4 "
Bornholm	17 "
Sassnitz	4 "
Swinscunde	8 "
Gydnia	5 "
Danzig	3 "
Pillau	6 "
TOTAL	130 mines

Casualties

8. 7 (10.8%) of our aircraft are missing from these operations; 4 (6.2%) reported damage by flak (2 Cat. AC, 2 Minor) and 1 aircraft crashed on return sustaining Cat. E damage, the cause in this case being probably not enemy action.

9. Flak, including machine-gun fire, and searchlights were encountered in coastal areas and also inland by those aircraft which crossed Jutland or Brittany. Only 1 interception was reported, an attack on a Wellington IV off the Dutch coast, and only 3 other sightings of enemy aircraft were reported. Wireless Intelligence intercepted no claims by enemy fighters to have attacked or shot down our bombers.

10. The 3 missing Wellingtons were all detailed for the west coast of France. One of these was seen to be shot down by ship's flak but there is no information as to the cause of loss of the others. Flak is, however, the most probable cause.

11. The remaining 4 missing aircraft were all Stirlings despatched to Kiel Bay and the Western Baltic where weather conditions were very bad. One of these was seen to be shot down by flak near Eckenforde. No information is available concerning the loss of the other 3 but the adverse weather conditions and flak are the causes most likely to have been responsible.

Summary

12. A considerable minelaying operations in which 130 mines were laid was carried out in weather conditions which were favourable everywhere except in the western Baltic. Losses were high and most were probably due to flak. The bad weather in the western Baltic, however, may have been responsible for some of the losses of aircraft despatched to that area.

...../LEAFLETS

LEAFLETS

13. 5 Halifax freshmen were despatched to drop leaflets over France. 3 were successful in distributing their load over their allotted targets. The remaining 2 were unable to locate their primaries and accordingly spread their propaganda over alternative areas.

BC/S. 26342/3/ORS.
25th September, 1942.

OPERATING AREA	Group	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to lay mines in Primary Area	Aircraft failing to bomb Primary Area			Result not known	Casualties			Interceptions							
					Reached other Target	Mining abortive	Over Enemy Territory other abortive Target		Not over Enemy Territory	Missing	Down by Flak	Down by E.A.	Not due to Enemy Action	Attacked	Not attacked				
Arandon	1	Well IV	1	1															
Arrot	1	Well IV	1	1															
Arrient	1	Well IV	1	1															
St. Nazaire	3	Well III	3	3															
St. Malo	3	Well III	3	3															
Bordeaux	3	Stirling	3	3															
Boulogne	3	Stirling	3	3															
Calais	3	Stirling	3	3															
Cherbourg	3	Stirling	3	3															
Dunkerque	3	Stirling	3	3															
Dieppe	3	Stirling	3	3															
Harlingen	3	Stirling	3	3															
Humbly Grove	3	Stirling	3	3															
Le Havre	3	Stirling	3	3															
London	3	Stirling	3	3															
Orleans	3	Stirling	3	3															
Reims	3	Stirling	3	3															
St. Omer	3	Stirling	3	3															
Toul	3	Stirling	3	3															
Wormhoudt	3	Stirling	3	3															
TOTAL HALIFAX SORTIES	4	Halifax	5	5															
			65	49															

* Not fitted Gee

* Freshmen

Total abortive 5

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS, 22/23RD AUGUST, 1942.LEAFLETSMeteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0920 hours. Estimated midnight position of fronts
 (1) cold front 60°N, 13°E - 55°N., 12½°E - Mannheim -
 La Pallice (2) minor cold front 60°N., 7°E - East
 Anglia.
- Germany:- Much low cloud over coastal strip of N.
 Germany; elsewhere behind cold front,
 variable amounts of layer and convection
 cloud and rain, also much medium cloud.
 East and South of a line Nurnberg - 55°N.,
 16°E. weather will be fine.
- France:- Variable amounts of layer cloud and
 convection cloud north of the cold front.
- Home Bases:- Variable amounts of convection with
 local rain and showers.
- 1240 hours. No important change.
- 1630 hours. Heligoland Bight:- Cloud below 1,000 ft.
- Lorient - St. Nazaire area:- Broken cloud above
 1,000 ft.
- Paris - Rouen area:- fit for leaflet dropping.
- Home Bases:- Mainly poor with local deteriorations
 due to passage of minor cold front. Local
 visibility troubles down in 5 Group.

Sorties

2. 3 Halifax aircraft of 4 Group set out to drop pamphlets over the
 Paris area. All successfully accomplished their task and returned without
 incident. 8-10/10 cloud was encountered and the aircraft relied on Gee
 to fix their positions.

BC/S. 26342/4/ORS.
15th September, 1942.

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 24/25TH AUGUST, 1942.Frankfurt; Kreuznach; Mayon; Bingen; MinelayingMeteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0920 hours. Estimated midnight position of fronts approaching from Atlantic:- (1) warm front: 58°N. 9°W - 55°N 4°W - Havre; (2) cold front: 58°N 9°W - Malin Head - S.W. Ireland.
- Home Bases:- Much low cloud with occasional rain probable in East England; cloud base very low in West Midlands and West England.
- Germany:- Much low cloud with local thunderstorms in Hamburg, Hanover area, broken medium, and well broken low cloud in Ruhr, Middle Rhine, area. East of 12°E: residual thundery cloud and local thunderstorms
- France:- Much medium cloud in N.E.; in N.W. much low cloud with base generally below 1,000 ft.
- Low Countries:- Much medium cloud.
- 1245 hours. Warm front now appears comparatively inactive. Base of low cloud in West England not likely to be below 1,000 ft. during first part of night. Outlook for other areas unchanged.
- 1620 hours. Home Bases:- Bases in operating Groups expected to be fit enough until 0400 hours for aircraft to land, but local visibility troubles likely; Kent the safest region if alternatives required by 5 Group.
- Frankfurt:- Well broken dispersing cumulus cloud; visibility only moderate.
- Frisian Islands:- Cloud base 1-2,000 feet; likely to be suitable area for minelaying.
- Routes:- No difficulties are expected.
- 2015 hours. Home Bases:- Low stratus cloud confined to coastal belt in Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and E. Anglia, stretching perhaps as far west as eastern bases of 3 Group. Visibility poor elsewhere but good enough for operations at most bases, 1 and 4 Group having most difficulty. Slight rain likely in western part of 3 Group, but no cloud below 1,500 feet. 91 and western part of 92 Group not suitable for diversions.

Executive Orders

2. Weather conditions necessitated the selection of a target as far south as possible. Frankfurt was selected as one within convenient range.

Sorties

3. 235 sorties were despatched, 226 being sent to attack Frankfurt.

...../over

29 (12.3%) of the sorties were abortive; 24 of these were due to technical defects, and 2 aircraft were unable to obtain pinpoints, while 3 more returned after being attacked by enemy night fighters.

Moon

4. The moon, which was 98% of full, was above the horizon throughout operations.

Weather at Home Bases

5. Patches of mist developed in 1, 4 and 5 Groups soon after dark, turning to fog in 4 and 5 Groups by 0100 hours; visibility improved a little by 0200 hours. Rain spread from the west to the west of 91 and 5 Groups by 0400 hours, reaching 1 and 4 Groups by 0400 hours and East Anglia by 0600 hours.

FRANKFURT

Plan of attack

6. The attack on Frankfurt was planned in three sections. Between 23.00 and 23.05 hours 20 aircraft of the Pathfinder Force were to mark the target by releasing either 30 lb. or 250 lb. incendiary loads in a salvo in order to produce blobs of fire at the aiming point.

7. At 23.38 hrs. and no earlier, aircraft of the second section were to attack with incendiaries. In this section were included the remaining aircraft of the Pathfinder Force, Stirlings and Wellingtons loaded with 4 lb. incendiaries and Halifaxes and Lancasters with loads of 1000 lb. H.E. or 4,000 lb. H.E. bombs made up with incendiaries, about $\frac{1}{3}$ of the aircraft of 1 Group, $\frac{1}{2}$ of the aircraft of 3 Group and $\frac{1}{2}$ the aircraft of 5 Group, with loads of 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries or mixed loads of 4,000 lb. H.E. made up with one or other of these types of incendiaries. The attack by this section was to be completed by 23.59 hours.

8. Remaining aircraft of 1, 3 and 5 Groups were to attack with H.E. between 23.55 and 0010 hours.

9. Aircraft of the Pathfinder Force were to follow the route: Base - Reading - Le Crotoy - Target, and return to 8 miles due west of Le Crotoy - Clacton - Base. In order that these aircraft might complete their task undisturbed no aircraft of sections 2 or 3 was to attack before 23.38 hrs.

10. Aircraft of sections 2 and 3 were to follow the route: Base - Orfordness - Furnes - Mons - Target, returning to base via Courtrai and Furnes, although some aircraft of 1 Group were to cross the English coast at Southwold on the outward and return journey.

11. It was expected that Gee would be effective at least as far as Mons on the outward journey and navigators were advised to obtain as accurate fixes as possible in order to check wind velocity before that point. It was hoped that the range of Gee might be extended well beyond that point by reason of the modifications made to Gee sets.

12. Aircraft of 5 Group at the Station Commanders' discretion, were permitted to carry flares, but these were not to be used anywhere before 23.45 hours. Aircraft of 1 Group were not permitted to use flares. The crew of each Lancaster squadron was detailed to reconnoitre the target at the end of the period of attack (0010 hours).

Weather

13. No cloud was encountered over the N. Sea and visibility was good. On the Continent aircraft found broken strato-cumulus cloud, increasing to 8-10/10 at above 8,000 feet over Frankfurt; ground haze was also reported in the target area.

Results

14. 172 (76%) of the 226 aircraft detailed claim to have reached the target.

area, dropping altogether 221 tons of incendiary and 167 tons of H.E. bombs. 55 x 4,000 lb. bombs were dropped.

15. The Pathfinder Force was late in arriving over the target since only 3 aircraft dropped their bombs before 23.40 hours. Only 6 aircraft, however, made their attack after 0010 hours, the time planned for the operation to end. It seems that most of the Pathfinder Force as well as the other two sections attacked between 23.40 and 0010 hours, there being a good and quite even concentration of aircraft over the target area during this period.

16. 190 of the aircraft detailed were equipped with modified Gee sets. Reports have been received from 154 navigators and the results obtained were a great improvement on those obtained before the introduction of the modification. The estimated limit to which fixes could be assured was 7°30'E. (i.e. about 400 miles from Daventry). Very few navigators were able to state that jamming existed although there was a sufficient number who experienced signs which leave no doubt that the jammers were operative. Their evidence was supported by the evidence of a sortie by 1474 Flight using an unmodified set. 13 fixes, 3 on the target, were obtained east of 6°3', which means that in exceptional instances the Gee coverage exceeded 425 miles from Daventry.

17. Owing to ground haze and the large amount of cloud it seems that the blobs of fire which were to be made by the Pathfinder Force were seen by only a few aircraft. The weather conditions also impaired the usefulness of the flares. Most crews report that fires were scattered over a wide area around the target although there seem to have been concentrated fires in some districts.

18. The night photographs suggest that this raid was not very successful. 48 photographs taken with bombing show ground detail and all these show open country. Those which have been plotted are all N.W. of the target at distances ranging from 4½ to 14 miles; most of these lie in an area centering on the village of Steinbach, 6 miles from Frankfurt. A fire trace taken from the print of a single aircraft shows about 10 sticks of incendiaries burning in this area. Two other photographs show a group of fires with decoy characteristics, but as no recent day cover of the area is available it is not possible to say definitely that the diversion of effort was due to a decoy.

19. Subsequent daylight reconnaissance revealed that a small number of aircraft did in fact bomb Frankfurt. There is a single area of damage in the town where approximately 4 acres have been devastated by fire. This consisted of sheds and warehouses, 2 of which, each measuring approximately 3,000 square yards, and 3 small buildings, have been gutted. A large U-shaped building has suffered very severe fire damage, and a small building has been demolished by a direct hit.

Other Targets Attacked

20. Owing to intercommunication failure a Lancaster turned back early and dropped its bombs on the runway of the Coxyde/Furnes aerodrome. A photograph taken with bombing shows the target.

21. Coblenz, Treiss and Unident were attacked by 3 Halifaxes of the Pathfinder Force who report that target markers were not sufficient to identify the target. A Lancaster of the same force who also could not locate the target dropped its bombs on Wiesbaden.

22. A Wellington which was coned by searchlights and damaged by flak dropped its bombs over Bingen; another Wellington bombed an unidentified built up area, while a third attacked what it believed to be Darmstadt.

23. After developing engine trouble an aircraft bombed searchlight positions between Dunkirk and Ostend, and a Stirling, owing to petrol shortage, dropped its bombs in a forest near Prum, causing a large fire.

...../Casualties

Casualties

24. 16 (7.05%) of our aircraft are missing from this operation; 18 (7.95%) reported damage by flak (all minor), 3 (1.3%) reported damage by night fighters (2 Cat. B and 1 Cat. AC) and 3 (1.3%) reported damage due to enemy action (1 Cat. E, 1 Cat. B and 1 Cat. AC).

25. Moderate heavy flak, mainly predicted was reported in the target area. Searchlights were active, but were rendered ineffective by clouds. Intense heavy and light flak and searchlights were experienced over the coast and en route. Enemy night fighters were active, 33 (14.6%) of our aircraft being intercepted; 6 of these interceptions developed into attacks.

26. Our own observations suggest the loss of 4, possibly 6 aircraft night fighters en route. The enemy claimed that 16 aircraft were shot down. It would appear therefore that our losses were probably all due to enemy action. From information available it seems likely that the majority of our losses were incurred as the result of the heavy flak defences encountered en route.

Summary

27. The attack was largely spoilt by the cloud and ground haze which was found in the target area. The Pathfinder Force was unable to mark the target. A very scattered attack resulted, only a few aircraft actually dropping their bombs in the target area. Casualties were rather heavy.

KREUZNACH, MAYEN, BINGEN

28. 1 Lancaster, carrying a special 4000 lb. bomb was detailed to attack the towns, Kreuznach, Mayen and Bingen. All 3 aircraft claim to have dropped their bombs in the primary area. Each aircraft also took a photograph with bombing. That on Mayen shows the target, that on Bingen is 1 mile from the target, and that on Kreuznach remains unplotted.

MINELAYING


29. 6 aircraft were despatched to lay mines off the Frisian Islands. 5 of these completed their task successfully; 4 of them reached their allotted positions by visual pin-points, confirmed by Gee fixes, but 1 aircraft relied solely on Gee.

30. One aircraft jettisoned its mines and turned back owing to the compass becoming unserviceable.

BC/S. 26342/4/ORS.
17th September, 1942.

Target	Group	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary				Missing	Casualties			Interceptions			
				Primary	Primary Area	Reached target area	Bombed other Target	Over Enemy Territory	Bombed other Target		Not over Enemy Territory	Down by Flak	Damaged by Enemy Aircraft	Not due to Enemy action	Attacked	Not Attacked	
FRANKFURT	P.P.F.	Well. III	4		2				2			1 m			1		
		Stirling	11		5				1	2	2		1 B		1		
		Halifax	8		4		3				1					1	
		Lancaster	14		9		1	2			2						
	1	Well. II	13 *		10		2			1			1 m				
		Well. III	14		10					1	3			1 mC		1	
		Well. IV	23 *		19				1	2	1	2 m		1 B		2	
	3	Well. III	50		40		1			3	5	1	3 m 1 B		3	4	
		Stirling	42		33				1	3	3	2	5 m 1 mC	1 B	1	6	
	5	Lancaster	47		39				1	2	1	4	5 m			5	
Total		226		172		7	2	3	12	14	16	18	3	3	6	26	
KREUZBURG	5	Lancaster	1		1												
MAYEN	5	"	1		1												
BILZEN	5	"	1		1												
MUNDELING Prison Islands	3	Well. III	6*		5					1							
Total			235		180		7	2	3	12	15	16	18 m 1 mC	2 B 1 B	1 E 1 B 1 mC	6	26

* Not fitted Geo * Freshman Total abortive 29





BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS: 27/28TH AUGUST, 1942. 8 OCT 1942

Kassel; Gdynia; Leaflets

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0930 hours. Home Bases:- Patches of medium cloud; fog developing, probably widespread before dawn.
- Germany:- Fine; much haze in north; haze in south.
- France:- Local thunderstorms, especially in west.
- 1240 hours. No change in outlook.
- 1415 hours. Home Bases:- Inland in 5 Group and south-westwards to Kent including south-western half of 3 Group: three quarters of stations expected to be fit all night. Conditions at most stations in 1 and 4 Group favourable until 0300 hours; diversion probably needed afterwards. In.2 and remainder of 3 Group and coastal strip of Lincolnshire and Yorkshire: fog expected off sea, giving local trouble after midnight. Some bases in 3 Group may be fit until 0400 hours. Conditions fairly good, except for local smoke, in most stations of 91 and 92 Group until 0300 - 0400 hours.
- Target areas:- Kassel: fine, some haze. Danzig: fine. Nantes and Paris: thunderstorms and residual thundery cloud.

Executive Orders

2. With the moon nearly full and with fine weather in Germany, a factor which had a big influence on the selection of the target was the range which could be covered in darkness before fog made the bases unfit. Kassel was chosen as the primary target with Osnabruck as an alternative if a shorter range flight should be necessary. Prospects of many bases remaining fit until 0400 hours were confirmed later, and all available aircraft were sent to attack Kassel with the exception of 9 Lancasters which were reserved to make an attack on major naval units at Gdynia.

Sorties

3. Altogether 320 sorties were despatched; 307 of these were ordered to attack Kassel.
4. 43 (13.4%) of the sorties were abortive for the following reasons:-
- | | |
|---------------------------------|----|
| Technical defects | 36 |
| Inability to locate target | 3 |
| Attacks by enemy night fighters | 3 |
| Sickness | 1 |

Moon

5. The moon, which was 88% of full, was above the horizon during these operations.

...../Weather at Home Bases

Weather at Home Bases

6. Bases were free from cloud but fog developed by midnight on the N. Yorkshire and East Anglian coast, becoming extensive in Yorkshire and N. Lincolnshire by 0300 hours. There were only patches of fog and mist in other base areas.

K.SSELPlan of Attack

7. This operation was planned to begin at 2320 hours and was divided into three sections, the whole attack lasting for 35 minutes.
8. The Pathfinder Force was to be over the target from 2320 to 2325 hours. During this period 4 aircraft were to illuminate the target for the marker aircraft by dropping flares after visual identification of ground features; these aircraft also carried H.E. bombs which were to be dropped after their flares to discourage fire-fighters. At the same time the marker aircraft of this force were to release loads of 250 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries in salvos in order to cause distinctive 'blobs' of fire at the aiming point.
9. Aircraft of Section 2, about two thirds of the remaining aircraft, were to attack between 2325 and 2345 with 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries. The Lancasters used in this phase carried mixed loads of H.E. and incendiaries. These aircraft were warned not to bomb earlier than 2325 hours in order to avoid upsetting the work of the Pathfinder Force. Their incendiary loads were to be dropped in a stick in the normal manner and the aircraft were to be manned by the best crews available.
10. Aircraft carrying only H.E. loads were to attack between 2340 and 2355 hours.
11. One crew of each Lancaster squadron, and one from each of 103, 305, 12 and 150 Squadrons were to be specially selected to make observations concerning the raid at the end of the period of attack.
12. No aircraft of either Sections 2 or 3 were to release flares before zero + 5 minutes in order to avoid confusion with flares released by the Pathfinder Force. Aircraft of 1 Group were not to carry flares.
13. It was also emphasised that crews should differentiate between fires caused by salvos and those caused by sticks of incendiaries, and fires were not to be bombed unless they were definitely seen to be on the target.
14. Since the target was at extreme Gee range it was stressed that navigators should use fixes en route to establish wind velocity and ensure an accurate E.T.A. If the strength of the signals permitted it, the approach was to be made, in conjunction with E.T.A., along the B lattice with the coordinates B 6.41 C 37.20 set up.

RoutePathfinder Force

15. Base - Southwold - Marker Island - Target - ~~Edam~~ - Southwold - Base.

1 Group

base - cross coast between Saltfleet and Cromer - Edam - Target -
Edam - cross coast between Saltfleet and Orfordness - Base.

3 Group

Base - Southwold - Marker Island - Target - Edam - Southwold - Base.

5 Group

Base - Skegness or Cromer - Edam - Target Edam - Skegness or Cromer - 514
...../Weather

Weather

16. Occasional small patches of cloud, tops 7,000 ft. were encountered en route and there were also patches of fog over the N. Sea. In the target area crews found 3/10 layer cloud, tops 7,000 feet, base 6,000 ft., with considerable haze.

Results

17. 224 (73%) of the 307 aircraft despatched claim to have dropped their bombs in the target area. 309 tons of incendiary and 258 tons of H.E. bombs were dropped, including 77 x 4000 lb. bombs,

18. Only 1 of the flare-carriers dropped its flares at the time scheduled, another was 15 minutes late, while a third was 25 minutes late; the fourth aircraft did not cross into enemy territory.

19. It seems that the incendiary carriers of the Pathfinder Force were also late, only 2 aircraft of this force attacking between zero ^{and zero} + 5 minutes. 4 more aircraft dropped their bombs during this period, the first being at 2323 hours.

20. Some of the aircraft carrying only H.E. bombs made their attack a few minutes before the time scheduled. Altogether 14 aircraft dropped their bombs after the time planned for the attack to end. There was a heavy and fairly even concentration of aircraft over the target between 2330 and 2350 hours.

21. There is one report of blind bombing on Gee but the majority of aircraft were able to bomb visually while a few bombed blindly on E.T.A. or existing fires. Jamming was ineffective against the modified Gee sets.

22. In spite of the haze it seems that the target was well illuminated by the flares dropped at zero hour by an aircraft of the Pathfinder Force, taking a photograph very near the target as it dropped its flares. Many crews reported that the 'blobs' of fire made by the Pathfinder Force successfully marked the target area.

23. Fires were scattered over the whole of the target area but at least one very large fire was also observed. Ground haze prevented some crews from seeing the results of the attack but many report that the bombing seemed well concentrated.

24. 112 photographs taken with bombing show ground detail, 26 of these have been plotted within 3 miles of the target.

25. Most of the photographs plotted show the S.W. part of the town where a number of bursts and considerable fires are evident. Subsequent daylight reconnaissance covering only part of the main industrial works revealed a useful amount of damage. The principal works of Henschel and Sohn have suffered some damage, a building adjoining the main building having been very seriously damaged by a direct hit and the main and several other buildings have suffered from blast. Elsewhere 2 large, 6 medium, and 1 small unidentified factory buildings have been destroyed, and 1 more damaged. A railway goods yard which appears to have dealt with bulk freight has been burnt out and a barrack block gutted. About 70 to 80 residential and commercial buildings have also been destroyed or severely damaged.

Other Targets Attacked

26. 2 Wellingtons and 1 Lancaster were forced by searchlights and heavy flak to drop their bombs in the Munster area while Essen, Dortmund, and an unidentified built up area were attacked by 3 more aircraft for the same reason. Essen was also attacked by a Wellington which encountered night fighters. Technical failures caused 3 more Wellingtons and 1 Lancaster to turn back early; their bombs were dropped on Borkenberge aerodrome and in the Munster, Gladbach, and Paderborn areas.

...../Casualties

Casualties

27. 30 (9.8%) of our aircraft are missing from this attack; 47 (15.3%) sustained damage due to flak and 11 (3.6%) were damaged by enemy fighters; in addition 3 (1.0%) received damage not due to enemy action. 58 interceptions were recorded by our aircraft and 24 of these developed into attacks.

28. The number of aircraft missing is higher than normal and the total number damaged by enemy action is also very high. The ratio of fighter to flak damage is considerably higher than usual, which suggests that a large proportion of the losses were due to fighters. This is confirmed by the high percentage of attacks and other interceptions.

29. Our own observations indicate that 3 aircraft were shot down by flak over Kassel, and 2 in the Hamm-Munster area. At least 2 other aircraft were lost to flak over Holland. 6 aircraft were seen shot down by night fighters, and 2 of these can be identified with enemy claims to have destroyed our aircraft. 7 further claims, however, cannot be identified. 1 aircraft is believed to have come down in the sea, but the cause is unknown.

30. There was an unusually large number of interceptions in a small area round Hamm and Munster. This suggests that in this area a number of aircraft were lost to fighters, the majority of which were probably on free lance patrol; these were assisted by the weather and moon, and the concentration of our aircraft en route.

31. There was intense heavy flak with searchlights in a belt between Hamm and Munster, and some flak over the target. Intense flak was also encountered from the defended areas in the Ruhr.

32. It is not possible to assess the losses in detail, but it is known that 7 were shot down by flak and 6 by fighters. It is probable that the majority of the remaining aircraft were lost to fighters and that losses on this night are to be apportioned between fighters and flak in the ratio of 3:2.

Summary

33. There was little cloud en route and over the target, and the ground haze was not heavy enough to make target location very difficult. It seems that, although some of the aircraft of the Pathfinder Force were rather late the target was fairly well marked for the main force. Quite a large amount of damage was done but the attack was widespread rather than concentrated. Casualties were high.

GDYHLA

34. Cloud and poor visibility made it difficult for the attacking Lancasters to identify the target and observe the results of bombing, but 6 of the aircraft detailed claim to have dropped their bombs in the primary target area. The crew of another aircraft, which encountered intense light flak over the target, reported that their bombs were dropped on Puc., 10 miles N. of the target. All the aircraft bombed visually,

LEAFLETS

25. 3 of the 4 aircraft detailed distributed leaflets over Rheims, Roubaix and Lille. A Stirling despatched to Liens returned with its task uncompleted owing to a technical failure,

27/28th August, 1942.

Target	Op.	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack Primary Area	Aircraft failing to bomb Primary			Result not known	Casualties			Interceptions					
					Reached Target Area	Over Enemy Territory	Not over Enemy Territory		Missed	Damaged by Flak	Destroyed by E.A.	Not due to Enemy Action	Attacked	Not attacked			
GSEEL	P.P.F.	Well. III	14	8			1	2		3	3 n	1 n		2	2		
		Stirling	8	4			1	3			2 n	1 n		2	2		
		Lancaster	11	11													
	1	Well. II	14 *	8			2	1	1		2	2 n	1 n		2	2	
		Well. III	18	14					1		3	1 AC	1 n		1	1	
		Well. IV	49 *	34			4		3		8	2 AC	1 n		3	3	
	3	Halifax	12	10					1		1						
		Well. III	54	38		2	1	2	7		4	6 n	1 AC	2 E	3	7	
	5	Stirling	40	28			1	2	4		5	6 n		1 n	5		
		Heppden	12	10					1		1	2 n	1 n		2		
		Lancaster	74	52			3	2	6		2	3 AC	3 n		8	12	
			Total	107	224		2	11	29		2	30	17	11	3	18	29
GODOLA	5	Lancaster	9	6		1		2									
PLEDS	P.P.F.	Stirling	3+	2				1									
		Lancaster	1+	1													
Total			320	233		1	2	11	9	32	2	30	3 AC	1 E	2 E	28	29

* Not fitted Gee

* Freshmen

Total Abortive 43

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COPY NO. 116 17 OCT 1942

URS

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS 28/29TH AUGUST 1942.Nurnburg; Saarbrucken; LeafletsMeteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0920 hours. Home Bases:- Yorkshire: fog developing.
Lincolnshire: fog patches, risk of local thunderstorms. East Anglia and S. England: local thunderstorms and fog patches.
- Germany:- Fine; hazy.
- France:- Scattered thunderstorms in central and Eastern France. Thunderstorms widespread in west.
- 1230 hours. No change in outlook.
- 1610 hours. Home Bases:- Possibility of local fog after 0100 hours, widespread in some places by 0400 hours, but many stations fit between 0400 hours and dawn.
- Target areas:- Fine, with some haze.

Executive Orders

2. Nurnburg was chosen as a target for those aircraft which were capable of operating at that range, and the less experienced crews and the shorter ranged aircraft were given Saarbrucken as their target.

Sorties

3. 275 sorties were despatched, 159 being sent to Nurnburg and 113 to Saarbrucken.

49 (17.8%) of the sorties were abortive for the following reasons:

Technical failures	38
Attacks by enemy fighters	6
Inability to identify target	1
Coned by searchlights	1
Flak damage	1
Sickness	1
Late take off	1

Moon

4. The Moon which was 81% of full, was above the horizon during these operations.

Weather at Home Bases

5. Weather conditions was mainly fine although mist or fog formed in the northern base area causing the bases of 1 and 4 Groups to become unserviceable after 0100 hours. The majority of the other bases remained fit but the reflection of the moonlight on thick haze made diversions necessary in some cases.

NURNBURGPlan of Attack

6. Zero hour was fixed at 0000 hours and the attack was to last for 30 minutes.

...../7

7. Aircraft of the Pathfinder Force were detailed to mark the target for the main force by attacking between 0000 and 0005 hours. 5 aircraft of this force carried loads of reconnaissance flares and H.E. bombs: the flares were to be released in strings, to illuminate the target. 15 aircraft carried loads of 250 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries which were to be released in salvoes to cause "blob" fires; each of these aircraft also carried two special target marker flares, burning red and emitting green stars which were to be dropped over the correct aiming point, when positively identified, to assure the main force that the fires were genuine.

8. The second section of the attack consisted of Lancasters, carrying 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiary loads made up with H.E. and about three quarters of the aircraft of 3 Group carrying maximum economical loads of 4 lb. or 30 lb. incendiaries. These aircraft were not to attack or release reconnaissance flares before 0005 hours and their attack was to end at 0020 hours.

9. The third section consisted of the unqualified crews of the Pathfinder Force and 3 and 5 Groups and all the Halifaxes of 1 Group which were detailed for this target; they were to carry loads of H.E. bombs. 3 Lancasters (from Coningsby) each carried 1 x 8000 lb. H.C. bomb. The time over the target for this section was from 0015 to 0030 hours.

10. One Halifax crew and one crew from each Lancaster squadron were to reconnoitre the target at 0100 hours and report on the success or otherwise of the raid. The attack was to be carried out from as low a height as possible according to weather conditions and the intensity of the defences, but not lower than 4,000 ft.

11. The target was far beyond the limit of Gee coverage and so the homing procedure was not to be attempted for target approach. Emphasis was to be laid on the importance of using Gee fixes on the outward journey to check wind velocity and assist in accurate D.R. and E.T.A.

Route

12. P.F.F. Base - Orfordness - Furnes - Worms - Target - Speyer - Le Touquet - Orfordness - Base.
- 1 Group Base - Orfordness - Furnes - Worms - Target - Speyer - Le Touquet - Beachy Head - Base.
- 3 Group Base - Orfordness - Furnes - Worms - Target - Speyer - Le Touquet - Orfordness - Base.
- 5 Group Base - Orfordness - Furnes - Worms - Target - Speyer, Worms or Trier - Le Touquet or Furnes - Orfordness - Base.

Weather

13. Mist and fog patches were encountered over the N. Sea and large amounts of convection cloud and thunderstorms in the area of the Ardennes.

There was no cloud over the target but moderate haze was reported.

Results

14. 101 (63.5%) of the 159 aircraft detailed claim to have attacked the primary target with 110 tons of incendiary and 14.5 tons of H.E. bombs. 45 x 4,000 lb. and 1 x 8000 lb bombs were dropped.

15. Only 15 aircraft of the Pathfinder Force attacked during the time scheduled: 1 aircraft of this force carrying incendiaries was 25 minutes early and another carrying flares, was 22 minutes early; a third aircraft dropped flares 2 minutes before zero hour. 15 aircraft dropped their bombs after the time planned. Between 0008 and 0035 hours, however, there was an even concentration of aircraft over the target area.

16. All aircraft were able to bomb visually. There are a few reports of G being unserviceable but there is no evidence to show that this was due to jamming by the enemy.

17. It seems that the red and green marker flares as well as the 'blob' fires were effective, there being many reports of their usefulness for target identification. Large fires were observed in the centre of the town and many smaller fires were also seen in the target area; crews reported that the main fires were very concentrated. Towards the end of the attack the heavy pull of smoke made the observation of results more difficult.

18. 61 photographs taken with bombing show ground detail; 3 of these show the target and 27 more have been plotted within 3 miles of it. The night photographs show many fires and smoke over the town, particularly the southern half, in the rally area to the south east. 2 photographs taken with bombing by aircraft claiming to have attacked Nurnburg, are actually of Augsburg.

19. Subsequent daylight cover shows that severe damage has been done to residential and industrial buildings. The most concentrated area of damage lies to the east of the main railway station and includes one area of burnt out houses extending over approximately 10 acres. There are 7 more large areas of devastation, including 3 heavy H.E. incidents causing damage over $\frac{3}{2}$, $1\frac{1}{2}$ and $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres respectively. Damage has been caused to both the H.A.N. and Siemens - Schukert Works, though not to any vital parts. At H.A.N. a long shed has been destroyed, 3 buildings severely damaged, and others have suffered from blast. Most of these buildings are thought to have been stores. One medium building at Siemens has also been demolished. Elsewhere, about 45 industrial and factory buildings have been destroyed or severely damaged. Three railway goods sheds have been destroyed and one damaged. At Nurnburg A/D a large hangar and two adjacent buildings have been damaged. In addition to the four large areas already mentioned over 130 residential and commercial buildings have been destroyed or severely damaged.

Other Targets Attacked

20. Stuttgart, Saarbrucken, Schwabach, Erlangen, Augsburg and an unidentified built up area were bombed by single aircraft which were unable to locate the primary target while for the same reason 2 aircraft claim to have dropped their bombs on Munich. A Lancaster after being hooded by searchlights dropped its bombs on Mannheim and another Lancaster, driven out of course by heavy flak, attacked a built up area believed near Augsburg. The bombs of a Halifax dropped over Furth directly the bomb doors were opened.

Casualties

21. 21(13.2%) of the aircraft detailed are missing while 15 suffered damage, 6 due to fighters, 4 to flak, and 5 not due to enemy action. 12 aircraft were attacked by enemy fighters and 8 more enemy fighters were sighted without an attack developing.

22. The proportion damaged by flak is low (2.5%) but the proportions attacked (7.5%) and damaged (3.8%) by fighters are higher than usual. This suggests that fighters, assisted by the cloudless weather and the moon, accounted for a considerable number of the aircraft missing on this target.

23. A fairly large amount of flak, both light and heavy, with two cones of searchlights, was reported over the target area. Intense flak was also encountered in the vicinity of Mannheim.

24. Our own observations indicate that 5 aircraft were shot down by flak 4 over Nurnburg and 1 near Mannheim, and 2 by fighters in the Mannheim area. 1 aircraft lost to flak and 5 to fighters (2 controlled) may have been attacking either Nurnburg or Saarbrucken. Wireless intelligence indicates that the unusually large number of 75 sorties was made by controlled night fighters. 10 successes were claimed by the enemy of which 3 can be identified.

25. 13 (8.2%) of the aircraft attacking Nurnburg landed away from base owing to petrol shortage. It is therefore probable that some of the losses were due to this cause.

...../Summary

Summary

26. Weather conditions were very good, and the Pathfinder Force marked the target effectively. A considerable amount of damage was done, but casualties were heavy.

SAARBRUCKENPlan of Attack

27. Zero hour was fixed at 2300 hours, the operation being planned to end at 2315 hours.

28. About two thirds of the aircraft were to carry maximum economical loads of 4 lb. incendiaries and the remainder H.E. loads. The best crews carrying incendiaries were to lead the attack and aircraft which carried H.E. loads were not to attack before 2305 hours.

29. In view of the proximity of the target to the French frontier aircraft of 4 Group were instructed to bring their bombs back if they failed to identify the target positively.

Route

30. 1 Group Base - Southwold or Orfordness - Furnes - Target - Le Touquet - Beachy Head, Dungeness, or Orfordness - Base.
- 3 Group Base - Orfordness - Knocke - Target - Le Touquet - Polkastone - Base.
- 4 Group Base - Orfordness - Furnes - Target - Furnes - Orfordness - Base.
- 5 Group Base - Orfordness - Furnes - Target - Le Touquet - Shorchan - Base.

Weather

31. Only small amounts of medium cloud were found over the target area.

Results

32. 78 (69%) of the 113 aircraft despatched claim to have dropped their bombs in the target area. 61 tons of incendiary and 56 tons of H.E. bombs were dropped including 9 x 4,000 lb. bombs.

33. 3 aircraft dropped their bombs before the time scheduled and half the attacking force arrived after the time planned for the attack to end. The greatest concentration of aircraft over the target occurred between 2310 and 2320 hours when 32 aircraft dropped their bombs. The last aircraft attacked at 2359 hours.

34. All aircraft were able to bomb visually.

35. It seems that the fires which were started were mostly small, and widespread rather than concentrated but some crews report that a few larger fires were observed in the target area.

36. 39 photographs taken with bombing show ground detail but only 4 of these have been plotted within 3 miles of the target. The night photographs suggest that this attack achieved no great measure of success. No daylight cover has since been obtained. All the 4 photographs taken within 3 miles of the target were secured by 408 Squadron. One of these is exceptionally clear and shows a 2000 lb. bomb bursting in the S.E. quarter of the town.

Other Targets Attacked

37. 1 of 3 aircraft which were unable to identify the primary target dropped its bombs on Mainz while another attacked a military camp near Saarbrucken and observed its bomb burst across the huts. The third aircraft bombed a bridgehead W. of Karlsruhe and saw its bombs burst across the road and nearby houses.

...../Casualties

Casualties

38. 10 (8.9%) of the sorties are missing and 18 aircraft were damaged, 10 of these by flak and 3 by fighters while 5 cases of damage were not due to enemy action.

39. The proportion of attacks is even higher than that for the Nurnburg raid but the proportion of fighter damage is lower. Moderate heavy flak with a few searchlights was reported over the target.

40. From our own observations it appears that 1 aircraft was lost to a controlled night fighter near Saarbrucken. Details of the other aircraft seen shot down on this night are given in the account of the Nurnburg casualties.

Summary

41. This attack was not as successful as that against Nurnburg. No daylight reconnaissance cover has yet been obtained but it seems that the attack was scattered over a wide area.

LEAFLETS

42. 2 Halifaxes distributed leaflets successfully over Paris but a third Halifax, despatched to Vichy, was forced by a technical failure to turn back soon after the take-off.

BC/S. 26342/3/ORS.
1st October, 1942.

Target	Op.	Type	No. of Sorties	Aircraft claiming to attack		Aircraft failing to bomb Primary			Casualties			Interceptions			
				Primary Area	Primary Area	Reached Target Area	Over Enemy Territory	Not over Enemy Territory	Missing	Damaged by Flak	Damaged by Enemy Action	Not due to Enemy Action	Not attacked	Not attacked	
NURNBURG	P.P.P.	Well. III	7	3			2	1					2	1	
		Stirling	7	3			1	1	2		1 m		1 B 1 m		
		Halifax	8	5				1		2					
		Lancaster	8	7					1						
		Halifax	5	3		1				1					
		Well. III	11	17			3	2	2	10	1 m	1 AC	1 m	2	1
		Stirling	27	17			2	1	4	3	1 m	2 AC	1 B	2	4
Total	159	102	1	10	8	17	21	4	6	5	12	8			
SAARBRUCKEN	1	Well. II	11	6			1	2	2			1 B	1	1	
		Well. III	11	9				2	2		1 AC	1 m	2	1	
		Well. IV	37*	26	1			2	5	3	1 B 4 m	1 AC	4		
		Halifax	2	1						1					
		Well. III	8	7			1				1 E 1 m	1 m		2	
		Stirling	1	1											
		Well. III	4	2			1			1				1	
Total	113	78	1	2	7	13	10	10	3	5	12	6			
PARIS	4	Halifax	2+	2											
		Halifax	1+					1							
Total	275	182	1	3	12	15	31	31	1 B 2 B 1 AC 10 m	2 B 3 AC 1 m 3 m	2 B 1 B 2 AC 5 m	24	14		

* Not fitted Gee + Prehmen Total Abortive 4

NIGHT RAID REPORT NO. 2 OCT 1942

COPY NO. 1

BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS, 31ST AUGUST/
1ST SEPTEMBER, 1942.

301
8 OCT

Meteorological Advice Submitted to the Command

1. 0930 hours. Estimated midnight position of fronts (1) occluded: Oban - 58°N. 4°E. becoming warm to Berlin and cold to Heligoland Bight and southwards. (2) cold: Oban - Spurn Head - Yarmouth - east of Paris - Pyrenees.
- Germany:- Residual convection cloud with breaks and scattered thunderstorms, conditions better in south than north. In Heligoland Bight - West Baltic area much low cloud and rain; freezing level 8,000 - 10,000 ft.
- N.W. France: Convection cloud with breaks behind cold front.
- Home Bases: Cloud breaking and lifting; patches of fog. Belt of rain and low cloud along cold front in Yorkshire and off east coast.
- 1250 hours. No change except that position of front (2) is doubtful and conditions at home bases therefore doubtful.
- 1605 hours. South-west Germany:- Small amount of cloud probable.
- North Denmark:- Much cloud with base about 1000 ft. or possibly lower.
- Routes:- Thundery conditions over much of routes with towering cloud and icing above 10,000 feet.
- Home Bases:- All expected to be fit for take off but for return low stratus at 600 feet or local fog, with threat of local thunderstorms in south, and at least 50% of bases unfit.
- 2150 hours. Home Bases:- Almost all bases in 1, 4 and 5 Groups and 75% of 3 Group's bases are liable to be unfit by dawn. Only 1 station on 92 Group reliable for diversion, but some stations in 2 Group may be available. The only other reliable diversion area is East Scotland.

Sorties

2. 5 Lancasters were despatched to lay mines in the Kattegat. 2 were successful and laid 10 mines but the remaining 3 were unable to obtain pinpoints and either jettisoned their mines safe or returned them to base. No damage was sustained by our aircraft and there were no interceptions by enemy aircraft or other incidents of note.

BC/S. 26342/1/ORS.
17th September, 1942.